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ABSTRACT
This study examines the evolution of federal regulation
of news, political and public affairs programming over
radio and television. It focuses principally on the
Fairness Doctrine, which regulates news and public
affairs programming, and on the Equal Time law, which
governs political programming.
First, the study analyzes the statutes as regulatory
mechanisms, which were enacted in response to the
introduction of radio and television in American
culture. It explores the hypothesis that Congress and
the FCC enacted the Equal Time law and the Fairness
Doctrine owing to fears that an unregulated broadcast
industry might exert an excessive influence over
American public opinion and political institutions.
Second, it examines debates between supporters and
critics of both statutes, and places their arguments in
the broader. context of first amendment law.
Third, it analyzes the validity of the spectrum scarcity
rationale for the Fairness Doctrine and the Equal Time
law, particularly in light of the such emerging
communications technologies as cable television and
satellites.
By looking at the origin and historical development of
the Fairness Doctrine and the Equal Time law and by
evaluating both statute's effectiveness, the study
questions their value, force and necessity in the modern
media marketplace.
Thesis Supervisor: Alan Brinkley, Ph.D.
Title: Associate Professor of History,
Harvard University
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INTRODUCTION
6
Years ago, Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis
warned that well-intended laws can be the most
pernicious. "Experience should teach us to be most on
guard to protect liberty when the government's purposes
1
are beneficient...," Brandeis wrote.
This study examines a law and a regulation, which
were intended for beneficient purposes. Enacted in an
earlier time under different conditions, each attempted
to enhance the average citizen's knowledge of the world
he lived in and the issues that affect his life. But as
time and tide have changed, the utility of the laws has
come increasingly into question. What were initially
touted as positive effects became more suspect, more
partial, more inhibiting, more troubling.
The specific focus of the study is federal
regulation of television news and political
programming. It explains the evolution of Equal Time, a
law regulating political programming, and of the
Fairness Doctrine, a regulation which governs tv news
and public affairs programming. Equal Time requires
7
broadcasters to provide political candidates with access
to the airwaves on equal terms. The Fairness Doctrine
imposes two obligations on broadcasters. First, the
Fairness Doctrine requires broadcasters to provide
controversial news and public affairs programming.
Second, it requires broadcasters to provide access
opportunities to issue-oriented citizens or interest
groups in response to broadcasters' editorial views.
The study argues that Equal Time and the Fairness
Doctrine define public discourse over American radio and
television by imposing access obligations on
broadcasters and by requirements to present balanced
news. It shows that Equal Time and the Fairness
Doctrine became less able to effect their well-intended
results, namely a greater flow of news and political
information to the average citizen, as the number of
broadcasting channels expanded dramatically and as
broadcasting became more of a fixture and less of a
novelty in American culture. While the main purpose of
the study is to explain the arguments of proponents and
opponents of Equal Time and the Fairness Doctrine so
that each will be more intelligible, the study also
advocates that their timeliness is exhausted, and that
both broadcast journalists and the public would be
better served by robust public discourse.
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Equal Time and the Fairness Doctrine can best be
understood in terms of two competing positions on free
speech and the first amendment, which I call the
majoritarian and libertarian positions.
The majoritarian position is the dominant tradition
in the American system of broadcasting. It has shaped
Equal Time and the Fairness Doctrine. Presidents
Herbert Hoover and Franklin D.Roosevelt, Supreme Court
Justices Felix Frankfurter and Byron White, and
virtually all Federal Communications Commissioners once
advocated or still assert a majoritarian position in
broadcast news and political programming. The
majoritarian position holds that the widest possible
flow of information to the public is the meaning of the
first amendment. It views radio and television as
instruments of mass communication to accomplish this
dissemination, and sees Equal Time and Fairness Doctrine
as useful policy instruments to assure that the public
is informed. In doing so,the majoritarian position
subordinates the free speech rights of broadcasters by
exerting the sovereignty of listeners to the airwaves
over those of broadcasters. I call this policy listener
sovereignty.
9
As the legal expressions of the majoritarian
position, Equal Time and the Fairness Doctrine place
listener sovereignty above the free speech rights of
broadcasters. Equal Time and the Fairness Doctrine
constitute historic reversals of the first amendment.
They turn the first amendment on its head by saying that
the rights of people to receive information take
priority over those of the speaker to speak his mind.
This is a novel meaning of the first amendment, and it
was expressed initially as federal law in 1927 due to
the scarcity of radio frequencies.
Spectrum scarcity is the technological basis for
listener sovereignty. Spectrum scarcity derives its name
from the physical limitations of the electromagnetic
spectrum for radio and television channels. In ruling
after ruling, the Courts and the Federal Communications
Commission uphold the Equal Time and the Fairness
Doctrine on the grounds that broadcasters are using
airwaves, which are a scarce resource, so they have
responsibilities to share their channel with others in
order that the public may be informed.
As policy instruments, Equal Time and the Fairness
Doctrine regard the individual broadcaster as the unit
by which the flow of a diversity of news, political and
10
public affairs programming to the public is to be
measured. After all, from the majoritarian point of view
it is the individual broadcaster who enjoys a monopoly
over a scarce radio frequencies, therefore he should be
responsible for its use. This implementation causes
first amendment problems. It places disproportionate
emphasis on the balance within an individual
broadcaster's news, political,and public affairs
programming, and minimizes the diversity of broadcast
news, political and public affairs programming that is
available in a mass media marketplace.
The libertarian position on free speech, a less
dominant but no less saliant position on the first
amendment, contends differently. Proponents of the
libertarian position are found mostly in the
broadcasting industry. Supreme Court Justices William 0.
Douglas and Hugo Black were also prominent proponents
of unabridgeable free speech rights. The libertarian
position argues strictly that the first amendment
prohibits any law, which denies freedom of speech. By
imposing obligations on broadcasters to provide access
to political candidates and to citizens interested in
controversial issues, advocates of the libertarian
position assert that Equal Time and the Fairness
Doctrine violate broadcasters' first amendment freedoms
of speech.
In a libertarian scheme, sovereignty resides
11
unequivocally with the broadcaster, not the listener.
Libertarians unambiguously advance the rights of the
broadcaster to assert his views. According to the
libertarian credo, the public is better served by
unfettered freedom of expression for broadcasters.
Regulations, which require broadcasters to provide a
diversity of news, political and public affairs
programming to the public, stifle the flow of news,
political and public affairs programming to the public.
Such policies as the Fairness Doctrine, according to the
libertarian view, exert a perverse effect. The Fairness
Doctrine in particular chills rather than promotes
controversial news and public affairs programming due to
its insistence that individual broadcasters balance
their programming and provide access opportunities.
The libertarian position dismisses the spectrum
scarcity rationale for Equal Time and the Fairness
Doctrine. When Equal Time and the Fairness Doctrine were
promulgated, advocates of the libertarian position
argued both were wrong-headed by focussing on the
individual broadcaster. Advocates of the libertarian
position argued the number of channels in the media
market place, not the individual broadcast station, was
12
the appropriate unit by which to measure the flow of a
diversity of news and political programming to the
public. More recently, with the emergence of cable
television and increased uses of satellites expanding
the number of channels, libertarians argue that spectrum
scarcity is a problem of the past, and that the
increased number of channels in a media marketplace make
Equal Time and the Fairness Doctrine obsolete.
By situating Equal Time and the Fairness Doctrine
within these competing first amendment traditions, this
study attempts to make both regulations more
intelligible. It strives to help to explain the
contiuning role each plays in shaping the flow of news,
political and public affairs programming to the American
public today, and their resonance in the modern media
market place despite giant leaps in broadcasting over
the past sixty years. Such a perspective is especially
important today due to the dramatic growth in television
news, political and public affairs programming due to
expanded news programming on broadcast channels and the
emergence of cable and satellites.
13
The study explores the Equal Time and the Fairness
Doctrine historically. An initial chapter explains the
emergence of Equal Time. The Federal Communications
Commission's articulation of the Fairness Doctrine is
discused in the second chapter. A third chapter explains
the first major changes in Equal Time and the Fairness
Doctrine in 1959. A fourth chapter looks closely at
waiving Equal Time for the Kennedy-Nixon presidential
debates in 1960. A fifth chapter explains the expansion
of the Fairness Doctrine in the 1960's. A sixth chapter
analyzes Federal Communications Commission redefinition
of Equal Time. A seventh chapter explores current issues
in the Fairness Doctrine.
14
CHAPTER ONE
THE EMERGENCE OF EQUAL TIME
15
Fiorello LaGuardia stood up. Just 5 feet
tall and representing New York's polyglot East Side,
Congressman LaGuardia wanted to know that the bill
before the House guaranteed free speech over radio.
Representative Wallace H. White, architect of the Radio
Bill, said it did. "The pending bill gives.. .no power
of interferring with freedom of speech in any
degree," White replied. LaGuardia pressed, "It is the
belief of the gentleman and the intent of Congress not
to exercise.. .any power whatever in that respect in
considering a license or the revocation of a license."
1
Again, White assured him, "no power at all."
LaGuardia, like many others, had cause for
concern. In 1926, the United States was struggling to
develop a national policy for radio. Radio had come
on the national scene with all the energy of the
Charleston, the brio of movies, and the wide popular
appeal of automobiles. By 1926, there were over
twenty million radios in American homes, up from 50,000
in 1921. So popular was radio and growing so like topsy
that radio stations routinely interfered with each
2
other's signals or drowned out those with weaker power.
16
Congress had little choice but to put some
national radio policy in place. Radio was growing
phenomenally and chaotically. The radio industry could
not develop radio as a new technology of mass
communications without ground rules, which the radio
industry could not develop on its own. The Clayton and
the Sherman Antitrust Acts prohibited the sort of
cartelization that would have been necessary for radio
companies to regulate the airwaves on their own. Federal
regulation was necessary due to the massive
interference, which resulted from unbridled competition
in a chaotic new industry of mass communications. But
unlike Britain and other European nations, which
controlled radio through national broadcasting
corporations or the national post office, the United
States was relying on antiquated statutes to regulate an
immensely popular mass communication. In America,
statutes dated back to 1912, when radio primarily
3
serviced shipping and ship-to-shore communication.
17
Majoritarian and libertarian concepts of
freedom of speech contended with one another as Congress
struggled to create new law on news, political and
public affairs programming to cope with the new
technology of radio. Congress had to enact law, which
would protect the rights of the majority of citizens to
receive news, political and public affairs programming
over their radios without unjustly discriminating
against the free speech rights of broadcast stations.
This was the question that LaGuardia had
posed to White: how was the federal government to
accomplish both contradictory goals of a radio system.
Based on a majoritarian position of the first amendment,
the federal government should exert strong authority to
assure a flow of news, political and public affairs
programming to the public. Based on a libertarian
position of the first amendment, the rights of broadcast
station operators to express their views should receive
first amendment protection, and the federal government
should exert correspondingly less authority over radio
news, political, and public affairs programming.
18
2In the mid-twenties, Congress considered
legislation on radio news, political and public affairs
programming among three different kinds of radio
systems: (1) a nationalized system, (2) a commerical
system of common carriers, or (3) a commercial system of
licensed broadcasters. Each would have had quite
different effects on radio news, political and public
affairs programming.
As a first alternative, Congress could have
enacted statute, which would have made radio into a
national broadcasting system, comparable, say, to the
British Broadcasting Corporation. But, by 1926,
Congress had excluded the possibility of a nationally
owned and controlled radio system. The idea smacked too
much of government control and censorship of radio news,
political and public affairs programming. With the
exceptions of the Navy, which held on to some
frequencies from the First World War and wanted to
extend its control over radio in peace time, and an
errant, liberal commentator in The Century Magazine, few
4
advocated government control of radio. In addition,
huge corporations in the United States had invested in
5
radio, and they resisted efforts to nationalize radio.
19
The commercial course for radio, and the one
travelled, required Congress to choose between two
mutually exclusive broadcasting systems. One was a
system of common carriers. The other was that of
licensed broadcasters.
Majoritarian requirements for the flow of
news, political and public affairs programming to the
public were stringent in the common carrier system. In
theory, a common carrier system most closely resembled
the American ideal of equal opportunity based on one's
ability to pay. The common carrier system would enable
anyone to purchase air time for news, political, public
affairs or entertainment programming he wished to
produce. Broadcasters would have had no discretion to
accept or reject programming: they would be required to
behave much as public utilities. But, in practice,
politicians, radio commentators and radio producers
complained that broadcasting companies censored them.
Policy discussions about radio news and political
programming within a common carrier system, therefore,
focussed mostly on such barriers to access and to
6
expression as price discrimination and censorship.
20
Majoritarian concerns about the flow of news,
political and public affair programming to the public
were no less insistent in a licensed system, but the
means of effecting majoritarian rules were entirely
different. Unlike the common carrier system, where
broadcasters would have had no discretion in
programming, broadcaster discretion played a much more
substantial role in a licensed system. The discretion of
the broadcaster as a trustee of public airwaves was the
crucial distinction, which distinguished a licensed from
a common carrier system in matters of federal policy for
radio news, political and public affairs programming.
A system of licensing raised perplexing
questions about radio news, political and public affairs
programming. Those with libertarian concerns like
LaGuardia .feared that by granting licenses the federal
government would exert its authority to define public
discourse in radio news, political and public affairs
programming. Those with majoritarian concerns worried
that broadcasters would monopolize the airwaves, and
deny all others freedom of expression without specific
federal law assuring the flow of news, political and
7
public affairs information to the public.
21
A system of licensing enjoyed greatest
support. Both amateur and commerical radio broadcasters
favored licensing. Republicans and Democrats were able
to reach a consensus on licensing as long as Congress
enacted legislation on radio news, political and public
affairs programming that prohibited price discrimination
and broadcasters' censorship.
In the odd workings of American politics, the
common carrier system received support from opposite
ends of the political spectrum. Democrats and reform-
minded Republicans favored a common carrier system for
radio due to their concerns about broadcaster censorship
and price discrimination by "the radio monopoly," a code
name for American Telephone and Telegraph. And, until
1926, American Telephone and Telegraph, the reformers'
nemesis, supported a common carrier system but for
reasons quite different from those of their political
foes. Until 1926, ATT pushed for a common carrier
system, and did so for business reasons that had nothing
to do with radio news, political or public affairs
programming. AT&T had pioneered radio in the United
States. It had developed an extensive network of "toll"
broadcasting. In the toll system, radio programmers and
22
producers paid AT&T a fee or toll for use of the radio
waves in much the same way one would pay the telephone
company as a common carrier for a long distance
telephone call. But, as radio grew into a medium of mass
communication rather than one-to-one communication,
radio reaped greater profits by selling time to
advertisers to reach potential markets and buyers, and
in doing so fit less and less into AT&T
telecommunications strategy. In 1926, therefore, AT&T
management reversed AT&T's strategy to develop radio
broadcasting, decided that the company's future lay in
telecommunications, and took AT&T out of broadcasting.
AT&T sold its eighteen (18) radio stations to the Radio
Corporation of America in exchange for several million
dollars and RCA's promise to use AT&T's wires for
8
interconnecting RCA's radio network.
The systemic issue was resolved in 1927 when
Congress passed and President Coolidge signed the Radio
Act. The Radio Act established a national system of
licensees in which broadcasters were charged to use
their discretion in radio news, political and public
affairs programming by acting in the public interest.
And to assure that the public received poilitical
programming, Congress inserted language in the Radio Act
which required broadcasters to provide Equal Time to
candidates during elections. Due to this majoritarian
23
language requirying Equal Time for political
programming, certain common carrier stipulations shaped
the Equal Time section of the Radio Act. Radio news and
public affairs programming received no comparable
protection in the Radio Act.
It is appropriate, therefore,in analyzing the
evolution of Equal Time to look more closely at
congressional deliberations of the issues of free
speech, monopoly, censorship and of common carrier or
licensing systems to explain the emergence of Equal Time
in radio political programming.
24
3The federal statute for Equal Time is:
If any licensee shall permit any person
who is a legally qualified candidate for any public
office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford
equal opportunities to all other such candidates for
that office in the use of such a broadcasting station,
and the licensing authority shall make rules and
regulations to carry this provision into effect:
Provided, that such licensee shall have no power of
censorship over material broadcast under the provision
of this paragraph. No obligation is hereby imposed upon
any licensee to allow the use of its station by any such
candidate.11
Equal Time remains in effect to this day, but with
revisions in 1959, 1976, and 1983.
In 1927, Congress enacted Equal Time as Section 18
of the Radio Act for several reasons. Political
programming over radio struck politicians directly.
Their ability to mount electoral campaigns over radio, a
new mass communications medium, were at stake. Long and
fervently held American notions that an informed
electorate reached political decisions by voting on the
basis of the fullest information supported arguments
that politicians enjoy access to radio during election
campaigns. Ideological and sectional politics came into
play. Western congressmen, suspicious of monopolies
due to fights with railroads and utilities, and
25
southern congressmen, demanding consideration for
sectional differences and equally as fearful as the
westerners of an eastern-dominated radio industry,
demanded minimal guarantees of Equal Time for the
omnibus 1927 radio bill to pass.
Senator Clarence C. Dill (D-Washington)
advanced the concept of Equal Time. Dill introduced
Equal Time as "equal opportunities" for politicians to
make use of radio during election campaigns. This
concept of equal opportunities was at once sufficiently
meaty to appease southern and western congressmen
and sufficiently vague to mollify Republicans favoring
only limited provisions for political programming.
Dill skillfully manuevered Equal Time through the
Senate and through Senate-House conference so that
Equal Time for politicians to the airwaves during
electoral campaigns became the first federal statute
that guaranteed politicians' access to voters through a
mass communications medium. Section 18 of The Radio Act
of 1927 became Section 315 of The Communication Act of
1934. Both acts are the cornerstones of communications
law in the United States as is Section 315 for
political programming. So skillful, in fact, was Dill
26
that a journalist would later remark, "He did the one
thing that in this day and age gives a man a
stranglehold on his job. He became a specialist in a
field so new, so complicated, and so interwoven with
technicalities of speech and function that there were
9
none to dispute him."
27
4The Republicans and Egual Time
The Republican position on Equal Time was
part and parcel of a larger vision of radio. The
Republican position favored broadcaster discretion for
political programming within a licensed system. The
Republicans believed that broadcasters should behave as
public trustees in return for receiving a license from
the government. They touted a policy of listener
sovereignty, but would have preferred to have left
political programming decisions with broadcasters.
To grasp fully Republican arguments about Equal
Time it is necesary before hand to place them in the
context of Republican policy toward the radio
industry as a whole. As proponents of licensing,
Republicans favored a nationally regulated system of
commercially financed radio stations and networks, which
would be under the control of the Secretary of Commerce,
along with a portion of radio channels set aside for
government and non-profit uses. They advanced the
policy of licensing and Commerce Department control due
to their primary concerns about ordering a chaotic radio
marketplace.
28
As Secretary of Commerce in the mid-twenties,
Herbert Hoover played the key role as architect of a
radio policy of licensing. Through his power at
Commerce, Hoover rationalized a rapidly-changing,
wildly-popular, technologically-complex growth
industry to function in a market-driven economy with
the minimal regulatory authority of the federal
government. Radio policy was under the authority of the
Secretary of Commerce until 1927 when the Radio Act
established the Federal Radio Commission, a five member
bipartisan commission, which was the precusor of the
10
Federal Communications Commission.
Policy issues turned more on how to control an
advertiser-supported mass medium than on how to
develop a system that depended on sources, other
than advertisers, for revenues. To that end, Hoover
began setting the agenda for legislation by
convening four National Radio conferences from 1922
to 1925. At these conferences, Hoover was able to
aggregate consent and shape consensus on policy goals
for a system of licensing among amateur and commercial
broadcasters and among the competing departments of
the federal government and military.
29
Importantly for Equal Time, both at these
conferences and through lobbying for the Radio Act,
Hoover articulated principles of a licensed system of
broadcasters, which would gird Republican senators and
congressmen in dealing with Democratic proponents of a
common carrier system. At the outset, for example,
Hoover acknowledged a public interest in radio. At the
first National Radio Conference in 1922, Hoover called
for regulation so that "there may be no national regret
that we have parted with a great national asset into
11
uncontrolled hands." At the fourth National Radio
Conference in 1925, Hoover continued the same theme of
listener sovereignty and a public interest in radio by
calling radio "a public medium" to be used "for public
benefit.... The dominant element in the radio field is,
and always will be, the great body of the listening
12
public." Despite the domination of commercial
broadcsters at the fourth National Radio Conference,
Hoover said radio was "too important for service,
news, entertainment, education and vital commercial
purposes to be drowned in advertising chatter or for
commercial purposes that can quite well be served by
13
other means of communication."
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Hoover advanced a majoritarian concept of
radio news, political and public affairs programming
based on listener sovereignty and spectrum scarcity.
Hoover argued that scarcity of channels supported the
sovereignty of listener over speaker due to radio
interference. Hoover said, "We do not get much freedom
of speech if fifty people speak at the same time," and
jumping quickly to listener sovereignty over speaker,
Hoover continued, "nor is there any freedom in a
right to come into my sitting room to make a speech
whether I like it or not." Hoover pointed out, "...
there are two parties to freedom of the air, and to
freedom of speech.... There is the speaker and the
listener. Certainly in radio I believe in freedom for
the listener. He has much less option upon what he
can reject, for the other fellow is occupying his
receiving set. The listener's only option is to abandon
his right to use his receiver. Freedom cannot mean the
license to every person or corporation who wishes to
broadcast his name or wares, and thus monopolize
the listener's set. No one can raise a cry of
deprivation of free speech if he is compelled to prove
that there is something more than naked commercial
14
selfishness in his purposes."
31
Despite the stridency of Hoover's rhetoric on
listener sovereignty, in practice Hoover granted more
licenses at more powerful frequencies to large
commerical broadcasters in preference to smaller
educational, religious, or labor broadcasters. For
Hoover, such a policy made sense, because in his view
commercial broadcasters were providing a greater
diversity of programming to the public than broadcasters
in one special area.
House and Senate Republicans advanced Hoover's
principles of listener sovereignty in congressional
deliberations of Equal Time within a licensed system
with considerable broadcaster discretion. Like
Secretary of Commerce Hoover, Representative Wallace H.
White (R-Maine), the Republican floor leader on the
Radio Bill, acknowledged that the public warranted
consideration for granting licenses to privately-
held corporations to exploit a natural resource
like the airwaves. In congressional debate, therefore,
Republicans advanced "the right of the public to
15
[radio] service," in Representatives White's succint
phrase, as "superior to the right of any individual to
use radio." Such a position is significant not
32
only because it inverted first amendment privileges
from speaker to listener, but also because it would
provide Republicans with a rationale to come to
agreement with Democrats and Progressives on Senator
Dill's compromise position on Equal Time.
In congressional deliberations, Republicans
supported minimal regulation, which guaranteed a
licensed system in which broadcasters acted as public
trustees. Representative White cautioned his fellow
congressmen that "we are here dealing with a new means
16
of communication." He said, incorrectly, radio was
competing for markets with telephones, telegraphs,
and cable. He said the public interest required no
new anti-monopoly statutes be enacted specifically for
radio.The Clayton and Sherman Antitrust Acts were in
force, and were sufficient. The public would benefit
from competition among competing communications
corporations, he contended. "A reasonable doubt
(exists] whether we are justified in applying to this
industry different and more drastic rules than the
17
other forms of communication are subjected to."
White reassured the House that these anti-monopoly
provisions in the pending legislation were sufficient
to meet Democratic concerns about censorship and price
discrimination. "Laws, narrow, restrictive,
33
destructive to a new industry serve no public good. We
18
should avoid them," he said. So that minimal
legislation for the industry as a whole was also fit
for radio news, political and public affairs
programming. Common carrier stipulations that the flow
of news and information to the public required
supplemental regulation limiting the discretion of
broadcasters did not carry sufficient weight with White.
Instead, White held up the regulatory powers of two
agencies, the Interstate Commerce Commission and the
Federal Trade Commission -- neither of which had ever
indicated its capacity to regulate political speech over
radio.
Like Republican floor leader White, Representative
Arthur M. Free (R-California) supported only minimal
regulation -of broadcasting. Free worried that burdensome
regulation would retard an infant industry. The
Federal Trade Commission with its focus on
restraint of trade and monopolistic practices, and
the Interstate Commerce Commission, with its focus on
price fixing, were sufficient federal authority to
police monopoly in radio and abuses in political
programming by radio broadcasters, Free said. Further
regulatory requirements would be burdensome. "The
question you gentlemen have got to consider," as
34
Free put it to his colleagues, "is whether or not
you are going to apply special rules to a new and
baby industry that you do not apply to any other
19
industry in the United States." Only American
Telephone and Telegraph's eighteen radio stations out of
536 radio stations in the country were cross-licensed
according to Republican figures. Two to three hundred
competing firms manufactured receivers, and over
3,000 manufactured radio parts and accessories. Free
believed that these industry dynamics, coupled with the
"public interest standards" that suffused the Radio
Bill, were sufficient to assure the flow of news,
political and public affairs programming to the
20
public. .
In the Senate, Republicans argued that
broadcasters themselves should retain maximum discretion
on political programming. Senator Hiram Bingham (R-
Connecticut) introduced a letter from W.G. Cowles,
Vice President for Broadcasting for the Traveller's
Insurance Company, owner of a Hartford radio station,
supporting maximum broadcaster discretion. Cowles was a
knowledgeable broadcaster: he had drafted a report on
radio news and political programming for Hoover for the
Fourth National Radio Conference. Cowles wrote that the
radio industry supported regulation for technical issues
like wavelengths and frequencies. When it came to
radio political programming, however, Cowles maintained
that decision-making appropriately resided with the
35
broadcasters. Cowles asserted that broadcasters would
be willing to provide Equal Time for politicians as a
matter of public service, but that they should not be
required to do so by federal statute. "It is well to
leave with the broadcaster the privilege of refusing,
as we refuse, all controversial matter, whatever its
nature, whether it be religious, political or
anything which is in the nature of controversy... "Cowles
wrote. "If we should extend to you the privilege of
our broadcasting station on an occasion when some
political discussion was existing, that is no reason
why we should be forced as common carriers to accept the
reply which anybody might make without any privilege
to distinguish between a speaker worthy of making a
21
reply and one who is totally unworthy, he wrote."
36
Democrats and Equal Time
Democrats and reform-minded Republicans
(excluding LaGuardia) insisted on common carrier
stipulations for political programming over radio. They
feared broadcaster censorship and price discrimination
would limit the diversity of political viewpoints over
radio. They did not share the blithe assurance of the
Republican side of the aisle that the public trustee
responsibilities of broadcasters were sufficient to
assure a flow of news, political and public affairs
programming to the public.
House debates of the Radio Bill capture these
majoritarian concerns about using common carrier
stipulations to assure of flow of news, political and
public affairs programming to the public. "What
greater monopoly," the Luther H. Johnson (D-Texas)
asked his House colleagues, "could exist than where a
radio company could give the free use of its line to one
candidate for office, one contender of some economic
theory, and then deny such...to those who are on the
other side of the question?" ". ... If the strong arm
of the law does not prevent monopoly ownership, and
make [price] discrimination by such stations illegal,"
Johnson warned, "American thought and American
politics will be largely at the mercy of those who
operate these stations. For publicity is the most
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powerful weapon that can be wielded in a republic, and
when such a weapon is placed in the hands of one, or a
single selfish group is permitted to either tacitly or
otherwise acquire ownership and dominate these
broadcasting stations throughout the country, then
woe be to those who dare to differ with them. It will
be impossible to compete with them in reaching the
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ears of the American people."
Remarking on rapid technolgical innovations in
radio and its diffusion into American society, Johnson
continued, "it will only be a few years before
broadcasting stations will.. .reach half the American
citizens.. .and bring messages to the fireside of
nearly every home in America." Broadcasters would
use this immense power to shape public opinion: "they
can mold and crystalize sentiment as no agency in the
23
past has been able to do."
To -remedy broadcaster discrimination, Johnson
advanced an Equal Time amendment for both candidates
and issues. He proposed that Congress require that
"equal facilities and rates, without discrimination,
shall be accorded to all political parties and
candidates for office, and to both proponents and
24
opponents of all political questions and issues."
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Representative Johnson's Equal Time amendment to
the Radio Bill is significant because it articulated
common carrier concept of news, political and public
affairs programming over radio. In Johnson's amendment,
broadcasters' rights of expression were subordinate to
those of political candidates and issue-oriented
individuals and organizations. "Equal facilities and
rates, without discrimination" is in essence a
common carrier stipulation to require broadcasters to
grant access to politicians, organizations and
individuals for discussion of electoral as well as
public issues.
House Democrats supported Johnson by citing
preferential radio rates for favored candidates and
broadcasters censorship. Representative Emmanual Cellar
(D-NY) put the matter bluntly. He told his colleagues
that WEAF, an American Telephone and Telegraph
owned and operated station in New York, charged him
"$10.00 for every minute [he] desired to use the radio
25
during the last election." Although Cellar stopped
short of saying his Republican opponent received free
air time, he said, "I have no knowledge that
candidates of the opposing party were asked to pay the
26
same amount for the same use."
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On the censorship charge, Representative
Ewin Davis (D-Tenn) took the floor. He cited
testimony by a vice president of American Telephone and
Telegraph to argue that big business censored radio
news and political programming. In testimony before
a congressional committee, ATT Vice President, Mr.
W.E. Harkness, had said that ATT routinely -rejected
applications to use its broadcast facilities on
grounds that ATT radio stations were like newspapers.
"We take the same position that is taken by the editor
of any publication. He has the right to accept or
reject any material presented to him. You cannot
walk into a newspaper office and get them to publish
anything you care to present.. .We do not censor -- we
edit. We feel if the matter is unfair or contains
matter which the public would not care to hear, we may
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reject it..." At the time, AT&T owned 18 stations and
interconnected many more through its telephone lines,
reaching nearly eighty percent of the public.
Davis decried this position of broadcaster freedom
of speech. Like Representatives Cellar and Johnson,
Congressman Davis called for stringent regulation, such
as Equal Time for politicians and issues, to protect
politicians and politically active citizens from price
discrimination and censorship. Responding directly to
LaGuardia's concern about government censorship, Davis
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told his colleagues, to the applause of the House
chamber, "I am even more opposed to private censorship
over what American citizens may broadcast to other
American citizens.....there is nothing in the present
bill which even pretends to prevent it or to protect the
28
public against it."
Democratic and reform-minded politicians'
insistence on common carrier stipulations to assure
political candidates and issue-oriented individuals'
access to the airwaves was not without foundation. In
the protracted fight over radio legislation, dating
from 1922, Congress had authorized a Federal Trade
Commission investigation of monopolistic practices in
radio. The FTC study had documented flagrant
monopolistic practices. It showed that eight
corporations -- the Radio Corporation of America,
General Electric, American Telephone and Telegraph,
Western Electric, Westinghouse, International Radio
Telegraph Company, United Fruit Company, and the
Wireless Specialty Apparatus Company -- restrained
competition and created a monopoly in the domestic
manufacture, purchase and sale of radio
transmitters and receivers as well as in domestic
and international radio communication and broadcasting.
"There is not any question whatever," Representative
Davis said but that "the radio monopoly... is one of the
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most powerful, one of the most effective monopolies
in the country.. .a monopoly, the capital stock whose
members is quoted on the stock exchanges for $2.5
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billion dollars." An infant industry, indeed.
Due to their insistence on political candidates and
issue-oriented citizens' access to the airwaves, House
Democrats inserted language into Section 18 of the
House bill that radio would be considered as a "common
carrier in interstate commerce" for political and public
affairs programming. In other words, House Democrats
successfully legislated Equal Time for both candidates
and issues out of the House and as far as the conference
committee of Congress. By inserting language that
radio was to be a common carrier on political and public
issues, House Democrats were at the edge of creating
law, which clearly defined politicians' and the
public's access rights as prior to the free speech
rights of broadcasters. If Section 18 survived
conference, broadcasters would have no choice but to
grant Equal Time for both politicians seeking
election and citizens discussing controversial, public
issues.
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As a second instrument to assure Equal Time
for both candidates and issues and to limit the power
of "the radio monopoly," House Democrats proposed a
bipartisan commission of five members, chosen from
various sections of the country, as the federal
licensing authority for radio. They contended that a
bipartisan commission would be more responsive to Equal
Time for candidates and issues than the Secretary of
Commerce, and that through its bipartisan quality would
limit the potential for government suppression of
freedom of speech. Interestingly, neither Democrats
nor progressives regarded licensing as a violation of
the broadcasters' free speech. Rather, they regarded a
bipartisan commission as a reasonable vehicle for
balancing the rights of the speaker and of the
listener. Senator Dill remarked, for example, that in
placing licensing authority in a bipartisan
commission, broadcasters need not be "under the fear
which they must necessarily feel, regardless of which
party may be in power, when the control is placed in
the hands of an administrative branch of the
30
Government." This commission would become the
Federal Radio Commission and, in 1934, the Federal
Communications Commission.
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In the Senate, Democrats and reform-minded
politicians pushed Equal Time for political candidates
and issue-oriented citizens through the Interstate
Commerce Committee. Their accomplishment is
significant because the bill for the Radio Act
assigned common carrier status to radio both for
politicians and for the discussion of public issues.
Again, as in the House debates, censorship figured
prominantly in the senate bill. The Interstate and
Foreign Commerce committee bill was prompted at least
in part by progressive senators Hiram Johnson's (R-
California) and Robert LaFollette's (R/Progressive-
Wisconsin) negative experiences with radio. One of
Senator LaFollette's broadcasts in Des Moines and
another in Detroit by Senator Johnson had been relegated
to low power frequencies, so that they reached only a
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fraction of their potential radio audiences. The bill
also put Secretary of Commerce Hoover and the Senate
Republicans on notice of strong support in the Senate
for a bipartisan commission as the federal licensing
authority.
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5Senator Clarence C. Dill (D-Washington)
proposed Equal Time for political candidates as a
compromise between Republicans, pushing for broadcaster
discretion within a licensed system, and Democrats who
advocated common carrier stipulations, which guaranteed
access for political candidates and issue-oriented
citizens. On July 1, 1926, Dill introduced an amendment
to the Radio Bill, which provided for equal
opportunities for legally qualified candidates,
stipulated that broadcasters could not censor political
comments, and relieved broadcasters of any liability for
derogatory remarks which politicians might make over
their frequency. Dill offered this amendment to
replace an earlier draft of Equal Time, which had
designated broadcasters as common carriers in
political and public affairs programming (that is, for
politicians and issue-oriented citizens) due to the
problems that Senators LaFollette and Johnson had
experienced with political speeches over radio.
Republicans criticized Dill's compromise
amendment for Equal Time on interpretative grounds.
Senator Simeon D. Fess (R-Ohio) feared Equal Time
would trigger requests from politicians' opponents
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anytime a politician got airtime even if he did not
speak about current public issues. In expressing
his concerns, Sentor Fess anticipated the problem of
bona fide news events, which also would recur in FCC's
rulings on Equal Time, culminating finally in an
amendments to Equal Time in 1959, which exempted "bona
fide" news events from Equal Time requirements. Dill
told Fess that the Equal Time included a provision that
"the commission shall make rules and
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regulations" to deal with Equal Time. He implied
that it was more efficacious to defer precise
language on such a provocative issue. "It seemed to me
to be better to allow the commission to make rules
and regulation governing such questions as the Senator
has raised rather than to attempt to go into the matter
33
in the bill."
One Democratic Senator worried that Equal
-Time was too expansive. Senator Earle Mayfield (D-
Texas) challenged Dill that the amendment would enable
too much public affairs programming over
radio,particularly for dissenters. Mayfield worried
that the wording of Equal Time was so vague that
proponents of Bolshevism might qualify for access to
radio. "If the Senator's amendment is adopted and
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becomes law and a lecturer desired to deliver a
lecture on Bolshevism or Communism, he would be
34
entitled to do so." As with the other senators,
Dill pointed out that Equal Time applied solely to
politicians campaigning for office, and specifically
excluded discussion of controverisal public issues.
Acknowledging that he had based his remarks on the
Interstate Commerce Committee version of Equal Time
for candidates and public affairs -- the version
adopted following LaFollette's and Johnson's
difficulties -- Mayfield withdrew his objection. "The
original draft had in it language which prevented the
operator from denying the use of the radio to
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anyone," Mayfield acknowledged. "That is true,"
Dill replied, "and that is the reason I have offered
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the new draft" limiting Equal Time to political
candidates.-"
Senate progressives criticized Equal Time for
political candidates as restrictive, confusing,
palliative, narrow, anemic. They advocated common
carrier status for radio political programming in an
effort to keep the provisions on Equal Time for the
discussion of public affairs in the Radio Act.
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Senator Albert B. Cummins (R-Iowa), a
Republican with a career of progressive political reform
against the railroad interests in Iowa, raised a
question of clarification. He told Senator Dill that
the Equal Time amendment would lead to confusion. The
language was vague, Cummins told Dill. Cummins said that
the effect of Dill's Equal Time amendment would be that
while radio would not be designated as a common
carrier in political programming, the language of equal
opportunities would nonetheless require broadcasters to
behave as though they were common carriers in political
programming.
Dill responded that the Equal Time amendment
only required "that if a radio station permits one
candidate for a public office to address the listener
it must allow all candidates for that public office to
do so...." This, Dill said was far different from
designating broadcasters as common carriers, which
would require them to "take anybody who came in order
of the person presenting himself and be compelled to
broadcast for an hour's time speeches of any kind they
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wanted to broadcast."
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Dill explicitly stated that the Equal
Time amendment provided broadcasters a significant
amount of discretion concerning politicians' use of
their stations. It allowed broadcasters to regulate
political programming. Section 18 required only that
broadcasters provide equal opportunities to all
legally qualified candidates if they had granted air
time to one candidate. Section 18, after all, reads
that "if any licensee shall permit any person who is a
legally qualified candidate for any public office to use
a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal
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opportunities to all other such candidates...." This
is a noteworthy distinction because it would recur in
F.C.C. cases concerning Equal Time. "In other words,"
Dill told his fellow Senators, "a station may refuse
to allow any candidate to broadcast; but if it
allows one candidate for governor to broadcast, then
all the candidates for governor must have an equal
right; but it is not required to allow any candidate
to broadcast. Or, as Senator Dill put it more
succinctly, "a station can regulate, but it
39
cannot discriminate."
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By distinguishing broadcaster regulation from
broadcaster discrimination, Dill accomplished a tough
balancing act. He succeeded in creating law that
provided broadcasters some discretion in political
programming and assured minimal guarantees of access to
political candidates. Such a balancing act made sense to
Senator Dill. Broadcasters entered the radio industry
voluntarily. Listeners paid nothing for the radio
service beyond the cost of their radio sets. The
nature of the radio marketplace encouraged
broadcasters to provide equal opportunities for
politicians in order to build up their own
reputations among their listeners. Due to these real
world incentives and constraints, Dill felt common
carrier status was both gratuitous and burdensome.
.. .It seemed unwise," he said, "to put the
broadcaster under the hampering control of being a
common carrier and compelled to accept anything and
every thing that was offered to him as long as the
40
price was paid."
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Senator Robert B. Howell (R-Nebraska), a long
time progressive and advocate of public ownership of
public utilities, raised principled objections to
limiting Equal Time only to political candidates. Howell
demanded that broadcasters be required to grant
issue-oriented citizens access to the airwaves as was
stipulated in the House and Senate Interstate Commerce
41
Committee version of Equal Time.
In legislating policy for political
programming for radio, Howell reminded his fellow
senators that voters had to know the issues if
democracy was to work. Of all congressmen and senators,
Howell articulated most clearly the majoritarian view
that freedom of speech meant the flow of news, political
and public affairs programming to the public. Laying
his ground work carefully, Howell refuted radio industry
agruments that radio broadcasters were like newspaper
editors as well as Republican arguments that
broadcasters should enjoy considerable discretion in
political programming. Howell said that radio differed
from newspapers due to the scarcity of radio channels.
Broadcasters invested in radio for exclusively
commercial purposes, Howell reminded his Senate
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colleagues, noting the high prices demanded for
sale of a broadcasting license. He countered the
Republican argument in favor of discretion by holding up
the goal of an educated citizenry, saying, in effect,
that democracy required a constant flow of news and
infromation to the public if democratic institutions
were to flourish, and that it would be marred public
policy to entrust so important a task to the discretion
of radio broadcasters. "As far as principles and
policies are concerned, they are major in political
life; candidates are merely a subsidiary," he said.
"We are not trying merely to place the privilege of
broadcasting within the reach of all so far as cost
is concerned," Howell said, "... we want to place it
within the reach of all for the discussion of public
questions when one side or the other is allowed to be
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presented."
Expressing sympathy with Howell's position,
Dill said Equal Time could not extend to public affairs
programming, specifically to access rights for issue-
oriented citizens. Industry opposition was too strong,
Dill confessed. "The broadcasters were so opposed
to having themselves designated as common carriers
we thought it unwise at this state in the development
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of the art to do it"....There is probably no question of
any interest whatsoever that could be discussed but that
the other side of it could demand time, and thus a
radio station would be placed in the position... that
[it] would have to give all [its] time to that kind
of discussion, or no public question could be
43
discussed."
Dill told Howell that setting federal policy for
public affairs programming and access rights for issue-
oriented citizens should reasonably be taken up by
the Federal Radio Commission once the Radio Act was
enacted. Right now, getting the Radio Act on the
books was what mattered, and he could not get the
bill through Congress with a stipulation that
broadcasters be required to act as common carriers for
44
political or public affairs programming.
Howell remained unimpressed. "Abuses have
already become evident," Howell countered. "We do not
need to wait to find out about these abuses...we ought
to meet these abuses now, and not enact a bill which in
the future it will be very difficult to change, when
these great interests, more and more control the
stations of this country; and that, apparently, is
45
the future of broadcasting."
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Senator Edwin S. Broussard (D-Louisiana)
came to Dill's aid. Broussard told Howell that common
carrier status did not apply to radio because
broadcasters did not make direct charges to listeners as
railroads did to customers shipping freight.
Secondly, Broussard said that broadcasters would
have no incentive to go into the broadcasting
business if broadcasting time was required to be used
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for discussions of public affairs.
Howell responded to Broussard by acknowledging
that while still in its infancy radio was nonetheless a
powerful industry. The time for enacting policy was at
hand. ". ..we are discussing a supervehicle of
publicity," Howell said. ". ..Unless we now exercise
foresight we will wake up some day to find that we
have created a Frankenstein monster... The time to
check abuses is at the beginning, in the infancy of
47
development of this great vehicle of publicity."
Howell offered methods of enabling broadcasters
to carry discussions of controversial public issues,
all of which had been rejected earlier in the Senate
Interstate Commerce Committee on the grounds that they
would be burdensome to broadcasters. Howell proposed
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limiting Equal Time for discussion of public affairs to
one affirmative or negative rejoinder. He said that if
a number of people requested time, they could either
agree upon a representative among themselves or, if no
agreement could be reached, they could draw lots.
Instead of accepting this proposal, the Senate
agreed with Dill to place regulatory decision-making
48
with a bipartisan commission.
In the end, Howell had to settle for a clause
in Section 18 that "it shall be the duty of the
commission to adopt and promulgate rules and
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regulations" on Equal Time for candidates.
As with Congressman Johnson's warnings on the
House floor, Senator Howell feared that radio was an
extraordinarly, powerful medium of mass communication,
requirying stringent laws on news, political and public
affairs programming. Howell's rhetoric about
Frankenstein indicates just how powerful Howell thought
radio to be. The potential dangers of broadcaster
manipulation of public opinion assaulted the
progressives' identification of good government with an
informed electorate, which was capable of making
indepedent political decisions after digesting news,
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political and public affairs information. Therefore,
Howell insisted on placing the rights or radio listeners
to receive news, political and public affairs
information ahead of those of radio broadcasters to
express their opinions. Hence, his insistence along with
that of Senators Hiram Johnson and Robert
LaFollette, Jr. that radio broadcasters be designated as
common carriers in radio news, political and public
affairs programming, and his opposition to Equal Time
for political candidates as anemic and palliative.
It is important to note as well that Howell's
position of common carrier designation for radio news,
political and public affairs programming is really
quite different from that, say, of Congressman White or
Secretary Hoover's position on listener sovereignty "in
the public interest."
The difference turns on broadcaster discretion
within a policy of licensing or of common carrier
stipulations within a licensed system. Howell wanted
common carrier stipulations, which would guarantee
access to radio for the discussion of public issues. He
supported common carrier stipulations within a licensed
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system as a means to the goal of sustaining an informed
electorate by effecting a flow of information to the
public for its acceptance or rejection. Hoover and
White, by contrast, trusted in broadcaster discretion
within a licensed system. White and Hoover argued that
the licensing power of the federal government was
sufficient to prevent broadcasters from abusing their
monopolies as public trustees of limited radio channels,
and thus licensing was a resaonable protection of "the
public interest." From their point of view,
broadcasters' abuses could best be curbed after a
broadcaster had violated "the public interest" in the
quality of his radio service or in the partiality of his
news and political programming. To impose common carrier
responsibilities on broadcasters needlessly burdened
broadcasters, White and Hoover maintained.
It is noteworthy, too, that for all the
differences between Democrats and Republicans on a
common carrier or a licensing system that both Howell's
position in favor of common carrier stipulations on
political and public affairs programming news and
Hoover's in favor of broadcaster discretion in a
commercially based system of licensees abrogated the
free speech rights of radio broadcasters. LaGuardia had
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tried impossibly to protect the free speech rights of
the speaker to express his opinion. But neither Howell's
nor Hoover's positions accommodated this libertarian
construction of the First Amendment in shaping radio
policy for political programming.
Dill emerged triumphant in Senate debate.
Dill's amendment for Equal Time for politicians went
into conference substantially unchanged, and emerged as
Section 18 of the Radio Act. Equal Time extended to
candidates but to issue-oriented citizesn to discuss
public issues. Politicians could command Equal Time
only if broadcasters had granted or sold airtime to
legally qualified candidates for the same office.
Broadcasters were not liable for derogatory remarks,
which politicians might make during radio addresses,
and which broadcasters would have no right to censor.
Rather than deal with the ambiguities of equal
opportunities in an effort to define more narrowly
broadcasters' legal responsibilities, Congress
empowered a bipartisan commission, the Federal Radio
Commission, to make rules and regulations to implement
Equal Time.
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Several features stand out. First, Congress
enacted statute only for legally qualified candidates
for public office. Section 18 had no stipulations,
guaranteeing issue-oriented citizens any access rights
to the airwaves.
Second, broadcasters retained a considerable
amount of discretion. They reserved the right to grant
access to political candidates. Congress required only
that a broadcaster provide Equal Time solely if he had
allowed use of his facility. In other words, Dill's
compromise that a broadcaster could "regulate,
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but.. .not discriminate" became the law of the
land. Broadcasters reserved significant power over
political programming under Equal Time, and had the
legal right to exercise considerable discretion in
political programming. To be sure, it might be a
negative power to deny access to all candidates. Or it
might be sound business sense to allow access to any
number of politicians to indicate evenhandedness about
public issues to a listening audienece. In any case, if
the broadcasters accepted the quid-pro-quo of allowing
access to a candidate one of them opposed, they had
nonetheless won the larger victory of significant
self-regulation on political programming. Broadcasters
were free to exploit radio's commercial potential
with only modest intrusion of politicians.
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Third, Congress established a bipartisan
commission and invested it with considerable discretion
in charting the regulatory course for Equal Time. This
matter of regulatory discretion is as crucial to the
evolution of Equal Time as broadcaster discretion. The
Federal Radio Commission and its successor the Federal
Communications Commission would cite this enabling
legislation as evidence of congressional delegated
authority to support subsequent interpretations of Equal
Time. And the issue of FCC discretion to make rulings on
Equal Time would become enmired in legal arguments and
political fights as to whether the FCC was acting within
its congressionally delegated authority or exceeding it.
In the final negotiations for the bipartisan
commission, Dill mollified White, who opposed a
commission in favor of vesting authority in the
Secretary -of Commerce. Dill said that the commission
would be temporary, functioning for only a year and
then from year to year until its work was done. At that
time, the Secretary of Commerce would assume regulatory
authority for radio, Dill promised. But, Dill would
remark later that he knew that a "temporary" commission
was a ruse. "I knew if we ever got a commission, we
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would never get rid of it," Dill remarked.
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These three outcomes, taken separately or together,
assured confusion. Equal Time assured broadcaster
discretion yet it provided minimal common-carrier-like
guarantees for political candidates. A regulatory
commission was to be empowered to cope with difficult
interpretative tasks. Equal Time partisans would
champion differing interpretations of congressional
intent to manipulate the regulatory commission's
decisions. Although Equal Time is precise in its
provisions, its very name, "Equal Time," suggested to
the public that broadcasters had common carrier
obligations that far exceeded their precise
responsibilities as licensees.
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6As President, Hoover blocked a law to
extend Equal Time to public affairs when in 1932 he
pocket vetoed H.R. 7716. Hoover used a pocket veto to
stymie provisions for procedural changes and greater
administrative authority for the FRC, which he wished to
limit. The broadened Section 18 included Equal Time
for people to speak for and against candidates for
political office, for and against referendum issues,
52
and for or against public issues.
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7In 1933, Franklin Delano Roosevelt became Prsident
of the United States, and so cowered broadcasters that
issues of Equal Time paled quite literally when compared
with broadcaster fears of nationalization. FDR's radio
policy was unambiguously majoritarian, particularly when
it came to informing the average citizen about the New
Deal.
In his inaugural address, Roosevelt spoke of the
Great Depression as a national emergency. He said that
the federal government must exert extraordinary powers
to cope with the emergency. Broadcasters immediately
cooperated with Roosevelt to fend off any
nationalization attempt. Some cut commentary that was
hostile to the New Deal. William S. Paley, the young,
dynamic president of the Columbia Broadcasting System,
V~rd theyPresident his willingness to lend CBS support
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f cogingwith the emergeny. "President Roosevelt if
he chose to do so might have comandeered the radio for
.the government as though the nation were at war,"
observed the radio trade journal Broadcasting, " but the
-immediate cooperation extended by radio obviated any
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suggestion that such a need would arise."
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There were as well powerful factions within the
New Deal, including labor, farmers, welfare reformers
and the universities, which favored nationalization.
Such prominent New Dealers as Secretary of Interior
Harold Ickes, Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins, and
Agriculture Secretary all favored nationalization.
Roosevelt manipulated the broadcasters against
proponents of nationalization within his administration
to get the maximum radio coverage for his New Deal
programs. With the help of White House insiders Louis
Howe, Marvin McIntyre and Stephen Early, FDR muscled
broadcasters to broadcast pro-New Deal programming, and
to give him a clear national signal for his fireside
chats by forcing the radio networks to interconnect his
broadcasts with independent braodcasters, so that FDR
reached a national audience, something neither Father
Coughlin nor Huey Long could do even with their popular
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broadcasts.
In 1934, Congress confronted Equal Time
again. And again, progressives -- now Liberal
Democrat Robert Wagner of New York and Henry D.
Hatfield (R-West Virginia) -- pushed for Equal Time for
public affairs as well as for political candidates.
Their expanded Equal Time (Section 315) proposal
resembled those originally proposed by Southern and
Western progressives in the twenties: it called for
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"equal opportunities" for access for issue-oriented
citizens to discuss candidates, election issues, and
referendum questions. The proposal also contended
that "it shall be in the public interest" for
broadcasters "to permit equal opportunity for.. .public
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questions." The 1934 proposal for Equal Time omitted
any reference to broadcasters as common carriers of
news, political and public affairs programming although
its wording of "equal opportunities" clearly intended
that effect. The Wagner-Hatfield amendment also
designated one-quarter of the radio channels for non-
profit organizations in an effort to stimulate public
affairs programming. A pragmatist like Dill opposed
the measure so that the Section 315 on Equal Time in
the Communications Act of 1934 emerged as identical to
Section 18 of the Radio Act of 1927.
On their side, broadcasters wanted stiffer
wording on libel. They wanted to be held harmless for
any libelous or defamatory remarks uttered by
politicians. Due the anti-censorship statutes of the
Radio Act (Section 29) and the Communications Act
(Section 326), broadcasters could not review
political statements without triggering charges of
censorship. In 1932, the Nebraska Supreme Court had
ruled against a broadcaster in a case involving a
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political broadcast. Referring to the anti-censorship
provisions of the Radio Act, the Nebraska Court had
ruled "the prohibition of censorship of material
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broadcast.. .prevents the licensee from censoring the
words as to their political and partisan trends..., and
does not give a licensee any privilege to join and
assist in publishing a libel, nor grant any immunity
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from the consequences of such action." Such a ruling
placed broadcasters in an impossible position: if they
demanded to review politicians' remarks, they were open
to charges of censorship, but if they did not review
remarks, then they risked suit. To remedy this
problem, broadcasters requested relief from liability
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for libel in the new version of Equal Time.
In deliberation of the Wagner-Hatfield
amendment to reserve a quarter of the spectrum for
non-profits, Senators Dill and White (formerly
Representative White) argued against reserving a quarter
of the spectrum for non-commercial
arguments were totally majoritarian.
broadcasters with specific interests
against those who did not share their
They also worried about government
assigning licenses to some educational
and cooperative organizations but not
predicted that programming costs for
stations would force the non-profits
commercial broadcasters themselves.
licensees. Their
They feared that
would discriminate
points of view.
discrimination in
religious, labor
to others. They
full time radio
to become like
They noted that
commercial broadcasters devoted significant programming
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to religious and educational programming. In short,
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Dill and White said the commercially dominant model of
licensees produced greater quantities of "balanced"
programming for "general public service" as well as
news, political and public affairs programming. Since
the commerical system of licensees provided an adequate
flow of programming to the majority of the public, they
argued that Senators Hatfield and Wagner would limit the
flow by assigning licensees to more narrowly interested
broadcasters.
The radio industry stated its opposition to
the Wagner-Hatfield amendment by asserting that existing
statutes were fine. "Almost every one recognizes
that, despite minor defects, the Radio Act of 1927, and
the court decisions under it, have established a solid,
workable and sound basis for government regulation of
61
radio," an industry spokesman told a Senate hearing.
In comparable language, the National Association of
Broadcasters representative argued against the Wagner-
Hafiel4I amendment on the grounds that it advanced
~16i .Ainterest programming. "The National
Assoeition of Broadcasters," he told the Senators,
fully agrees that the facilities of broadcasting should
be made available in the fullest possible measure, as
t maintains they are now, and either free of all
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charge or at the lowest possible cost, in the service
of education, religion, or other activities for human
betterment, but it insists that these facilities should
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be those of stations serving the public as a whole."
In the end, Wagner and Hatfield relented.
They settled on a compromise, Section 307 of the
Communications Act, which called upon the FCC to
deliver a study on reserving a fixed percentage of the
spectrum for non-profits by February 1, 1935. The FCC
report, to no one's surprise, reaffirmed long-
standing FRC policy that commercial stations served
the public interest better than non-profits. While
expressing Commission policy "to assist the non-
profit organizations to obtain the fullest
opportunities for expression," the FCC agreed with the
Dill-White position. "It would appear that the
interests of the non-profit organizations may be better
served by the use of existing facilities, thus giving
them access to costly and efficient equipment and to
established audiences, than by the establishment of
new stations for their peculiar needs. In order for
non-profit organizations to gain the maximum service
possible, cooperation in good faith by
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broadcasters is required." In making this
assertion the FCC arrogated to itself the policing
function.
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8Summary/Conclusion
By 1934, the dominant dynamic for Equal Time
was in place. Congress enacted a majoritarian policy for
political programming over radio. Equal Time functioned
within a commercially based radio system of private
licensees, regulated by a bipartisan commission, to
provide mass communications to the American public. To
some extent, western progressives and Southern
Democrats had won their point on Equal Time even if
Equal Time applied only to legally qualified
political candidates. Equal Time protected the
majoritarian free speech rights to the extent that it
imposed a common-carrier-like stipulation on
broadcasters to that extent. Equal Time established
listener sovereignty in radio political programming:
Section 18 placed the rights of the listener to hear
political information above those of the broadcaster to
articulate his views.
At the same time, Hoover, with his vision
of a national system of licensees regulated "in the
public interest," also emerged as a partial victor.
Radio took the commercial direction, providing mass
entertainment, which Hoover and later the Federal Radio
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and Federal Communications Commission supported
with licensing policies that favored larger, commercial
broadcasters. Radio broadcasters also retained
considerable discretion in political programming because
they had to meet only the FCC's "public interest"
criteria rather than more stringent common carrier
obligations. While hardly a libertarian policy, the
FCC's "public interest" criteria were much less
burdensome than some of the common carrier proposals
articulated by Democrats and political reformers in
congressional debate over radio policy.
Like many compromises, Equal Time produced
its own controversies. The progressive insistence on
Equal Time for public affairs and access rights for
issue-oriented citizens was not the least among them.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE ARTICULATION OF FAIRNESS
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1The Fairness Doctrine (1949) is to news and public
affairs programming as Equal Time is to political
programming. The Fairness Doctrine defines broadcast
news and public affairs in the a way comparable to that
in which Equal Time defines political programming over
radio and television.
The Fairness Doctrine defines public discourse for
broadcast news and public affair programming by imposing
two obligations on broadcasters. First, the Fairness
Doctrine requires broadcasters to provide controversial
news and public affairs programming for their listeners
and viewers. Second, the Fairness Doctrine requires that
broadcasters extend access to issue-oriented citizens to
discuss controversial public issues. Neither obligation
was required of them before 1949. Until 1949,
broadcasters had only to satisfy the general "public
interest" standards of the Communications Act in matters
of news and public affairs programming.
The Fairness Doctrine is a majoritarian policy
instrument. Its intent is to assure a flow of news and
public affairs programming to the majority of the
citizens. As with Equal Time, spectrum scarcity is the
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technological rationale for the Fairness Doctrine:
because there are more people who wish to broadcast than
available frequencies, those with broadcast licensees
have "public trustee" obligations to those who do not.
Like so many regulations, the Fairness Doctrine
hardly emerged de novo from bureaucracy's grey
corridors. There were many precedents to impose news
and public affairs programming obligations upon
broadcasters, dating from failed efforts to extend Equal
Time to public affairs programming in legislating the
Radio Act and the Communications Act. Both the Federal
Radio Commission and the Federal Communications
Commission had made a number of rulings in which they
asserted the rights of the public to the fullest
possible news and public affairs programming. In the
mid-forties, the Supreme Court upheld the Federal
Communications Commission's licensing authority. Writing
in expansive majoritarian language, Justice Frankfurter
ruled that the FCC could properly exert its authority
over content (referred to as "traffic" in the decision)
as a legitimate function of its licensing authority. In
the latter half of the forties, the FCC made a number of
regulatory rulings, which specifically promoted
controversial news programming. Then, in 1949, a thin
FCC majority articulated the Fairness Doctrine.
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Acting on its discretion, the FCC issued "A Report
of the Commission In the Matter of Editorializing by
Broadcast Licensees," which became known as the Fairness
1
Doctrine. Congress had not legislated the Fairness
Doctrine. Neither the Radio Act nor the Communications
Act addressed news and public affairs issues aside from
general requirements that broadcasters behave "in the
public interest." Here, then, is another aspect of
discretion, which figures importantly into defining
broadcast news and public affairs programming. Rather
than broadcaster discretion, it is a matter of
regulatory discretion. FCC discretion to "make
2
appropriate rules and regulations" to assure a flow of
news and public affairs programming to the public
enabled the FCC to issue the Fairness Doctrine.
From a libertarian point of view, the Fairness
Doctrine was doubly abhorent. First, it clearly
placed the rights of the majority to receive news and
public affairs programming above the free speech rights
of broadcasters. By imposing obligations on broadcasters
to balance stories and provide access opportunities to
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issue-oriented citizens to discuss controversial public
issues, the Fairness Doctrine imposed duties on
broadcasters far beyond those expected of newspapers,
magazines and other printed forms of news and public
affairs information. From the libertarian view, such
obligations stiffled and chilled broadcast news and
political programming. As libertarians saw it, the
Fairness Doctrine would have a perverse effect. It would
accomplish the opposite of what the FCC had hoped. By
imposing obligations on broadcasters to balance news and
to provide access opportunities, libertarians
prophesized broadcast stations would avoid covering
controversial issues rather than endure a host of access
requests.
Second, from the libertarian view, it was improper
that FCC enjoyed the authority to define the content of
news and public affairs programming and to dispense
broadcast licenses. They feared grave consequences for
broadcasters' free speech rights, for here was the
licensing authority defining program content standards
against which broadcasters' licenses would be measured
for renewal. There was a serious potential for FCC abuses
3
due to its power as the national licensing authority.
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2The Fairness Doctrine was originally a regulatory
reform. The Fairness Doctrine abolished a total ban on
broadcast editorials, which the FCC had put in place in
4
1941 in the "Mayflower Decision." In articulating the
Fairness Doctrine, the FCC intended to increase
libertarian freedoms of expression for broadcasters and
issue-oriented citizens alike, and to promote the
majoritarian goal of assuring a flow of news and public
affairs programming to the public.
The Fairness Doctrine's intended reform was
narrow. The Fairness Doctrine enabled broadcast
licensees to assert editorial views on controverial
issues. It aimed at lifting the Mayflower Decision's
black-out on editorials by broadcast licensees. The
Fairness Doctrine dealt only with editorial comments by
the broadcast licensee or a spokesman, who identified
himself as representing a licensee's views. It did not
formally cover broadcast commentators although as
employees of broadcast licensee's it would seem unlikely
serious differences characterized relations between
individual licensees and the commentators they chose to
hire.
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In practice, however, the Fairness Doctrine
redefined broadcast news and political programming. It
imposed obligations on broadcasters, which they did not
have before the Fairness Doctrine. These obligations,
which are discussed in detail below, effected an
expanded majoritarian policy in news and public affairs
programming.
The FCC's total ban in 1941 on broadcast editorials
in the Mayflower Decision grew out of a case in Boston
in the late-thirties concerning a license renewal for the
Yankee Network to operate WAAB, a radio station that
had broadcast strongly opinionated editorials on public
issues during its news casts. This case is known as the
Mayflower case because a competing company, the
Mayflower Broadcasting Company, challenged the Yankee
Network's license for WAAB on the grounds that due to
their partiality WAAB's editorials violated the
station's "public interest" obligations. The specific
editorial policy in question concerned personal attacks
on political candidates.
In the Mayflower Decision, the Federal
Communications Commission ruled that the Yankee
Network could keep its license for WAAB as long as
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Yankee Network management did not broadcast editorials
on public issues and political candidates over WAAB.
In its affidavits, Yankee Network management promised
that since September 1938 "no attempt has ever been or
will ever be made to color or editorialize the news."
The Yankee Network's attorney told the FCC that "there
are absolutely no reservations whatsoever, or mental
reservations of any sort, character, or kind with
reference to those affidavits. They mean exactly
what they say in the fullest possible amplification
that the Commission wants to give them." In issuing the
the Yankee Network's license renewal, the FCC noted that
5
" the station has no editorial policies."
Beyond the specifics of a Boston radio station,
the Mayflower Decision illustrated the stubborn
resistance to resolving the tension between shaping a
majoritarian broadcast policy, which effected a flow of
news and public affairs programming to the public
without trammeling broadcasters' freedom of expression.
In an effort to assure a flow of news and public affairs
information to the public, the FCC ended-up stiffling a
broadcaster's right to editorialize.
Spectrum scarcity was the technological basis for
the Mayflower Decision. Bandwidth on the spectrum was
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too precious to allow broadcasters to use radio channels
to express their editorial views, the FCC ruled. Due
to "the limitations in frequencies inherent in the
nature of radio, the public interest can never be served
by a dedication of any broadcast facility to support of
[broadcasters'] own partisan ends." "The public
interest -- not the private -- is paramount." "A truly
free radio cannot be used to advocate the causes of the
licensee," the FCC wrote. "It cannot be used to support
the candidacies of his friends. It cannot be devoted to
support the principles [the broadcaster] happens to
regard most favorably. In brief, the broadcaster
10
cannot be an advocate."
Spectrum scarcity reasoning was hardly novel. The
Mayflower Decision reiterated longstanding FCC policy
and court precedents that a scarcity of channels placed
the flow of information to the public above the free
speech rights of broadcasters. The FCC had stated
such a policy as early as 1929 in the Federal Radio
Commission's decision in the Great Lakes Broadcasting
Corporation and as recently as its 1940 Annual Report in
noting that "stations are required to furnish well-
rounded rather than one-sided discussions of public
7
questions."
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The reach of the Mayflower Decision was novel. It
preempted editorials entirely. It went beyond customary
FCC practice of policing public affairs programming in
considering license renewals, and of reviewing any
abuses on a case by case basis after they had occurred.
Instead, the Mayflower Decision denied editorials a
priori.
Like the Fairness Doctrine, which was to follow it,
the Mayflower Decision mixed together editorials and
public affairs programming. Rights of editorial
expression henceforth became attached to news and public
affairs programming. "Freedom of speech on the radio
must be broad enough to provide full and equal
opportunity for the presentation to the public of all
8
sides of public issues," the FCC ruled. "Radio can
serve as an instrument of democracy only when devoted to
the communication of information freely and
9
objectively communicated." By broadcasting opinionated
editorials on a candidate without providing such
counterbalancing news as his rebuttal, the Yankee
Network had neither fully nor objectively informed the
public, and hence was derelict as a public trustee.
By accepting a license, the FCC ruled, broadcasters
"assumed the obligation for presenting all sides of
important public issues, fairly, objectively and
10
without bias."
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But, unlike the Fairness Doctrine which exerts a
significant influence over policy for broadcast news and
public affairs programming, the Mayflower Decision had a
mostly formal impact. It forbade licensees such as the
Yankee Network from editorializing but it did not
strictly deny a radio commentators, employed by
licensees, from editorializing on public issues. It
applied to commentators only if -they stated they were
speaking for the licensee. Commentators continued to
remark on the news, public affairs and
politicians, doing so as individual commentators and
not as advocates of the licensees.
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3A number of court decisions and FCC rulings created
a basis for the FCC to modify the Mayflower Decision.
The Supreme Court's decision in the Network case (1943),
the FCCs Blue Book (1946), and three FCC rulings
(1945,1946, 1946)each in its own way contributed to the
articulation of "fairness" as a doctrine in 1949. All
advanced the majoritarian position that the flow of news
and information to the public had priority over the free
speech rights of broadcasters. Each applied majoritarian
rulings on freedom of expression to a number of facets
of the radio industry. Cumulatively, these decisions
affirmed FCC policy that its enabling legislation, its
own body of regulatory precedents, and a Supreme Court
ruling--upholding its licensing authority--all supported
FCC rule making on editorial expression and public
affairs programming.
In the Network case, Justice Felix Frankfurter
affirmed the constitutionality of FCC licensing
authority in expansive majoritarian language. Supreme
Court imprimatur on FCC licensing authority helped to
set the stage for a more active regulatory role by the
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FCC in programming content. Frankfurter ruled that a
national radio system was unworkable without licensing
due to spectrum scarcity. Frankfurter called the
scarcity of channels radio's "unique
11
characteristic." "Because [radio] cannot be used
by all, some who wish to use it must be denied." The
FCC had been established to effect maximum efficiency
of the radio spectrum by granting licenses,
Frankfurter wrote. He ruled, accordingly, that the FCC
was correctly applying its licensing authority over
the National Broadcasting Company as "a proper exercise
12
of its power over commerce."
Frankfurter's majoritarian language supported
later FCC's policy statements, particularly the Fairness
Doctrine, which forcefully reminded broadcasters that
they were licensees. He rejected NBC arguments that
_ breaking-up its networks constituted a violation of its
F irst Amendment freedoms of expression. The FCC was not
denying the free speech of NBC and/or its affiliates
-by denying a station or in this case an entire radio
network licenses to broadcast. Rather, Frankfurter wrote
that the FCC was exercising its authority to regulate
13
the airwaves "in the public interest."
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Following the Second World War, the FCC put itself
on record forcefully by asserting that public affairs
programming constituted the public interest, and that it
would consider "balance" in public affairs programming
in issuing licenses. In 1946, the FCC published the
Public Service Responsibility of Broadcast Licensees, a
book of standards that became known in the trade as the
14
Blue Book. The FCC published the Blue Book in
anticipation of more AM and FM radio stations and the
commercial emergence of television. There is also a
hint that the emergence of United States international
leadership following the Second World War encouraged
Blue Book writers that the flow of diverse, high quality
news and public affairs programming to the American
public constituted the public interest due to new
international responsibilities.
In the Blue Book, the FCC championed its
recommendation for public affairs programming under
the banners of diversity and excellence. It
deplored the preponderance of soap operas over
news, public affairs and classical music. The
Blue Book went on to document that network
affiliates routinely rejected network-produced
public affairs shows by substituting music and
light entertainment for more serious news, public
15
affiars and cultural programming.
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The writers of the Blue Book also saw a variant of
"private" censorship, which had worried some members
of Congress in the twenties. Blue Book writers worried
that the broadcasters' dependencies on advertising,
and the advertisers' insistence that radio programming
offend no segment of any potential market combined so
that radio did not serve the "public interest" as
fully as its promise. Hence, their call for more public
16
affairs programming and classical music. They quoted
Norman Rosten, a recognized writer, that "the
sponsor and the advertising agency have taken over radio
17
quietly in the matter of writing."
Three FCC rulings on license renewals contributed
to setting the agenda for the Fairness Doctrine. In the
rulings, the FCC identified the flow of news and
information to the public through controversial public
affairs programming with broadcasters' public interest
responsibilities as trustees of the airwaves. It
asserted that broadcasters had affirmative
obligations to provide controversial public affairs
programming in order to keep their licenses. And, as in
the Network case and the Blue Book, the FCC upheld its
18
authority to force broadcasters meet these standards.
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4The FCC announced its decision to reassess the
Mayflower Decision in 1947. A petition from the Cornell
University radio station, WHCU, requesting the right
to editorialize, provided an occasion for the FCC to
reconsider the Mayflower Decision.
In its call for hearings, the Federal
Communications Commission requested comment on
editorials
candidates
side or
controversy
difficult
It called
between
views on
obligation
"urging the election of various
for political office or supporting one
another on various questions in public
19
The FCC requested testimony on
first amendment issues of freedom of speech.
for testimony specifically on the relation
broadcasters' rights to express their
issues and broadcasters' "affirmative
to be fair and to represent all sides of
20
controversial issues" in news and pubic
programming.
This construction on regulatory policy
indicates the tight-rope that the FCC apparently
affairs
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sensed it had to walk in its efforts to encourage the
fullest flow of news and information to the public
without triggering charges either of granting too much
power to broadcasters or of censoring broadcasters
inordinately.
In making the call for hearings, FCC Commissioner
Denney observed that the radio industry was split over
radio editorials. Some broadcasters favored the
Mayflower Decision ban of editorials. They believed
radio enjoyed higher public acceptance than
newspapers because broadcasters avoided partisan
issues. They wished to preserve radio's reputation
and the revenues that flowed from its reputation
for impartiality. Other broadcasters demanded the
right to editorialize. FCC Commissioner Denney noted
that many radio stations broadcast editorials through
radio commentators. He also remarked that
technological constraints on the number of radio
channels had abated, noting that there were 1,200 radio
stations after World War II up from the 600 odd in
1938 when WAAB had broadcast its editorials and the FCC
21
did its fact finding for the Network case.
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5The Mayflower hearings capture issues comparable to
those discussed in 1926 when Congress had initially
wrestled radio news and public affairs programming. In
1926, Congress was unable to reach a policy for radio
news and public affairs programming. In order to pass
the Radio Act, Congress had assigned the FRC, its
initial licensing authority, the repsonsibility for
devising rules and regulations for the discussion of
public issues over radio. In the spring of 1948, as
successor to the FRC, the FCC engaged this precise duty,
and in doing so, provoked wholesale reconsideration of
freedom of expression over radio.
The issues are not unfamiliar. The scarcity of
channels, though less pressing than in 1926,
constituted the technical basis for policy.
Broadcasters championed unrestricted editorial rights
22
due to first amendment rights of the press. Farm
and labor groups, heirs to the concerns of the
progressives and Democrats about media monopoly,
worried about media power.
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The Mayflower hearings, held in March and April
1948, brought out over fifty witnesses. Roughly a
dozen witnesses advocated an unqualified first
amendment right for broadcast licensees to
editorialize. Broadcasters, National Association of
Broadcasters representatives, a radio preacher, and a
professor of journalism comprised this group. The
majority of witnesses, however, favored the Mayflower
Decision's prohibition on broadcaster editorials. Trade
unions, farm groups, radio writers and directors, and a
former FCC commissioner at the time of the
Mayflower Decision comprised this group. A smaller
number of witnesses advocated editorializing with
certain provisos such as extending editorial rights
to licensees but not to networks or assuring a right to
reply. Individual broadcsters and a college professor
23
constituted this group.
Broadcasters advanced first amendment claims for
lifting the Mayflower ban and for granting them
unqualified editorial rights. ABC President Woods
asserted that broadcast editorials were "in the public
interest," because they would increase the flow of
information to the public. Woods rejected the attachment
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of any provisios such as access opportunities for issue-
oriented citizens to respond to editorials. Woods
maintained broadcasters should feel free to reject
access requests if other media in their communities
devoted sufficient publicity to those views. In a word,
Woods believed the mass media marketplace provided
sufficient means to assure a flow of news and public
affairs information to citizens. "Radio... is only one
of many effective means... for the expression of
24
ideas," he said.
CBS President Frank Stanton told the FCC that
"radio should be as free as the press," but that in
1948, radio was "only half free." Stanton argued that
spectrum scarcity was a problem of the past by pointing
out that radio stations outnumbered newspapers by two to
one (3,690 stations to 1,792 newspapers). He added that
25
access opportunities were "constitutionally unsound."
The National Association of Broadcasters cited
first amendment rights and FCC enabling legislation,
specifically the anti-censorship provisions (Section
326) of the Communications Act of 1934, to claim
unqualified editorial rights for broadcasters. Justin
Miller, Director of the NAB argued that the
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first amendment forbade government censorship. Any FCC
policy on radio editorializing constituted an improper
extension of FCC authority, Miller asserted. Access
opportunities to respond to broadcasters' editorials
were an unconstitutional intrusion on free speech,
Miller said. Any FCC policy on editorializing,
comparable, say to, Equal Time would be similarly
26
faulty in Miller's view.
A.D. Willard, Executive Vice President for the NAB,
argued that the Mayflower ban stifled the expression
of a diversity of points of view on controversial
public issues, and thus accomplished the opposite
effect of what the FCC had intended. Willard
testified that eitorializing was a responsibility that
rested properly with broadcasters and should be placed
there, not with the FCC. He claimed that under
Mayflower, the broadcasters' microphone was accessible
27
to everyone but the broadcasters.
Fred Seibert, Professor of Journalism at
the University of Illinois, argued that the
Mayflower Decision violated the first
amendment and the FCC's anti-censorship regulation.
He would prefer occasional abuses with
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controversial programming on the air than no
discussion of controversial issues due to a
regulatory prohibition on editorializing, Seibert
28
told the FCC.
Several proponents of editorials pointed out that
the listening audience, as the broadcasters' markets,
exerted a temporizing effect on editorial excesses.
Frank C. Waldrop, a reporter for the Washington Times-
Herald reminded the FCC that broadcasters could not
afford to offend their listeners without endangering
their revenues. He suggested that market-driven factors
played an important role in predisposing broadcasters to
balance news and public affairs programming. He added
that broadcasters editorialized to a considerable degree
in their news programming due to their selection,
29
writing, and placing of news stories. Professor
Seibert pointed out that broadcasters had to live
with interest groups and listeners in their
communities, implying a sanction on editorial abuses
30
within the marketplace.
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Mr. Louis F. Caldwell, former general counsel
for the Federal Radio Commission, urged the FCC to
lift Mayflower on first amendment and administrative
grounds. He reminded the commissioners that "fair
play" cases in news and political programming in
the early days of the FRC had posed thorny first
amendment issues. He said that as general counsel he had
written FRC rulings for and against license renewals for
different broadcastes on the basis of substantially
similar evidence concering their news and public affairs
programming.
Caldwell warned the commissioners that the FCC would
be placing a priori restrictions on freedom of
expression if it stipulated access opportunities as a
condition for lifting the Mayflower ban. By creating
such a policy, the FCC would not only violate the first
amendment, Caldwell said that it would also create
impossible administrative burdens for itself. Caldwell
said he feared that the FCC would place itself in the
untenable position of policing a general review
standard, such as a proscriptive standard of
"fairness," when it could only deal effectively with
specific cases of abuse of the public trust after it had
30
occurred.
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Proponents of the Mayflower ban on editorials
asserted that broadcasters already had too much power.
They testified that broadcasters' discretion in public
affairs programming was not sufficient protection of
"the public interest." Several testified that
broadcasters had made partisan attacks in the past, and
should not be trusted in the future. Granting editorial
rights to broadcasters would endanger the free flow of
ideas and opinions to the public, they contended. As a
rule, Mayflower proponents believed that the first
amendment entitled broadcasters to broadcast news and to
hire commentators.
James Lawrence Fly, a FCC commissioner at the
time of the Mayflower Decision, provided the
strongest testimony against granting editorial rights
to broadcasters. Fly said that the NAB's Justin Miller
stood on "pathetic ground" in presenting his case for
broadcasters' freedom of expression. Fly charged that
Miller's argument in behalf of broadcast editorials
amounted to private censorship. He warned any FCC
regulatory policy which might be based on
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Miller's brief "turn[ed] the right of exclusion over to
the licensee..." He worried that such a ruling would
chill free speech. "With a thousand tongues free to
31
criticize the government, democracy is secure," Fly
said.
Fly articulated the majoritarian view. He was
willing to suppress the free speech rights of
broadcasters due to his confiction that their rights to
editorialize would hamper the flow of news and public
affairs to the majority of American citizens. Fly's
position is essentially that of the progressives, who
had worried about broadcaster censorship in
congressional debates over the Radio Act. Fly
acknowledged that the technological grounds of a
scarcity of channels were not as pressing as had been
the case before the Second World War. However, Fly
observed a great deal of duplication among the major
radio networks. He said this duplication of programming
provided further evidence that the FCC would be
limiting rather than expanding the flow of news and
information to the public if it were to grant editorial
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rights to broadcasters. Fly concluded by asserting
the the Mayflower ban on editorials served radio
industry well, noting that the American public
32
respected radio more than newspapers.
Miller made a rejoinder to Fly.
Miller replied that the Communications Act
ruled out any FCC jurisdiction over editorial
comments. His was the libertarian position: the
first amendment protected broadcasters' right to
broadcast editorials on public issues. Radio's
power constituted no grounds to restrain it,
Miller argued. "Does Mr. Fly mean to suggest
that because of the powerful influence of radio
broadcasting, does it not come, properly with
33
the meaning of the first amendment?" To Miller,
concerns about media power or media monopoly were
clearly secondary to a primary concern with the
freedom of expression.
Proponents of the Mayflower ban, coming from
organized labor, claimed that broadcasters did not
deserve editorial privileges due partiality in the
past and unwillingness to produce controversial public
affairs programming. Henry C. Fleisher,
representing the Congress of Industrial Organization,
told the FCC that historically "radio treated
controversy as a form of leprosy, at best to be
avoided, at worst to be handled under carefully
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prescribed conditions." He charged that broadcasters
"place[d] controversy in carefully sterilized cells" so
that "as few listeners as possible may be
'contaminated' by the expression of ideas." As an
example of broadcaster partiality, the National Farmers
Union testified in favor of the Mayflower ban on the
grounds that a radio commentator in the mid-west
criticized farmers' cooperatives. Joseph A. Breine,
president of the Communications Workers, argued that
broadcasters' dependency on advertising revenues
prevented "fair and reasonable" editorial
34
policies.
Eric Barnouw, President of the Radio Writers
Guild, supported the Mayflower ban on editorials on
grounds similar to those articulated by CWA President
Briene about broadcasters' dependencies on advertising
revenues. Barnouw feared that mass marketing to mass
audiences would exert increasing influence over the
broadcasting industry. He feared that independent
editorial voices would be unable to assert themselves
35
in the midst of huge entertainment corporations.
Their testimony is instructive, because neither
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supported the Mayflower ban on radio editorials on the
basis that radio networks or broadcasters were adherents
to a particular ideology such as liberalism or
conservatism. Rather, each contended that the
institutional constraints on news and public affairs
programming within radio corporations frustrated
editorial expression. Certainly, Briene also felt that
broadcasters had an anti-labor ideology.
Other proponents of the Mayflower Decision urged
the FCC to keep the ban in place because they feared
that broadcasters were stifling liberal commentators.
The Voice of Freedom Committee opposed news editorials
on the grounds that more liberal than conservative
commentators had left the air. Charles A. Siepmann,
author of the Blue Book, "reluctantly" supported the
Mayflower Decision because he felt the radio networks
were not balancing liberal and conservative news
commentators. Saul Carson, radio columnist of
the New Republic, expressed concern that radio
broadcasters would dominate public opinion if allowed to
broadcast news editorials. He testified that Mayflower
should be strengthened lest the broadcasters gain
even more power over the flow of news and public affairs
36
to the public.
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A number of religious, legal aid and military
groups urged the FCC to prohibit broadcaster editorials.
The American Jewish Congress urged the FCC to
retain Mayflower because it worried about anti-
semitism. The AJC expressed its concern that some
broadcasters would provoke religious animosities and
racial bigotry if freed to articulate their editorial
views. The National Lawyers Guild testified that
the Mayflower Decision was not censorship, and that
broadcasters who did not comply with the Mayflower
Decision should be penalized by having their licenses
revoked. The American Veterans Committee added that
Mayflower was a "logical and necessary extension of
59
the constitutional guarantees of free speech.
Access opportunities to reply to broadcaster
editorials emerged as a middle ground between
broadcasters' libertarian position that they be
allowed to make news editorials without any quid pro quo
and the Mayflower proponents' majoritarian position
that the free flow of information and opinion to
the public required FCC prohibition of radio news
editorials. In much the same way that Senator Dill had
championed Equal Time for political candidates as the
pragmatic middle ground between the radio industry,
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which wanted no restrictions on its news and
political programming, and the Democrats and
progressives, who had insisted on common carrier
designation for radio for news and public affairs
programming, so too, access opportunities emerged in
1949 as a middle ground on broadcast news and public
affairs programming.
Several witnesses urged access opportunities to
reply to broadcaster editorials as a pragmatic
compromise and worthy ideal. Professor Robert E.
Cushman of Cornell University, whose radio station's
petition to the FCC had prompted reconsideration of
Mayflower, came with proposals in hand. In
addressing broadcasters' right to editorialize,
Cushman ignored the technological issue of a limited
number of radio channels. Cushman said that radio was
like a newspaper, but due to the Mayflower Decision
radio lcked an editorial page. Radio was "useful," he
37
-Id7 but - not as useful as [it] could be." The
-publ c, Cushman continued, looked to newspapers for
informed opinion and advice because the public assumed
that newspapers had greater access to information than
the average citizen. To make radio more useful,
Cushman recommended access opportunities.
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Some independent broadcasters supported the right
of broadcasters to editorialize if access opportunities
for reply were assured. Nathan Straus, owner of WMCA
radio, advocated equal opportunities for the public to
reply to broadcaster editorials. Straus supported
editorial rights as long as stations programmed
editorials for no more than fifteen minutes each day,
labeled editorials at the beginning and end, granted
rebuttal time, and read letters from the public
following editorials. All licensees, save those
stations controlled by absentee owners, should enjoy
editorial rights, Straus testified. Morris Novick of
WNYC favored editorial rights, as long as the FCC
imposed and affirmative responsibility on broadcasters
to seek out people critical of editorials and provide
them reply time. Gordon P. Brown, owner and general
manager of WSAY in Rochester, urged abolition of
Mayflower for individual licensees, but told the FCC
38
the ban on editorials should still apply to networks.
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6In issuing the Fairness Doctrine, the Federal
Communications Commission took a middle course from
among the proposals, which were suggested at the
Mayflower hearings. The FCC ruled in favor of editorial
rights for broadcast licnesees and in favor of access
opportunities for issue-oriented citizens to respond to
broadcast editorials. This is the root meaning of
"fairness." Fairness carries the meaning of freedom of
expression through broadcast editorials combined with
the two fold duty to seek controversial public issues as
part of news programming and to provide access
opportunities for a variety of views on controversial
39
public issues.
The Fairness Doctrine changed the rules on
broadcast news and public affairs programming by
attaching an affirmative duty or obligation to seek out
and present controversial programming as a function of
broadcasters' discretionary powers. This FCC
construction of broadcaster discretion altered the
construction Congress had originally placed on
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discretion in 1926 and again in 1934. Broadcasters won
the fight to classify themselves as licensees and not as
common carriers precisely so they could decide what
issues to cover and what news to present within, of
course, the strictures of the FCC's "public interest"
standard.
In ruling that broadcasters had an affirmative
duty to provide controversial public affairs
programming, the FCC replaced an a posteriori standard
of public affairs programming with an a priori standard.
It imposed the duty of presenting controversial public
affairs programming on broadcasters as a prior condition
for maintaining their licenses. Here, long after Senator
Howell's remarks on the urgency of presenting "public
questions" to radio listeners, stood a regulatory
decision requiring broadcasters to behave as Howell had
fruitlessly recommended to an unwilling Congress.
The FCC tried to diffuse some of the problems this
shift to a priori from a posteriori review standards
posed for broadcasters. The FCC ackowledged that there
was no formula for measuring fairness. It noted that
40
broadcasters should rely on their "good judgement,"
and that as a rule, good judgement would foster
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programming on all shades of opinion. In the end, the
FCC said decisions on licenses could turn not on any
mechanical formula for achieving fairness, but on the
reasonableness of broadcasters' actions to achieve the
41
practice of providing access to "responsible"
individuals and organizations to address controversial
public issues.
The FCC said it would implement the Fairness
Doctrine in terms of overall news and public affairs
programming, and not on a case by case basis. It warned
broadcasters that they could not editorialize on
specific issues and subsequently report to the FCC that
opposing sides were covered during routine news
42
programming.
Implementation turned on "the reasonableness of
[a] station's actions" and not on "any absolute
standards of fairness," the FCC ruled. Broadcasters
might well err in their editorial judgements, the FCC
observed. The FCC held up reasonableness as a
"flexible standard" well within the canon of Anglo-
43
American law. By way of example, the FCC
reminded broadcasters that considerations of
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reasonableness in terms of granting access
opportunities did not set up the FCC as thought-police.
Indeed, the FCC opined that the content of their
editorials really had little to do with whether or not
broadcasters opened their studios to people to respond
to them. What mattered, the FCC wrote in reference to
a hypothetical legislation, was "if the licensee had
permitted only advocates of the bill's enactment to
utilize its facilities to the exclusion of its
opponents." "No independent appraisal of the
bill's merits by the Commission would be required to
reach a determination that the licensee had miscontrued
its duties and obligations... to serve the public
44
interest." The FCC said it drew the line, however,
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at any broadcaster effort to "stack the cards" by
favoring one side over others in covering public
controversy. It also asserted that no reason existed why
broadcasters should not be able to afford "a fair
opportunity for the presentation of contrary
46
positions." The FCC noted that if broadcasters felt
that the FCC enforced standards of fairness in an
arbitrary or capricious manner, they could use
47
"procedural safeguards" under the Communications
Act and Administrative Procedure Act and in the end
resort to the courts if they so opposed a FCC decision.
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The FCC rejected the libertarian arguments of
broadcasters, the NAB, and journalists and academics
48
that imposing "a basic standard of fairness"
amounted to an a priori restraint on broadcasters'
freedom of speech. The FCC cited the Associated Press
case on diverse sources of information and the free
flow of ideas. The AP case had found that the first
amendment did not "afford non-governmental combinations"
any rights to "impose restraints upon [the]
49
constitutionally guaranteed freedom" of expression.
In language about print that was analagous to the
limited number of channels, the AP case continued that
"freedom to publish means freedom for all and not for
some. Freedom to publish is guaranteed by the
Constitution but freedom to combine to keep others from
50
publishing is not." This standard of freedom of
expression was virtually identical to the arguments,
dating back to discussion at the National Radio
Conferences and the original congressional debates in
1926 about freedom of speech over radio, in favor of
listener sovereignty due to the technological
constraints of a scarce radio spectrum. It was also
Fly's argument about broadcaster censorship against
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Miller in the Mayflower hearings. With such a precedent
as its beacon, the FCC rejected the broadcasters'
arguments that the Fairness Doctrine was a prior
restraint on their freedom of speech. In language
comparable to the Associated Press decision, the FCC
rebutted Justin Miller, Frank Stanton et al., "the
freedom of speech protected against government
abridgement by the First Amendment does not extend any
privilege to government licensees or means of public
communications to exclude the expression of opinions
and ideas with which they are in disagreement. We
believe, on the contrary, that a requirement that
broadcast licensees utilise their franchises in a
manner in which the listening public may be assured of
hearing varying opinions on the paramount issues
facing the American people is within both the
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spirit and letter of the First Amendment."
The FCC's language extending editorial rights to
broadcasters was remarkably limp. The FCC ruled that
broadcaster editorials were "not contrary to the public
interest." The Commission noted that it was "not
persuaded" that broadcasters' editorials "may not be
52
actually helpful" in promoting informed public
opinion. Nowhere in the Fairness Doctrine did the FCC
renounce the Mayflower Decision.
107
Finally, the FCC's articulation of "fairness" as
a doctrine was hardly auspicious or firmly supported.
Two commissioners supported the Fairness Doctrine
unequivocably; two supported it with reservations; one
opposed it; two abstained from voting. The FCC
Commissioners' vote on "fairness" was four to one,
but considering the two qualified opinions, the Fairness
Doctrine was off to a shaky start at best.
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7The separate and additional opinions of FCC
commissioners regarding the Fairness Doctrine are
noteworthy because they point out the can of worms the
FCC opened by requirying on broadcasters to be fair and
to provide access opportunities. Commissioner E.M.
Webster criticized the Fairness Doctrine as an "academic
legal treatise" of little use to broadcasters in
determining the day-to-day radio news and editorial
management. He wrote that no individuals, except legally
qualified candidates during elections, enjoyed access
rights. In practice the Fairness Doctrine required only
evidence of a reasonable effort toward providing equal
opportunities for public affairs programming, Webster
53
said.
Commissioner Robert F. Jones wrote a blistering
concurrence in his "separate views." He anticipated
administrative problems, which would beset the FCC in
implementing the Fairness Doctrine. He noted that the
broadcasting industry had carried on editorials through
commentators despite the Mayflower Decision, and
109
criticized the Fairness Doctrine for dealing exclusively
with licnesees. Rather than impose an a priori
obligation on broadcasters, Jones recommended that the
54
FCC revoke licenses for broadcast abuses.
Jones criticized the Fairness Doctrine for
developing "prospective conditions" on broadcasters'
editorial rights. He wrote that these conditions were
as ambiguous as they were unenforceable.
Jones reprimanded the majority for its equivocal
recision of the Mayflower Decisions. He advocated an
unambiguous and unequivocal assertion of editorial
rights and responsibilities. In making a tacit recision
of the Mayflower Decision, Jones charged the majority
with not having the courage to repudiate a past error on
censorship and for temerity by perpetuating the
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negative effect of the Mayflower Decision.
Jones contended that the Fairness Doctrine violated
the first amendment, and complained that the FCC was
setting its own standards of "reasonableness" as the
litnus of broadcasters' freedom of expression. Such a
policy, Jones wrote, was contrary to the anti-censorship
provisions of Section 326 of the Communications Act.
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Jones complained the vagueness in defining fairness
made the Fairness Doctrine unenforceable. It was one
matter to enforce a specific decision, after the fact of
an abuse than to hold up a standard of fairness, which
would be difficult to apply to daily news operations.
Jones found the majority position on a flexible
standard of reasonableness similarly untenable. He
labelled it as another attempt at prior restraint, and
argued that "problems with editorialization can only and
should only be determined a posteriori in connection
56
with specific situations."
The FCC failed to follow correct administrative
procedures in issuing the Fairness Doctrine as a
regulatory memorandum, Jones charged. He wrote that
Congress had charged agencies such as the FCC with the
responsiblity of publishing policy statements, rules and
regulations in codified form in the Federal Register. As
a result, Jones feared the Fariness Doctrine's standing,
if contested in courts of law, and the confusion it
could create in broadcasters' minds due to its vague
57
status as a regulatory memorandum.
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In addition to these shortcomings, Jones
criticized the Fairness Doctrine for conflating
"news" with "comment" with "editorialization."
"Neither the general policy created not the
qualifications on the right to editoralize are made
clear in terms free from ambiguity," Jones
blisterd. "Background, policy, example,
58
qualification are commingled."
There was one dissent. Commissioner Freida P.
Hennock wrote that the Fairness Doctrine was beyond the
enforcemnt powers of the FCC. She ruled to sustain
59
the Mayflower ban.
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8Broadcasting industry response to the Fairness
Doctrine was cautious. After pushing for abolition
of the Mayflower Decision, broadcasters now
wondered if the Fairness Doctrine might become some
sort of "Frankenstein" turning against them.
Broadcasting worried that the Fairness Doctrine
would foster more conformity in public affairs
programming due to the vague requirement to be
fair, which could inhibit braodcaster from taking
60
partisan stands on controversial issues.
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9In conclusion, one can observe that the Fairness
Doctrine put a majoritarian policy in place for news and
public affair programming. Spectrum scarcity was the
technological rationale for the Fairness Doctrine.
Although partisans on each side of the free speech
debate acknowledged an increase in the number of radio
channels and the emergence of television, the FCC ruled
that access opportunities and controversial news
programming were required of broadcasters.
that the individual broadcaster as a
responsible to balance the flow of news
affairs programming to his listeners.
contending arguments, which held that
marketplace, if free from supplemental
could and would assure a more diverse flow
public affairs programming. It ignored
thorny problems of implementation. It
The FCC ruled
licensee was
and public
It dismissed
the media
obligations,
of news and
warnings of
denied the
validity of arguments that the Fairness Doctrine would
stifle rather than enhance controversial news and public
affairs programming.
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As was the case in the twenties and would be the
case through the mid-eighties, advocates for broadcast
regulation feared the power of the media to influence
American political institutions and public opinion.
Accordingly, federally imposed requirements to balance
news and to provide access opportunities constituted
policy mechanisms to sustain the rights of listeners
over those of broadcasters. In the forties, regulatory
advocates included such groups as labor and farm groups,
religious organizations, and the American Civil Liberties
Union among others.
Opponents of regulation argued different. They
down-played the power of the media to influence American
political institutions and public opinion. Instead, they
advanced strict first amendment grounds for broadcasters
free speech rights. Even if broadcasters might be
influential-, opponents of regulation argued
unsuccessfully that they were entitled to the same first
amendment rights as their print confreres. Supplemental
regulations, requiring them to be fair or to provide
access opportunities, were intrusive and counter-
productive, they said. By and in large, broadcasters
were members of this group.
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By the late forties, then, movement was in the
direction of increased regulatory oversight for news and
public affairs programming. In issuing the Fairness
Doctrine, the FCC had made that clear.
In the fifties, Congress would cut some of the
Equal Time regulations because literal applications of
Equal Time rules stifled rather than increased the flow
of political programming to the public.
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CHAPTER THREE
EQUAL TIME IN '59
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Snow hit Mayor Daley's face. Together with other
city officials and executives from International
Harvester, Chicago Mayor Richard Daley had braved a snow
storm to welcome Argentine President Frondizi to Chicago
at the windy city's Midway Airport in February, 1959.
Television cameras from Chicago television stations
filmed the event for newscasts. The story was brief due
to the storm: a few handshakes, President and Mrs.
Frondizi waved to a crowd, Mayor Daley had only enough
time to say "How do you do?,"dignitaries enterred
limousines, the departing limousines went on their way
1
to the Drake Hotel.
Lar "America First" Daly, a perennial candidate for
many political offices and an opponent of Mayor Richard
Daley in Chicago's upcoming Democratic primary, did not
like what he saw on television that night. Lar Daly felt
Chicago television treated him poorly not just because
they covered the Mayor performing official duties while
denying Daly equal time, but also because they had
failed to broadcast a news stories on Lar Daly's
unprecedented filing as a mayoralty candidate in both
the Democratic and Republican primaries. Television
stations had broadcast stories of Mayor Daley filing his
petitions for the Democratic primary and former
Congressmen Timothy P. Sheehan filing his for the
2
Republican.
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Lar Daly requested equal time from several of the
Chicago television stations. WBBM, the CBS affiliate,
and WNBQ refused. Daly petitioned the Federal
Communications Commission to require the stations to
grant him time equal to that the stations had provided
Mayor Daley and former Congressman Sheehan in their
newscasts. In making his request, Lar Daly cited other
instances where television newscasts had covered his
opponents in the Democratic and Republican primaries,
but had ignored his candidacy. Among others, these
instances included stories on each candidate recieving
his party organization's nomination, interviews with
Sheehan and the Democratic Cook County Chairman, and
3
Mayor Daley's annual report on the city. Interestingly,
Lar Daly did not include news coverage of Mayor Daley's
greeting of President Frondizi or of the Mayor's
participation in a story on the March of Dimes in his
complaint to the FCC. Daly was more upset with segments
of the Mayor as a campaigning incumbent politician in tv
newscasts than those depicting Mayor Daley in more
strictly ceremonial activites. However, in ruling in
"Lar Daly," the FCC addressed the issue of television
news coverage of ceremonial as well more clearly
political activities of campaigning incumbents.
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The Federal Communications Commission ruled in Lar
Daly's favor, and ordered WBBM and WNBQ each to provide
Daly roughly ten minutes of air time. WNBQ complied;
WBBM refused, and CBS asked the FCC to review its
4
decision.
The Federal Communications Commission's decision in
"Lar Daly" came as a surprise. Just two years before,
the FCC had ruled that television news coverage of
politicians did not fall under Equal Time because such
on-the-spot coverage was appropriately part of a
broadcaster's judgement in covering newsworthy events
and because the politician in question had not initiated
5
the coverage. In October,1958, the FCC had restated
this position exempting newscast coverage of politicians
performing ceremonial duties from Equal Time in an
6
official handbook on political uses of television. To
be sure, the FCC had qualified this ruling by stating it
would review television newscast coverage of politicians
on a "case by case" basis, but precedent and practice
seemed to exclude newscasts from Equal Time
requirements.
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In "Lar Daly," the Federal Communications
Commission ruled that a politician's appearance on a
newscast during an election constituted a political
"use" of television, thereby falling under Equal Time.
Interestingly, the FCC based its ruling on "use" on
Congress's "unequivocal" language in Section 315. In its
interpretative ruling, for example, the FCC did not pay
attention to the compromises Congress struck in enacting
Equal Time originally in 1927 as Section 18 of the Radio
Act or in re-enacting Equal Time as Section 315 of the
Communications Act in 1934. Rather, the FCC majority
supported its interpretation of "use" on the basis of a
incomplete and partial reading of congressional intent,
significant court precedents, and its sense of the
persuasive power of television. In the legislative
history, the FCC found the basis for its ruling on use
in the colloquy between Senators Dill and Fess in 1926
investing regulators with authority to make rules
governing newscast coverage of politicians performing
ceremonial duties. It also cited Senator Howell's
remarks that broadcasters had public interest
responsibilities to inform the public fully. Of the
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court precedents, the FCC found standing for its ruling
on "use" in the Supreme Court's ruling in the Associted
Press case, supporting maximum flow of news and
7
information to the public. Finally, the persuasive
powers of television warrented equal coverage of
political candidates on newscasts no matter how remote
any politician's electoral possibilities. "While not
always indispensable to political success... television
may enjoy a unique superiority in selling a candidate to
the public in that it may create an impression of
immediacy and intimate presence, it shows a candidate in
action, and it affords a potential for reaching large
8
audiences." By witholding news coverage of some
politicians, broadcast journalists put these candidates
at a disadvantage due to television's "ability to reach
widespread audiences and to create an illusion of
initmate presence by placing the candidate, as it were,
9
in the home of the viewer."
John C. Doerfer, Chairman of the Federal
Communications Commission, disagreed with his fellow
commissioners ruling on "use"in Lar Daly. He voted
against such a literal application of Equal Time to
television newscasts. Doerfer wrote that his fellow
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commissioners had subordinated the public's right to
receive information to an idealized concept and
impossible standard of fairness in television news
coverage of polticians. Broadcaster discretion was the
backbone of the licensing system, Doerfer contended. By
construing "use" so literally, the FCC was denying
broadcasters their rights to make judgements about the
newsworthiness of public events. Such a literal
interpretation of Equal Time was a giant step backwards,
Doerfer argued, because it imposed common carrier
requirements on broadcasters, a course rejected by
Congress since 1927. "A broadcaster should be given some
discretion other than a Hobson's choice. This is either
a plethora of political programming ad nauseam or a
10
complete blackout," Doerfer arugued. The better
course lay in repealing Eqaul Time all together and
applying the FCC's public interest standard to license
11
renewals, Doerfer recommended.
In his minority position on "use," Doerfer was
closer to the mark in reading congressional intent than
the FCC majority. In 1927, Congress enacted Equal Time
to cover political programming initiated by politicians.
News programming fell under the Radio Act's public
interest standards. Equal Time was a compromise between
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a common carrier model on the one hand, where
broadcasters would be at the mercy of anyone who wished
to comment on public issues, and a licensing system on
the other, where broadcasters would control the "use"
of their channels for news and political programming
subject to public interest standards set by the
government. In 1927, Congress found a solution to these
competing constructions of "use" for political
programming by enacting Equal Time as a statute which
required broadcasters to grant equal opportunities to
air time if and only if broadcasters had exercised their
judgement or discretion by allowing a legally qualified
candidate the "use" of their broadcast facilities. This
was the meaning of Senator Dill's assertion that
broadcasters could regulate but not discriminate in
12
providing air time for political programming. Doerfer
grasped this meaning while his fellow commissioners did
not. In other words, Equal Time ruled that broadcasters
had discretion over the use of their facilities for
expressly political programming up to the point of
selling or granting air time. But once they had granted
or sold air time to a politician, broadcasters were
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legally obliged to grant or sell time at the same rate
to other legally qualified candidates for the same
office. It did not cover news programming. Indeed,
Senator Dill came out of retirment to clarify that
Congress never intended "use" to apply to newscasts but
only to occasions where politicians bought or were
13
granted air time for political programming.
Network executives warned that the "Lar Daly"
decision would cause a black-out of television news
coverage of the 1960 Republican and Democratic National
Conventions and presidential election besides making
impossible television news coverage of incumbent
politicians performing their official duties. There was
not enough time on newscasts to accommodate all the
politicians, who were legally entitled under the ruling,
14
_.they said By requiring broadcasters to provide time
t -all legally qualified candidates if they had shown
ny ne - -- -in a news cast, industry spokesmen
-- continued,"Lar Daly" accomplished the reverse of its
portedly ameliorative intent. Such a requirement
created "unequal opportunities" by requiring equal time
or -all legally qualified candidates irrespective of
their seriousness. Further, the networks contended, the
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FCC had misconstrued the meaning of "use." Congress
meant ""use to apply solely to occasions when
politicians initiated radio or television coverage for
political programming, and did not apply to routine
newscasts. These were properly the broadcasters'
metier. Indeed, RCA Chairman Robert Sarnoff told
Congress that for all the politicians' complaints about
the reporting of news and politics, politicians should
really take some comfort in journalists' discretion in
making judgements about the newsworthiness of public
events. He warned the Senate Interstate and Foreign
Commerce Committee that the public may well tire of
major party politicians if television were to be
15
required to provide time for all politicians.
The FCC's "Lar Daly" ruling drew intense criticism.
16
President Eisenhower called the ruling "rediculous."
The national press joined their television confreres and
decried the ruling as a violation of the first amendment
rights of television journalists. A raft of bills to
amend Section 315 were quickly filed in the Senate and
17
House.
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As a result of the "Lar Daly" decision, Congress
authorized the first major change in Equal Time since
its enactment in 1927. Congress redefined "use" to
exclude "bona fide" news events, interviews,
documentaries in which a candidates' appearance was
incidental to the story, and on-the-spot coverage of
news events, including conventions from Equal Time.
Congress defined "bona fide" as either regularly
18
scheduled or special news casts. "Bona fide" assumed
that broadcasters initiated coverage of the relevant
news events, interviews, and documentaries as part of
their news judgement. Significantly, the "bona fide"
definition did not engage the issue of what would come
to be called "media events" staged by politicians to
gain broadcast coverage. Its meaning was much simpler,
dealing only with whether a politician or a broadcaster
initiated the "use" of air time during a newscast. If a
politician initiated "use" by purchasing airtime or a
broadcaster initiated a politician's "use" by granting
airtime for expressly political programming, then the
programming fell under Equal Time. If broadcast
journalists initiated "use" in deciding to cover a news
event, the "use" was then exempt from Equal Time. The
issue of who manipulated whom, the politicians or the
media, was a conundrum left unsolved by the 1959
amendments.
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Television journalists had won a substantial first
amendment victory. Congress recognized their discretion
to determine the newsworthiness of the news and
political information reaching more and more Americans.
Although broadcasters had claimed all along that Equal
Time was never intended to cover newscasts, they
nonetheless came away from this fight with statutory
recognition of their discretion and judgement in
determining how they covered politics in their news
programming.
But broadcast journalists also lost ground on
Fairness Doctrine aspects of their news programming. In
rewording Equal Time, Congress warned broadcasters they
still had public interest responsibilities to provide
"reasonable opportunities for conflicting issues of
public importance." By inserting this language, which
was initially proposed by Senator Proxmire as an
amendement to Section 315, Congress gave statutory
approval to the Fairness Doctrine. Until this new
langauge in Section 315, which was inserted in Section
315, the Fairness Doctrine had the hazy status of a
regulatory memorandum. Henceforth, this 1959 wording of
Section 315 would be cited as elevating the Fairness
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Doctrine to the status of U.S. Code, which meant that
Congress rather than the FCC had the final say in
keeping the Fairness Doctrine on the books or dumping
19
it. In retaining control over news casts, a control
they claimed was rightly theirs all along and improperly
wrenched from them by a literal and overzealous FCC,
broadcasters had lost legal ground in fighting the
Fairness Doctrine.
Perhaps major party politicians were the biggest
winners in the 1959 amendments to Equal Time. Because
broadcast journalists judged major party politicians to
be newsworthy by virtue of the number of votes they got,
major party politicians received the bulk of broadcast
time during newscasts. It seemed a perfectly reasonable
proposition: the votes indicated newsworthiness,
newsworthiness legitimated coverage. And, in terms of
self-interest the dynamic worked well: politicians,
at least from the major parties, reached voters through
television newscasts, and broadcast journalists reached
their audiences, providing the audience with political
fare well within the mainstream of American politics.
129
The newsmen gained a measure of autonomy through
statutory recognition of their judgement; major party
politicians won access to the airwaves for themselves
without an appearance of heavy-handedness by placing the
decision making to cover minor party politicians with
broadcast journalists, who had little reason to find
these fringe parties newsworthy in producing newscasts
for mass audiences.
The public came out of the 1959 amendements to
Equal Time neither as a big winner nor as a big loser.
The public's relative position stayed about the same.
Within the dynamics of an industry like broadcasting,
which is sensitive to public pressure and dependent upon
the good will of its audience for its revenues, caution
dictated the kinds of news and political programming
that would be produced. So it is unsurprising that in
exercising discretion broadcasters did not alter their
news coverage a great deal. And given the majority
support for the Democratic and Republican parties it is
not puzzling either that the activies of politicians
from these parties were "bona fide" news events.
It might be pertinent to mention briefly some of
the details of the bills before Congress to amend Equal
Time in order to place this larger issue of the winners
and loser of the 1959 amendments into context. Of the
130
bills before Congress, four proposed exempting newscasts
and news commentaries from Equal Time. Five bills
proposed exempting newscasts, interviews, documentaries,
panel discussions, debates and "similar type"
programming from Equal Time. Of these bills, the Hartke
bill, S. 1585, also specified grounds for determining
"substantial" candidates by setting a percentage on
votes in previous elections or 200,000 or one-percent of
voters' signatures for candidates. The Hartke bill also
exempted broadcasters from any liability for libelous or
defamatory remarks politicians might make in the course
of campaigning--remarks broadcasters could not censor
due to anti-censorship provisions (section 326) of the
Communications Act.
In congressional hearings on these bills, various
interest groups testified as to which bills better
served the public interest. CBS supported the Hartke
bill, giving most discretion to broadcsters, because CBS
President Frank Stanton said, it provided a
comprehensive solution to Equal Time problems. NBC's
General Sarnoff and ABC's John Daly recommended going
beyond reversing "Lar Daly," but indicated their
20
networks could live with a law reversing it. The
Radio and Television News Directors Association urged
total abolition of Equal Time. The American Civil
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Liberties Union argued that newscasts, documentaries and
commentaries should be excluded from Equal Time, but
that debates and panel discussion should not. The
Democratic and Republican Parties differed in how far
each would go in urging amendments to Equal Time: the
Democrats were more expansive urging exemption of
newscasts, news documentaries, on-the-spot coverage of
newsworhty events, panel discussions and political
debates, while the Republicans urged exemption only for
newscasts and special news events like political
conventions. Among the minority and fringe parties,
Norman Thomas recommended that Congress require
broadcasters to make time available for discussion of
election issues five to six weeks before elections. The
Socialist Labor Party came out for keeping "Lar Daly."
Speaking on behalf of New York's Liberal Party, Senator
Kenneth Keating urged that debates and panel discussions
remain under Equal Time requirements. Lar Daly testified
that Congress should retain unchanged the FCC ruling
bearing his name on the grounds that broadcasters' news
judgement constituted a "subjective determination" of
news, which Daly said placed tyrannical power with
broadcast journalists. Amidst all this testimony,
Senator Pastore of the Senate Interstate and Foreign
Commerce Committee, the committee responsible for
drafting legislation to cope with "Lar Daly," complained
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to Senator Hartke that his bill was too expansive and
opened a pandora's box of election law technicalities by
imposing a federal statute on state law, which
customarily determined how many votes or petition
signatures constituted legally qualified or substantial
21
candidates.
In conclusion, the 1959 amendements to Equal Time
defined the limites of broadcaster discretion covering
candidates as part of their routine news gathering and
reporting work. Without tampering fundamentally with
majoritarian, regulatory policy, these amendments
remedied literal applications of Equal Time, which had
the perverse effect of limiting news programming. They
enabled broadcast journalists only the freedom to do
their jobs as news reporters. In 1959, Congress was
still quite uneasy about the power of a mass
communications technology like tv to influence American
political institutions and to shape public opinion. An
irony, of course, is that broadcast journalists paid the
price of congressional codification of the Fairness
Doctrine to win so modest a measure of journalistic
discretion and freedom of speech. Despite congressional
anxiety about the power of television news programming,
broadcasters won a victory for televised presidential
debates the following year.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE GREAT DEBATES
135
Senator John F. Kennedy looked great. Tanned, just
back from Cape Cod after a campaign swing through
Florida, Kennedy stepped on stage of Chicago's WBBM-TV
for the first of four nationally broadcast presidential
debates with Vice President Richard M. Nixon. The Vice
President looked pallid. Nixon's phlebitis was acting
up. When stepping out of his car to enter the tv studio,
Nixon hit his knee, causing his face to contort with
pain. Earlier in the day, Mr. Nixon had addressed an
unenthusiastic audience at a convention of the United
Brotherhood of Carpentars and Joiners. He had kept his
own counsel on this first ever television debate between
presidential candidates, and accepted only a phone call
from his running mate Henry Cabot Lodge in which Lodge
reportedly urged Nixon to erase his "assassin image."
Nixon met with tv advisors only during the car ride to
the studio.
Senator Kennedy had the first say. Kennedy told the
television audience America could do better. "I'm not
satisfied when the United States had last year the
lowest rate of economic growth of any major
industrialized society.... I'm not satisfied when the
Soviet Union is turning out twice as many scientists and
engineers as we are. I'm not satisfied when many of our
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teachers are inadequately paid. I'm not satisfied when
I see men like Jimmy Hoffa .... still free... If a Negro
baby is born...., he has about one-half as much chance
to get through high school as a white baby. He has one-
third as much chance to get through college,
[and]....four times as much chance that he'll be out of
work in his life as the white baby." Kennedy tied the
idea of a bustling America and an America of equality to
effective national government, saying that an active,
effective federal government was America's and the
world's best guarantee of freedom. He quoted from
Roosevelt's 1933 inaugural that an earlier generation
had a rendezvous with destiny, and said "our generation
has the same rendezvous." "It's time America started
1
moving again."
Nixon agreed with his Democratic rival on America's
potential, but told the audience of some 80 million that
he and the Massachusetts senator differed on the means
toward achieving national greatness. Nixon reminded
Americans they prospered under Eisenhower. He told the
tv audience their wages had gone up five times as much
under Eisenhower than under Truman while the prices they
137
paid for goods had gone up five times more under Truman
than under Eisenhower. The average person had more money
in his pocket thanks to Eisenhower. "Now, that's not
2
standing still,"Nixon said. The Eisenhower
Administration had also built more schools, hospitals,
highways and hydroelectric power plants than any other,
he said. Nixon called Kennedy's proposals "retreads" of
Truman programs, said they cost too much, and, in a
remark that brought a look of perplexity to Kennedy's
face, warned they would stifle "creative energies."
Nixon said he agreed with Kennedy on the need to promote
equality and to provide medical care for the aged. The
difference for America, Nixon said, was the means of
reaching these goals. "I know Senator Kennedy feels as
deeply about these problems as I do, but our
disagreement is not about the goals for America but
3
only about the means to reach those goals." As a
debater, Nixon had successfully rebutted Kennedy's
assertions, and as a campaigner he had failed utterly to
address a television audience.
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And so, on September 26, 1960, in the first of
four television debates, Kennedy and Nixon squared-off
for the American vote. Kennedy would later say the
television debates made all the difference in energizing
his becalmed presidential campaign. Nixon acknowledged
the debates' importance, but qualified his assessment
about how crucial a role the debates played among other
4
variables.
These televised presidential debates, dubbed the
"Great Debates,"provided Americans with an unprecedented
opportunity to see the Democratic and Republican
presidential candidates discuss campaign issues, and to
measure their candidate. Political scientists would
later argue over the effects. Sam Lubell's observation
that religion was the most important variable in the
1960 presidential election seems the most telling.
Lubell observed that Kennedy's sharper vision of America
and his concise answers convinced enough voters to put
aside momentarily their negative feelings about the
suitability of a Roman Catholic to serve as president.
If the debates failed to meet a political
scientist's hope of a dispassionate discussion of issues
for the enlightment of voters, they did something else
quite as valuable. They provided an opportunity for
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voters to measure their candidates under stress, and,
in Theodore White's words "let the voters decide, by
instinct and emotion, which pattern of behavior under
5
stress they preferred in their leader." Significantly,
they consolidated and accelerated a trend toward Kennedy
in the 1960 presidential election. Kennedy's crowds had
been growing in numbers and enthusiasm fully a week
before the first television debate. They grew
phenomonally and frantically afterward. And Kennedy's
presentation in the first debate had been so forceful
that ten Democratic governors from the South, at best
indifferent and at worst hostile to Kennedy, wired him
their congratulations and support from a regional
6
conference they were attending.
More importantly, the Great Debates changed the
chemistry of electing an American president. Performance
on television became a crucial variable. John F.
Kennedy emerged from this first television debate as
something of a movie star. Beyond the wildly
enthusiastic crowds following his first debate with
Nixon, Kennedy's example showed other candidates that
speaking directly to voters in an adversarial situation
with opponents guaranteed public attention. Henceforth,
politicians' abilities to project on television became
an all important considertion in presidential elections.
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In 1964, 1968, and 1972, Lyndon Johnson and Richard
Nixon refused to debate their opponents over television,
because they believed they had more to lose than gain
7
from doing so. In 1976 and 1980,televised debates
enabled challengers to appear as the equals of
incumbents. In 1984, televised debates showed again that
when a challenger spoke convincingly to the American
people he could put a chink in a strong incumbent's
armor. Following his defeat, Walter Mondale acknowledged
that he felt he could not overtake President Reagan's
commanding lead when he had failed to repeat in the
second of two televised debates the same performance he
8
had deliverd in the first.
In 1960, presidential debates were hardly a given.
The Equal Time law interferred. Congress authorized
permission to waive Equal Time just a month before on
August 23rd, and President Eisenhower had only signed
the joint resolution into law on August 25th. Without
this congressional waiver, there could have been no
televised presidential debates. Under Equal Time,
broadcasters were required to include all legally
qualified candidates for an office in televised debates
if they provided time to major party candidates.
Congress waived Equal Time only for presidential and
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vice presidential debates in the 1960 election.
Following Election Day, 1960, the Equal Time law would
go back on the books. Broadcasters would be required to
to provide time to all legally qualified candidates, no
matter how insignificant their following, if they
provided time to major party candidates. In this moment
of congressional reprieve, Kennedy and Nixon squarred
9
off. That November, more people voted than ever before.
Negotiations for the presidental debates had been
intense. The television networks wanted to host debates
between the Democratic and Republican presidential
candidates in order to counter their sagging reputations
10
due to scandals involving tv quiz shows. The networks
were willing to offer "free time" only if they retained
editorial control over the proposed debates by
scheduling them on expanded versions of such news shows
as "Meet the Press."
Events happened quickly. In April, 1960, Robert
Sarnoff, Chairman of the National Broadcasting Company,
offered eight hours of an expanded Saturday night
version of the popular public affairs show "Meet the
Press" to the Democratic and Republican presidential
11
candidates for questioning by reporters. CBS and ABC
quickly followed. CBS's Frank Stanton urged
congressional repeal of Equal Time for the Republican
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and Democratic presidential and vice presidential
candidates for the 1960 election. He said CBS would be
willing to provide an hour a week for eight weeks prior
to the election for joint use by the major party
candidates, but would not participate in simultaneous
broadcasts with NBC and ABC. Under questioning from
South Carolina's Strom Thurmond, the Dixiecrat candidate
for president in 1948, Stanton said CBS would provide
equitable time for substantial third party candidates,
and cover their candidacies as part of evening
newscasts. ABC's David C. Adams suggested that networks
rotate an hour each week for the nine weeks preceding
the election for debates between the Republican and
Democratic presidential candidates, that way each
12
network would produce three hours of time.
In May, Adlai Stevenson went before the Senate
Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee to argue that
the television networks should be compelled to provide
airtime --for the Democratic and Republican presidential
momnees-Stevenson proposed that Congress require the
major television networks to make an hour available free
of charge during prime time evenings for the eight weeks
preceding election day. He said each hour could be
divided equally between the major party presidential
candidates, and that the vice presidential candidates
should be able to use two of the eight hours. He said
143
Sarnoff's proposal of an expanded "Meet the Press"
format was wanting, because a panel would control the
issues to be discussed. Debates were far better.
Stevenson did acknowledge that the federal government
might pay for the time, but added the networks' donation
of the time in the public interest "would hardly be so
13
expensive as to be beyond the[ir] endurance."
Stevenson said his proposal would reduce the influence
of campaign contributions and enable voters to "make a
14
direct comparison" of candidates. One hundred-fifty
people crowded into the committee room. They gave him a
15
standing ovation.
Television network executives disagreed with
Governor Stevenson, and all offered time to the major
party presidential nominees. NBC's Robert Sarnoff
criticized Stevenson's proposal as "the wrong way to go
16
about doing the right thing." He stuck to his original
offer of eight hour length shows of "Meet the Press."
Sarnoff claimed that S.3171, the bill Stevenson
supported, was withdrawn after his offer of 8 expanded
17
hours of "Meet the Press."
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Republicans did not like Stevenson's idea. They had
more money to spend on political commercials than the
18
Democrats. Vice President Nixon and former New York
Governor Thomas Dewey called the proposal
"expropriatory." Former President Hoover criticized the
proposal for violating the first amendment rights of
minority candidates like the Republicans, adding that
18
candidates should buy television time.
In July, all three networks offered time for
debates to Nixon and Kennedy after they had been
nominated by the Republican and Democratic parties.
Kennedy accepted quickly so that the burden was placed
on Nixon to accept the offer. Nixon accepted through a
spokesman within a day.
Both the politicians and the broadcasters willingly
put aside any reservations they might have had about the
free speech rights of minor party candidates in order to
enable televised presidential debates between the major
party candidates to take place. The network
executives, who were so insistentent on their own free
speech rights, held up the prospect of such minor party
candidates as as Lar Daly of the Tax Cut Party or Orval
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E. Faubus of the National States Rights Party or Whitney
Harp Slocomb of the Greenback Party or William Lloyd
Smith of the American Beat Consensus debating with John
Fitzgerald Kennedy and Richard Milhous Nixon as the
basis for insisting on a waiver of Equal Time.
For all this, the Great Debates were a step toward
greater freedom of expression for broadcasters besides
being a benefit to the public. Where one could assert in
the case of the 1959 amendments to Equal Time that the
public came out just about where it was all along, here,
with the Great Debates, the public won the opportunity
to see and to measure the major party presidential
candidates. Had Congress not waived Equal Time, there
would have been no televised presidential debates. Equal
Time would have had the perverse effect of denying a
flow of political programming to the public.
The waiver constitutes another example of the
stubborn resistance of majoritarian and libertarian
standards of free speech for television. The free speech
rights of minor party candidates were sacrificed so that
broadcasters could exercise their free speech rights to
put the major party candidates on tv. By winning their
free speech rights, broadcasters had effect majoritarian
goals of informing the public.
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Finally, the limited scope of the waiver suggests
another theme in this study, namely the effort of
politicians to cope with a major means of mass
communications like tv in making law and shaping
policy. The waiver, after all, was only for the 1960
presidential election. After the fourth Kennedy-Nixon
debate, Equal Time law returned to the status quo ante.
The brevity of the waiver suggests that politicians were
so anxious about the power of television to shape
electoral outcomes by influencing public opinion that
they were willing to grant only the most minimal
discretion to broadcasters. During the sixties, and
activitist FCC and Supreme Court would further limit
broadcasters' free speech rights in news and public
affairs programming.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE CRESTING TIDE OF THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE
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This chapter chronicles the cresting tide of the
Fairness Doctrine. It runs roughly from the late
fifties to the early seventies, the period in our
culture known more popularly known as the sixties.
During this time, the FCC extended and amplified the
Fairness Doctrine and the Supreme Court recognized its
constitutionality. Although radio and television were
fixtures in the culture by the sixties, policy and law
still regarded them as a technology, which required
special regulation. Broadcasters won no free speech
victories during this period. Indeed, the current is
entirely that of a cresting majoritarian tide.
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1During the late fifties and early sixties, the
initial salvo for high quality news and public affair
programming came from within the broadcasting industry.
In 1958, Edward R. Murrow, the distinguished news
reporter, urged tv management to televise more news and
public affairs due to a dual sense of enlightened self-
interest and public service.
Murrow's argument was that of enlighten
libertarianism. In his address to the Radio and
Television News Directors Association in 1958, Murrow
made an eloquent plea for high quality tv news and
public affairs programming. Essentially, Murrow
advocated self-regulation. He argued for no more than
intelligent management. Murrow correctly foresaw that
news and public affairs programming were essential
ingredients in successfully managing huge entertainment
corporations. He did not advocate increased government
scrutiny. He made no mention of the Fairness Doctrine,
only one reference to the Communications Act, two of
the FCC. He spoke as a thoughtful, intelligent,
influential insider, who was 'going public' with
recommendations that had fallen on deaf ears within
1
television management.
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Murrow's long and distinguished carreer as a
broadcast journalist, dating back to his wartime radio
reports from London and including major news specials
such as his "See It Now" broadcast on Senator Joseph
McCarthy, added credibilty to his criticisms. Despite
the quality of Murrow's work, CBS had discontinued his
"See It Now" series in 1958. TV had grown so immensely
profitable as a medium of mass entertainment that CBS
management could sell the "See It Now" time slot far
more profitably for entertainment programming than for
news and public affairs. CBS management was also wary
of offending potential viewers by televising
controversial news programming of the sort Murrow
2
produced. It was at this point in Murrow's career that
he addressed the Radio and Television New Director's
Association in October, 1958.
Murrow's broadside was impelling. Murrow complained
that broadcasting was an "incompatible" mix of show
business, advertising, and journalism. He criticized
broadcast management for timorousness in acquiescing to
the government, particularly a "fiat" from Secretary of
State Dulles banning American journalists from Communist
China. He complained that corporate interest routinely
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dominated the public interest, remarking critically
about CBS's and NBC's delayed broadcasts of an address
by President Eisenhower on "the probablity of war
between this nation and the Soviet Union and Communist
China" in order to avoid disrupting entertainment
programming. He stated flatly that many broadcasters had
"welshed on [their] promises" to televise news and
3
public affairs programming due to greed.
Murrow spoke as a man who believed in the capacity
of broadcast journalism to inform the public about
serious issues. Murrow noted that the United States in
the late fifties was "wealthy, fat, comfortable and
complacent. We have currently a built-in allergy to
unpleasant or disturbing information. Our mass media
reflect this. But unless we get off our fat surpluses
and recongnize that television in the main is being used
to distract, delude, amuse and insulate us, then
television and those who finance it, those who look at
it and those who work in it, may see a totally different
4
picture too late," Murrow warned. To avoid such a
fate,Murrow urged something be "done within the existing
framework" that "redound[ed] to the credit of those who
5
finance and produce" television programming.
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Murrow proposed that the major tv advertisers
devote a share of their advertising money to quality
news and public affairs programming, and that the
networks absorb the production costs. By doing so,
Murrow asserted, both advertisers and the networks would
come out ahead in terms of the "corporate image" so
important to them. Murrow offered a solution within the
existing framework, which would not threaten the
profitability of the corporations engaged in
broadcasting either as advertisers or as producers.
Eventually the television networks would follow Murrow's
advice but only after scandals had rocked their
industry. He also said the public would come out ahead.
6
It would be better informed.
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2In the early sixties, the federal government and
the courts articulated a majoritarian view of news and
political programming. During the sixties, this view was
clearly dominant. To many people, stiff regulation
seemed necessary. In the late fifties, broadcasing was
mired in scandal surrounding the rigging of television
7
quiz shows. Two FCC Commissioners, including the
Chairman, were forced to resign due to improper dealings
8
with the broadcasters they were charged to regulate.
Murrow's argument fell on deaf ears. And, in 1960, the
nation elected a vigorous, optimistic president,who
espoused the positive role of government in directing
the nation's future.
Three FCC programming statements in the early
sixties pushed the cresting tide of the Fairness
Doctrine. Two addressed tv programming generally: both
upheld the flow of a diversity of news, public affairs,
and entertainment programming to the public over the
broadcasters' own programming preferences. Each tried to
contend with the banality of most prime time television
programming by asserting the regulatory authority of the
FCC. The third dealt explicitly with the Fairness
Doctrine.
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In 1960, the FCC issued a policy statement in
which it called for more diverse programming. The
censorship restrictions of the Communications Act
prohibited the FCC from involving itself directly in
programming content so the policy statement did not have
much bite. But the FCC did specify a number of
programming formats, which, it contended, did serve the
public interest. Among others, these formats included
editorials, public affairs, educational, political and
news programs. The statement also designated "service to
minority group" along with these other program formats
as consistent with broadcasters' public interest
9
responsiblities.
A second statement, FCC Commissioner Newton
Minnow's "Vast Wasteland" address to the National
Association of Broadcasters in 1961, had a more dramatic
impact. Minnow spoke for the New Frontier. He told
broadcasters to "help prepare a generation for great
decisions... ,[to] help a great nation fulfill its
future." He urged broadcasters "to put the people's
airwaves to the service of the people and the cause of
10
freedom." He warned broadcasters that license renewals
would become rigorous, and that the FCC would view local
programming and high quality news and public affairs
programming as important parts of tv programming. He
said that he intended to chair an activist FCC, one
guided by serving the public interest.
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Minnow's activist rhetoric was a clear signal to
broadcasters that at the least the FCC had changed its
tone along with the incoming administration. At a
glance, Minnow's majoritarian position differs little
from those dating back to Hoover's statements advocating
listener sovereignty. But the freshness and insistence
of Minnow's statement put broadcasters on notice. It was
much more directed. It signaled the difference in tone
between an acquiescent and ineffective FCC during the
last quarter of the Eisenhower administration, and the
insistence under Kennedy that broadcasters had to
provide more variety and content in their programming.
In the New Frontier, the FCC asserted unambiguously that
news and public affairs programming would be crucial
factors in determining their license renewals.
The third FCC statement of this period dealt
explictly with the Fairness Doctrine. In 1964, the FCC
published the Fairness Primer, and distributed it to
broadcasters. The Primer compiled a number of 'typical'
cases, and provided broadcasters with information on FCC
decision making on Fairness Doctrine complaints. It was
further evidence of FCC seriousness in reminding
broadcasters about the Fairness Doctrine and news and
11
public affair programming.
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These FCC three statements from the early sixties
set the basis for FCC administrative expansion of the
Fairness Doctrine. All upheld the majoritarian view on
news and public affairs programming. It is important to
remember the dominance of the majoritarian position,
because the FCC based the following decisions, expanding
the Fairness Doctrine, on the validity of its authority
to assure that broadcasters provide a flow of 'balanced'
news and political information to tv watchers.
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3FCC actions, expanding the Fairness Doctrine,
carried forward the majoritarian position that the
public's right to diverse information preceeded those of
broadcasters to express themselves. In each of the
following decisions, the FCC extended the Fairness
Doctrine beyond its original bounds. It is important to
note that the decisions do not violate the spirit of the
original Fairness Doctrine. It's authors, after all,
intended subsequent FCC's to modify it as "the public
interest" required. What's telling is that the FCC's of
this period expanded the Fairness Doctrine as an
instrument of the public interest.
In 1963, in the Letter to the Honorable Oren
Harris, the FCC changed fourteen years of Fairness
Doctrine administration. The FCC announced that it would
consider Fairness Doctrine complaints individually on a
case by case basis. In the future, the FCC wrote, it
would consider fairness complaints as they arose on
specific issues and stories. It would no longer withold
decisions on news and public affairs programming
complaints until license renewals were issued nor would
it evaluate the Fairness Doctrine obligations of
broadcasters on the basis of his overall programming as
it had done from 1949 to 1963.
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The FCC contended such a policy was fairer to
broadcaster and public alike. Broadcasters could
seek legal relief in the courts if they wanted to
contest a specific FCC Fairness Doctrine decision. Such
a course, the FCC wrote, was better for broadcasters
than potentially losing their licenses. The public would
benefit of timely disposition of Fairness Doctrine
cases, the FCC wrote.
The FCC's change in administrative policy came
about in response to a query from Congressman Oren
Harris. Harris wanted the FCC to clarify when it would
reach Fairness Doctrine decisions on complaints. The FCC
defended the policy change by writing Harris that case
by case review would not be intrusive since FCC
inquiries focussed only on the reasonableness of a
broadcaster's discretion in providing contrasting views
on controversial issues and not on the substance of the
issues themselves.
Substantive problems arose directly for the FCC.
Due to case-by-case review, the FCC found itself
involved directly in the content of controversial news
programming. While the the FCC had written Congressman
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Harris that case-by-case review would require the FCC to
deal only with the reasonableness of a broadcaster's
efforts to assure a balance of conflicting views, in
practice this policy created a myriad of bureaucratic
problems. The FCC placed itself in the position of
deciding what constituted a reasonable balance of
conflicting views on individual topics. For example, the
FCC had to determine the appropriate ratio of time for
proponents and opponents of conflicting points of view.
This this meant the FCC had to do its own documentation
of time alloted to controversial issues as well as the
balance of conflicting views within those presentations.
The FCC then had to reach a decision on the
content of the programming: was it for, against or
neutral on the issue? The use of stop watches became
necessary to reach these determinations.
The timing and frequency of the scheduling of
conflicting views on controversial issues had to be
considered. For example, how much weight could and
should the FCC place on a complainant's direct access to
a relatively small audience by appearing on a Sunday
morning talk show when an "unbalanced" program might
well have reached a significantly larger audience during
a prime time broadcast. And, should a broadcaster
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subject to a complaint suddenly start televising more
balanced programming duing FCC review, what then
12
constituted the basis for an FCC decision?
In practice, case-by-case review did not work so
well for tv viewers. In making this rule, the FCC placed
the procedural burden on complainants to show a
broadcaster's unfairness, but it did not require
broadcasters to release any programming information to
complainants. Individuals or groups with Fairness
Doctrine complaints then to go through time-consuming
documentation in order to prove a broadcaster's
unfairness. Despite these procedural problems, the FCC
received more Fairness Doctrine complaints after making
its case-by-case review decision.
In the Cullman corollary, the FCC extended the
Fairness Doctrine to ballot issues. The FCC ruled that
the Fairness Doctrine required broadcasters to provide
reply time, free if necessary, to spokesmen on ballot
issues.
The Cullman corollary comprised two significant
elements of Fairness Doctrine policy. It was
majoritarian in its first amendment logic that the right
of the public to information clearly took precedence
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over the rights of broadcasters to express their views.
Secondly, it acknowledged that broadcasters retained
considerable discretion in public affairs programming.
The FCC specifically told Cullman that "if it is your
good faith judgement that the public has had the
opportunity fairly to hear contrasting views... then it
would appear.. .that you obligation pursuant to the
13
fairness doctine has been met." The ruling contained
a number of mollifiers for broadcasters. The FCC ruled
broadcasters would be required to provide time to
spokesmen only if they had previously aired programming
that was clearly partial. The responsibility for
providing time free-of-charge depended entirely on the
broadcaster's judgement. The Cullman corollary impelled
broadcasters to provide free time only if he were unable
to find someone capable of paying, who was competent to
.articulate a view opposing that which already aired on
s station. Broadcasters retained discretion under the
Cullman decision about the format in which these parties
14
or individuals would appear.
The dangers of the Cullman corollary were those of
subsidizing partisans and inhibiting broadcasters.
Broadcasters worried that the Cullman decision opened
162
them up to manipulation by interest groups. They feared
not incorrectly that interest groups would use the
corollary to demand free tv time and then spend their
funds for other purposes, such as newspaper ads,
organizational help, etc. In fact, in 1985 when the FCC
formally reconsidered the Fairness Doctrine, fully
twenty-two years after the Cullman corollary was
announced, public interest groups championed its first
amendment virtues while broadcasters derided its
chilling effect and the burdens of subsidizing
referenda campaigns due to the regulation.
The Cullman corollary came about when the Cullman
Broadcasting Company asked the FCC to clarify whether
Fairness Doctrine obligations applied to local spokesmen
of national issues. Cullman maintained the Fairness
Doctrine applied only to local spokesmen for local
issues. A citizen's group, the Citizens Committee for a
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, had approached Cullman
management with a request for air time to respond to
programming, which they felt was biased against passage
of the treaty.
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In the Zapple decision, the FCC extended the
Fairness Doctrine to the spokesmen for political
candidates during campaigns. One such spokesman,
Nicholas Zapple, had asked for equal time for spokesmen
for candidates under Equal Time (Section 315). It was
Zapple's concern that broadcasters be required to
provide equal time for one candidate's spokesmen if they
had provided time for another's. Since Equal Time
(Section 315) applies solely to candidates during
political campaigns, and does not cover their spokesmen,
Zapple asked the FCC to rule whether the Fairness
Doctrine might enable candidate's spokesmen to equal
time.
In the Zapple decision, the FCC ruled only on paid
time. The FCC responded that broadcasters must sell time
to one candidate's spokesmen if they already had sold it
to another's. The FCC made a clear distinction between
the Cullman corollary, which dealt with ballot issues
and the Zapple decision. In the Zapple decision, the FCC
expressly ruled out any requirement to provide free time
to a candidate's spokesman. "Any such requirement would
be an unwarranted and inappropriate intrusion of the
164
fairness doctrine into the the area of political
15
campaign financing," the FCC reasoned. In Cullman, by
contrast, the FCC felt the public's right to hear
information on ballot issues overrided potential abuses
of the corollary by partisans.
In 1967, the FCC extended the Fairness Doctrine to
commercials, specifically cigarettes. The FCC required
broadcasters to provide "a significant amount of time
16
for the other viewpoint" if they televised cigarette
commercials. Controversey surrounding the health hazards
of smoking warranted extension of the Fairness Doctrine
to product advertising, the FCC argued. The Commission
also noted that it would not apply the Fairness Doctrine
to other products because, it said, cigarettes were a
"unique" product.
A dizzying series of congressional acts, court
decisions and FCC rulings then followed. Congress banned
cigarette advertising over radio and television
effective January 2, 1971. The Court of Appeals in
Washington, D. C. upheld the rule and extended it to
other products deemed to be hazardous or to cause
pollution, in this latter case super-powered cars and
the use of high-test gasoline. Then, in 1974, the FCC
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backed off its initial 1967 decision, by ruling that
commercials did not "inform the public on any side of a
controversial issue of public importance" or make "a
17
meaningful contribution to public debate." Thereafter,
the Fairness Doctrine became applicable only to
commercial advertising in which sponsors explicitly
raised controversial issues and no longer included
ordinary commerical advertising.
The substantive problem confronting the FCC was the
reach of the Fairness Doctrine. In keeping with the
original status of the Fairness Doctrine as a regulatory
memorandum subject to change, the FCC extended it to
commercial advertising of a clearly controversial
product. No more. It was as the original authors had
wanted. In 1949, the rationale for articulating the
Fairness Doctrine as a regulatory memorandum rested
precisely on the notion that succeeding FCC's could
apply it as the public interest required. And, in 1967,
the FCC decided the pubic interest required a ban on
cigarette advertising over radio and television. The
aggrieved, in this case, broadcasters and cigarette
companies took their complaints to the courts, again as
the original Fairness Doctrine indicated was proper, and
had an opportunity, which they lost, for the court to
overrule the FCC.
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Nevertheless, the policy proved unworkable for the
FCC. The ruling and the subsequent backing-off proved
only that the FCC found itself involved in creating
policy it could not maintain. Although the Courts
sustained the original policy, the FCC extension of the
Fairness Doctrine to product commercials involved the
FCC too directly in tv programming. And, by 1974,
Congress had legislated a ban on cigarette advertising
over radio and television.
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4Two court decisions, one enabling citizen
participation in license renewals, and the other,
upholding the constitutionality of the Fairness
Doctrine, crested the Fairness Doctrine wave. Each
decision is majoritarian in its First Amendment
arguments.
In The United Church of Christ case, the Court of
Appeals in Washington, D. C. upheld the right of
ordinary citizens to participate in the FCC's licensing.
The decision opened the door to greater public
participation in licensing renewals. It sanctioned the
public trustee role of broadcasters as the yardstick
against which the FCC measured license renewals.
The United Church of Christ contended that WLBT in
Jackson, Mississippi was broadcasting racist news and
public affairs programming, and that the FCC had acted
irresponsibly in renewing WLBT's license. The FCC had
granted provisional license renewal to WLBT on condition
that WLBT management change it ways. Specifically, the
FCC required WLBT to "comply strictly with
the. .. fairness doctrine,....to observe strictly its
168
representations to the Commission in this [fairness]
area,.....[to] have discussions with community leaders,
including those active in the civil rights movement.. .as
to whether its programming is fully meeting the needs
and interests of its area, [and to ] cease
18
discriminatory programming patterns." The Court found
this wanting, and instructed the FCC to consider new
applicants for WLBT's frequency. The station was
operated by a non-profit, integrated group of local
residents during FCC comparative hearings for the
license.
The United Church of Christ decision showed that
the Fairness Doctrine rather than the other legal
remedies, such as bringing suits for libel, slander, or
defamation, was an effective tool for a public interest
group to wrest a license from a broadcaster. It
therefore put broadcasters on notice in no uncertain
terms that their licenses could be challenged not merely
by other businessmen competing for the same license, but
by groups of entrepreneurs and public interest
proponents as well.
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The Red Lion decision was the high water mark in
the cresting tide of the Fairness Doctrine. It
constituted the big victory for proponents of the
majoritarian position on free speech. The Court held
that the FCC had broad policing powers to assure a flow
of diverse news programming to listeners. The Court
ruled that the FCC had not exceeded its congressionally
delegated authority in making rules that required
broadcasters provide direct access to the airwaves for
individuals who had been attacked in broadcast
commentary. It acknowledged congressional codification
of the Fairness Doctrine in the 1959 amendments to Equal
Time.
The Red Lion case dealt with personal attacks in
broadcast commentaries. The personal attack rule
required broadcasters to provide reply time to persons
or individuals whose honesty, integrity or character
they attacked in editorials on controversial public
issues. The FCC required broadcasters to notify the
person or group of the editorial within a week, provide
him or it with a transcript, and offer a "reasonable
opportunity" for response over the broadcaster's
station. The personal attack rule extended to political
editorials, which dealt with a broadcaster's editorial
endorsement or opposition to political candidates. In
such a case, the rule required broadcasters to notify
170
all candidates of their editorial opionion, provide each
a tape or transcript, offer each or his spokesman "a
reasonable opportunity" to respond over the
broadcaster's station. It specifically exempted
commentaries that were within newscasts, but it did
apply to editorials a broadcaster might make on his own
following a newscast.
For a number of reasons the Court held that the
personal attack rule did not violate the first amendment
rights of broadcasters. Listener sovereignty remained
paramount. The Court held that the first amendment does
not protect private censorship by broadcasters. The
Court observed that the chilling effect of the personal
attack rule on broadcasters was "at best speculative."
It held that spectrum scarcity was still a problem, so
that broadcasters could not legitimately assert that the
number of channels in a market relieved individual
broadcasters of their responsibilities to provide "a
reasonable opportunity" for response. In the Court's
opinion, broadcasters held licenses to scarce airwaves
as public trustees, and as such, were obligated to
provide reply time for expressing controversial
editorial views. For all these reasons, the Court held
that the personal attacks rule upheld the first
amendment rather than undermined it.
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The logic behind Red Lion was entirely that of the
majoritarian view. Writing for a unanimous court,
Justice Byron White ruled that "it is the right of the
public to receive suitable access to social, political,
esthetic, moral and other ideas which is crucial
19
here." Like Frankfurter in the NBC case, White wrote
"there is nothing in the first amendment which prevents
the government from requiring a licensee to share his
frequency with others an to conduct himself as a proxy
of fiduciary with obligation to present thouse views and
voices which are representative of his community and
which would otherwiseby necessity, be barred from the
20
airwaves." And, like the AP ruling, White saw "no
sanctuary in the first amendment for unlimited private
21
censorship operating in a medium not open to all."
And, again, "as we have said, the first amendment
confers no right on licensees to prevent others from
broadcasting on 'their' frequencies and no right to an
unconditional monopoly of a scarce resource which the
22
government has denied other the right to use."
White cited FRC and FCC regulatory policies, which
effected a majoritarian policy in broadcasting. In the
Great Lakes case of 1929, the Federal Radio Commission
ruled "the public interest requires ample play for the
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free and fair competition of opposing views, and the
commission belives that the principle applies ... to all
23
discussions of issues of importance to the public."
The Court noted that in the thirties the FCC had denied
license renewals or refused construction permits for
broadcasters, which wanted to broadcast special interest
programming, due to regulatory insistence that
broadcasters carry programming for a diversity of
people. Noting the Mayflower decision in passing, the
Court jumped quickly to the Fairness Doctrine and its
component parts -- a) adequate, fair coverage of public
issues, and b) the presentation of conflicting views on
pertinent, public issues. All these regulatory
precedents indicated a consistency between the FCC's
personal attacks rule and earlier rulings on news
programming, according to the Court.
The -court then trained it eye on statute and FCC
ii ~akif authority. It found broad authority for the
dCto ke rules, such as the personal attack rule, in
-the original Communications Act. It found in the final
24
version of Proxmire amendment to the 1959 Equal Time
amendments a link between the public interest standards
173
of the original Radio Act and the Fairness Doctrine.
"The amendment vindicated the FCC's general view that
the fairness doctrine inhered in the public interest
standard," the Court wrote. And again, "thirty years of
consistent administrative construction left undisturbed
by Congress until 1959, when that construction was
expressly accepted, reinforce the natural conclusin that
the public interest language of the Act authorized the
Commission to require licensees to use their stations
for discussion of public issues, and that the FCC is
free to implement this requirement by reasonable rules
25
and regulations...."
From there, it was a short leap to the personal
attack rule itself. The Court noted that the FCC had
promulgated the personal attack rule in 1967. The rule
fell, therefore, within the FCC's congressional
delegated authority to make rules. The FCC had made the
rule on its own discretion. Congress had not passed a
law nor instructed the FCC to implement precise aspects
of the law. This distinction was crucial, because the
FCC's own rule making capacities and the scope of FCC
authority were being tested. And, again, the Court found
no inconsistency between the personal attack rule and
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earlier FCC regulations, specifically Equal Time and
the Fairness Doctrine. "Elementary considerations of
fairness may dictate that time be allocated to a person
or group which has been specifically attacked over the
27
station," the Court quoted the Fairness Doctrine.
In an important aspect of the Red Lion decision,
Justice White upheld the constitutionality of the
Fairness Doctrine. He wrote that FCC rules requirying a
broadcaster to provide reply time to an individual, who
had been attacked over his radio station, were
consistent with congressional intent in codifying the
Fairness Doctrine as part of the 1959 amendments to
Equal Time. Placing placed great weight on the final
version of the Proxmire amendment, White noted that
Senator Joseph Pastore, the majority manager on the 1959
amendments, and Senator Hugh Scott, minority manager of
the 1959 amendments, asserted the paramount importance
28
of assuring a flow of news to the public. The
importance both Pastore and Scott attached to Proxmire's
amendment proved to White that Congress wanted to impose
Fairness Doctrine responsiblities on broadcasters.
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Red Lion was thus a double blow to broadcasters.
First, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the
Fairness Doctrine on the time-tried majoritarian view of
the first amendment that a flow of news and information
to the public took precedence over their first amendment
freedoms of expression. Second, the Court recognized
that Congress had given statutory authority to the
Fairness Doctrine by inserting the watered-down version
of the Proxmire amendment, requirying broadcasters to
provide "a reasonable opportunity for the discussion of
conflicting views on issues of public importance," to
29
the 1959 amendments to Equal Time.
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5Henry Geller, a prominent communications attorney
and expert on the Fairness Doctrine, provided expert
advice on managing an expanded Fairness Doctrine.
Geller wrote a Rand Corporation report on the Fairness
Doctrine. The Ford Foundation underwrote the project.
The report was intended for use by the FCC as part of an
30
inquiry into the Fairness Doctrine. In order to be of
most use to the FCC, Geller confined his recommendations
to rules and regulations that the FCC could make on its
own without having to go to Congress for further
authorization. "The report's suggestions are pragmatic
ones, which can be implemented by the FCC within
31
existing law," Geller noted.
Geller's recommendations were straight-forward. He
told the FCC to dump the case-by-case review method,
which it had adopted in 1963. He advised the FCC to
return to the original Fairness Doctrine standard of
evaluating overall programming only at license renewals.
Such a course, Geller wrote, would get the FCC out of
evaluating single issues and daily news operations. At
the same time, overall review a license renewal would
assure sufficient scrutiny to determine whether
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broadcasters fulfilled their public trustee
responsibilities, Geller said. To make this policy work,
Geller urged the FCC only to require broadcasters to
"show in a general fashion" that they had afforded
reasonable opportunities for contrasting views to be
heard. He also suggested that broadcasters submit a list
of ten issues, nationally and locally, which they
covered most extensively the previous year. He thought
"time percentage guidelines" might be a useful tool
rather than the case-by-case, single issue method. He
recommended a more efficient complaint procedure, one
32
less burdensome to complainants.
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6The sixties produced a remarkable expansion of the
Fairness Doctrine, all within the majoritarian canon.
The Supreme Court held that the Fairness Doctrine
effected the first amendment rather than undermined it.
The FCC successfully expanded its applications to
partisans for ballot issues and spokesmen for candidates
as well as to the FCC's own review of specific issues.
Issue-oriented citizens won standing as participants in
FCC licensing decisions due to complaints about a
broadcaster's fairness.
An ebbing tide follows an incoming one. For
proponents of a libertarian policy, the ebbing tide
would slowly and minimally wash away some of the
majoritarian policies of earlier FCC's and Courts. FCC
policy reversals in areas of political programming
signaled the shifting tides. By the mid-seventies,
pressure for televised presidential debates prompted the
FCC to amend Equal Time so that debates could occur
again.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE ASPEN DECISION AND THE FCC'S 1983 RULING
ON CANDIDATES DEBATES
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1Although President Nixon had resigned in August,
1974, the after-effects of Watergate loomed over the
Republic well into the following year. On May Day, 1975,
North Vietnamese troops rolled into Saigon. To
thoughtful people, the Watergate scandal and the victory
of the North Vietnamese over the US-backed South
Vietnamese signaled the disasterous shortcomings and
ultimate conclusions of the Imperial Presidency. In the
press, the Pentagon Papers and the Nixon tapes had
revealed and exposed both the savage, imperial
remoteness and veniality of the Presidency. And despite
all the bad news, one could only thank the press for
doing its job so well. Many believed the press had
rescued the nation from calamity. True to the first
amendment vision of the founders, a free press had
reported, and public opinion had finally rid the nation
of an irresponsible chief executive and commander-in-
chief. But something more had to be done to return the
Presidency to the people, to bring it back into contact
with voters, to make it more responsive to public
opinion.
The problem troubled Douglass Cater, Director of
the Aspen Institute Program on Communications and
Society. Cater was a former journalist, and in 1975, he
directed the Aspen Institute, a think tank on
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communications issues. Throughout 1975, Cater advocated
televised debates between presidential candidates as an
important way to enable voters to assess the president,
who would be elected in 1976. In April 1975, at Cater's
instigation the Brookings Institute had recommended that
the FCC re-evaluate its Equal Time regulations on
candidates' debates so that debates between the
Democratic and Republican presidential nominess could
appear on national television without triggering a host
of Equal Time requests from fringe party candidates.
Later in April, the Aspen Institute and CBS, Inc.
presented petitions to the FCC to alter its Equal Time
regulations on candidates' debates and news conferences.
Aspen petitioned the FCC to lift its Equal Time
requirement on presidential debates, and CBS petitioned
the FCC to lift its Equal Time requirement on
candidates' news conferences.
In the Watergate era, both petitions made sense.
They opened up the presidency to scrutiny. They enabled
the people to see the major candidates debate face to
face and to hear how an incumbent president handled
questions from journalists. They enabled the press to do
its job, free of government regulation. Both were
liberalizing proposals. And both ran squarely into the
FCC's regulations on Equal Time, regulations which were
themselves animated by a liberal vision to assure the
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fullest flow of news and political programming to the
American public.
in September, 1975, the FCC gave television a freer
hand in covering candidates' debates and press
conferences. In a significant Equal Time decision that
became known as the Aspen decision, the FCC announced
that both candidates' debates and news conferences were
"bona fide news events" and, as such, exempt from FCC
1
Equal Time requirements. Gone were the old rules
requirying broadcasters to provide Equal Time to any
candidate if they broadcast a debate or news conference
of any one or two candidates, rules originally put in
place by the 86th Congress in 1959. In the Aspen
decision, the FCC swept these rules away, and assumed
the power to redefine the Equal Time rules Congress had
set for political programming.
But the FCC gave broadcasters a freer hand only up
to a point. Even at the moment in the mid-seventies when
journalism enjoyed substantial public support,
broadcasters wrested only a partial victory for
themselves and found they still had one hand bound by
new rules, particularly on candidates' debates. A
pattern set in 1959 seemed to be emerging once again: a
limited victory on one programming format, in this case,
press conferences, accompanied by only a modest gain in
another, candidates' debates.
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The FCC majority ruled in Aspen that broadcasters
could cover candidates' debates only if the broadcasters
themselves neither initiated nor controlled them. In
other words, broadcasters could not stage candidates'
debates nor could they determine who would and would not
be invited. Such control, the FCC felt, would give too
much power to tv. The more expedient course lay in a
third party, such as the League of Women Voters, hosting
debates between candidates somewhere outside a
television studio, and broadcasters then exercising
their news judgement to cover the debates in their
entirety as "bona fide" news events. Such a construction
skirted troublesome control and use issues. The FCC
simply included candidates' debates along with other
kinds of "bona fide" news exempted from Equal Time in
1959.
Although the broadcasters' victory was limited, it
was by no means hollow. In 1959 and 1960, television
broadcasters were the big winners. They rescued their
scandal-tainted industry from public disfavor and
perhaps increased regulatory oversight by winning
congressional approval for greater broadcaster control
over news and political programming. Many regarded the
FCC's literal interpretation of Equal Time in Lar Daly
as extreme. Congress had provided broadcasters greater
discretion in their news programming by holding that
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candidates' appearances in a newscast, news interview,
documentary and news events did not require Equal Time.
In 1960, broadcasters had won the right to initiate and
stage televised debates between Nixon and Kennedy thanks
to a Joint Resolution of Congress. Then, in 1975, in the
wake of the Pentagon papers, Watergate, and the Nixon
tapes, broadcasters won again. But this time, they won
a limited but nonetheless significant victory. In the
Aspen decision, broadcasters attained total discretion
on televising candidates' news conferences and limited
discretion on televising candidates' debates.
Incumbent candidates were big winners in the Aspen
decision. They had a better chance of pressing their
cases directly to voters over television after Aspen
than before it. Incumbent politicians could hold news
conferences for whatever purposes they wished whenever
they wished, particularly during elections, without fear
opponents would receive Equal Time for press conferences
of their own. Any petition to the FCC requesting Equal
Time for rebutting press conferences were now moot:
press conferences were news events and, as such, exempt
from the Equal Time rule. Incumbents also got a boost
from Aspen due to their newsworthiness as office
holders. It was far more likely that broadcasters would
exercise their newly gained discretion in the area of
press conferences by making a news judgment to televise
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or not to televise an incumbent but would provide
opponents rebuttal time only as news stories in news
casts.
The League of Women Voters gained considerably from
the Aspen decision. The League won increased prestige
and public esteem for the role it would play in hosting
candidates' debates. The League assumed the role of host
for the debates. The Aspen Decision did not assign host
responsibilities to the League.
Among the losers were challengers for electoral
office whether they were major party candidates or not.
Shirley Chisholm, a prominent black Congresswoman who
had mounted a presidential bid in the Democratic Party
in 1972, carried the banner for challengers. Chisholm
argued against exempting debates from Equal Time. The
Democratic National Committee opposed exempting
presidential news conferences from Equal Time, but later
withdrew from appeals to Aspen on the press conference
issue when it appeared a court ruling against Aspen
2
would jeopardize the Ford-Carter presidential debates.
A closer look at the Aspen decision shows how the FCC
majority expanded congressional intent on Equal Time
rules. In Aspen, the FCC majority wrote that in 1959
the 86th Congress had originally intended debates to be
included with news shows, news interviews,news
documentaries as "bona fide" news events, and, as such,
exempt from Equal Time.
186
After expanding congressional intent in the Aspen
decision, the FCC majority admitted past interpretative
errors in two FCC rulings on televised political
debates. The FCC renounced two 1962 rulings, The
Goodwill Stations, Inc. and National Broadcasting
Company, which implemented the 1959 Equal Time law
requirying Equal Time for candidates'debates. In
Goodwill, the FCC had ruled that radio broadcast of a
debate between then Governor of Michigan, John B.
Swainson and his Republican challenger George Romney
required the radio station to provide Equal Time to the
Socialist Labor Party candidate for governor although
the Socialist Labor Partry received only 1,500 votes out
of 3.2 million in the 1960 elections. In National
Broadcasting Company, the FCC ruled that television
broadcast of a debate between then Governor Pat Brown of
California and Richard Nixon, his Republican challenger,
required Equal Time for the Prohibitionist candidate. In
Goodwill, the FCC recognized that radio and tv coverage
of the debates were "on the spot coverage of bona fide
3
news events" and, as such, seemingly exempt from Equal
Time. However, the FCC ruled that the debate's "bona
fide" status as a news event was not sufficient
grounds to enable radio and tv to cover it live without
providing Equal Time to other candidates. To do so would
place too much control on the news judgement of radio
and tv reporters and news directors. Congress intended
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no such discretion when it came to political debates,
the FCC had ruled in the sixties.
But in laying bare its sins of commission in these
two Equal Time cases, the FCC also found in them the
necessary precedents to acknowledge new-found virtue. In
re-examining the legislative history of the 1959 law for
its consideration of the Aspen petition, the FCC
majority asserted it had found that the grounds for its
1962 rulings had been erroneous. The real issue, the FCC
wrote in Aspen, turned on whether a candidate's
appearance in a "bona fide" news event such as a
political debate was or was not "incidental to" the
event. This goes back to the 1959 law and 1962 rulings.
In 1962, the FCC had based those rulings on the grounds
that the candidates appearances were central to the
debates, so Equal Time was required. Such rulings were
hardly inconsistent with the 1959 law, because Congress
had required that candidates' appearances could only be
"incidental" to news events. Otherwise, tv coverage
would trigger Equal Time. But in re-examining the
legislative history, the FCC now found that Congress had
meant all along that a candidate's appearance could be
central to a news event, such as a debate, without
triggering Equal Time. It supported this re-
intepretation on the basis of arguments on the House
floor about language in the conference report concerning
news casts, news interviews, and news events, but not
debates. To get around this, the FCC reasoned that the
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debates, such as those between Nixon and Brown and
Romney and Swainson were news events, hence Equal Time
4
should not apply to debates. The 1962 rulings, the FCC
claimed in self-defense of its recision, had mistakenly
cited a 1959 House Report of a version of an Equal Time
bill that had never passed for the previous now
erroneous interpretation.
On candidates' news conferences, the FCC majority
reversed an earlier Equal Time decision, Columbia
Broadcasting System (1964), requiring Equal Time
following candidates' press conferences. In 1975, CBS
urged the FCC to classify presidential news conferences
as "bona fide news events and news interviews," and as
such, exempt from Equal Time. The FCC agreed, but not on
the grounds CBS had pressed. CBS wrote that control of
press conferences rested with the journalists asking
questions rather than the candidate responding. The FCC
disagreed, -and wrote that candidates controlled press
conferences by deciding whether or not to hold them. CBS
argued that candidates press conferences should be
exempt from Equal Time, because they were really
routine news. By routine, CBS meant "recurrent in the
normal and usual course of events" like such "regularly
scheduled" news interviews as "Meet the Press" and "Face
the Nation." The FCC rejected this argument, writing
that Congress meant "regularly scheduled" to mean just
that, and had not contemplated including press
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conferences with weekly news shows in the 1959 Equal
Time exemptions. Another CBS argument, calling on the
FCC to distinguish between press conferences "called by
an incumbent candidate in his official capacity and
those called in furtherance of his candidacy" opened a
can of worms on content that the FCC wanted to keep
shut. Then, the FCC ruled that its 1964 objection in CBS
no longer held, and ruled that candidates' news
conferences were "bona fide" news events exempt from
Equal Time.
The FCC minority vehemently disagreed with the
majority in the Aspen decision. The two dissenting
commissioners worried the public would never see
minority party candidates in televised political
debates, and feared incumbent politicians, particularly
presidents, would further exploit press conferences for
their own partisan, political goals due to the relaxed
regulations.
In meeting fresh constructions of Equal Time in the
Aspen decision, the dissenting FCC commissioners argued
vainly for the existing, unworkable, majoritarian 1962
position. Commissioner Benjamin Hooks warned that Equal
Time was being struck "a severe and, perhaps, mortal
blow." He chastised the majority for making a "tragic
mistake." Hooks contended that political debates were
not hard news, and should appropriately be covered as
news stories on news telecasts. Hooks saw danger in
granting broadcasters a fuller measure of discretion in
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broadcasting debates and press conferences. Such
discretion, he cautioned, put too much power in the
hands of television journalists. He argued that
candidates manipulated press conferences, and that it
was mistaken to allow politicians any further latitude.
In a word, Hooks argued the FCC majority had interpreted
5
Equal Time into "oblivion." "If newsworthiness is the
operative test, then all the other carefully drafted
315a [Equal Time] exemptions and protections are useless
6
and unnecessary." . Even the ghost of Lar Daly appeared
in Hooks's dissenting opinion as Hooks worried about the
7
"subjective newsworthiness judgment" of tv newsmen.
Hooks finally complained that the FCC had not followed
correct procedure in Aspen. The decision on debates and
press conferences really was Congress's not the FCC's,
and the FCC majority was wrong to assume it had the
power on such a political issue. Commissioner Robert E.
Lee echoed Hooks' positions in his dissent.
In ruling on candidates' debates and press
conferences in Aspen, the FCC redefined political uses
of tv. The policy question, dating back to initial
legislation on radio in the twenties, centered on
whether a candidate or a broadcaster initiated a
political "use" of broadcast time when broadcasting
political programming. In the twenties, use meant the
purchase or gift of air time to campaign for election:
Congress was more concerned about price discrimination
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against candidates going on the radio at election time
than with radio's minimal news programming, so in 1927
Congress enacted Section 18 of the Radio Act to assure
that candidates purchasing or receiving radio time would
be treated equally. By the late fifties,Congress took
television news programming into account. Congress
decided that news reports on incumbent politicians and
candidate's activities in broadcaster-initiated
newscasts, interviews, documentaries, and on-the-spot
coverage of "bona fide" news events were not political
uses of television. TV, after all, was presenting news
and candidates appeared in the news along with other
stories. Candidates did not initiate the coverage, such
as Chicago tv's coverage of Mayor Daley greeting
Argentine President Frondizi, so it was not sensible to
require Equal Time for routine tv news programming. In
1975, the FCC changed the legal meaning of political use
by ruling on its own discretion that candidate's debates
and politician's news conferences were "bona fide" news
events.
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The important issue in all this, of course, is why
Equal Time rules changed in 1975. Several factors
warrant attention. Television was held in higher esteem
in 1975 than in 1959. The Watergate hearings, televised
by the major networks, had rid the government of a
cloven hoofed president. Richard Wiley, Commissioner of
the FCC, had pushed for deregulation of political
programming in large radio markets, so the FCC was
beginning its swing toward deregulation of news and
political programming. Anti-Washington sentiment
abounded, and in the spirit of returning government to
the people, it doubtless seemed sensible to let
television do its job informing people by lifting the
'59 restrictions on candidates debates and press
conferences.
Power plays and confusion marked initial
implementation of the Aspen decision, particularly due
to the new-found role of the League of Women Voters. The
networks, jealous that the League of Women Voters would
get all the credit for arranging debates between
President Gerald Ford and Democratic presidential
nominee Jimmy Carter while they were reduced to mere
transmitters, complained about several aspects of the
first televised presidential debates since the Great
Debates between Kennedy and Nixon. Back in 1960, the
networks had hosted those debates without any
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intermediary, such as the League. And while tv memories
may be short those of network television news
executives, particularly those of Richard Salant at CBS
News and Reuven Frank at NBC, proved to be long, so
there was lots of wrangling about control of the Ford-
Carter debates.
Control issues surfaced about details. First, the
League and the presidential candidates excluded the
networks from initial planning stages. Then, the League
and the candidates worked-up a list of journalists, a
list over which the candidates had veto power, who
would pose questions to the candidates. The League and
the candidates also reached agreement that television
cameras would focus exclusively on the candidates: there
were to be no reaction shots from the audience. Robbing
the networks of the last bit of control, the League and
the candidates agreed to a pool camera, thus denying
8
networks cameras of their own.
To Salant and Frank, it seemed as though tv was
being reduced to a mere conduit, a lowly transmitter.
After all, wasn't the tail waging the dog in this case?
The Aspen Decision had enabled television coverage of
presidential debates as long as they were hosted by a
group other than broadcasters, and took place outside
televison studios, and were broadcast in their entirety.
The League had stepped in, and had taken control of the
show. But what was the League compared to the great
television networks? How could the League pretend to
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host an event so significant as the first televised
presidential debate in sixteen years anywhere nearly as
competently as the networks with all their experience
covering national politics? Could the League really
"control" the debate? Its dealings with Ford and Carter
certainly suggested otherwise. As if to corroborate the
worst fears of the television executives, the League
surrenderd the few prerogatives the networks had won in
the 1960 presidential debates to the candidates,
including the selection of journalists.
In the planning meetings where the networks finally
did participate, Salant grew heated. He chastised the
League for accommodating Ford and Carter so fully. The
public was going to get cheated, he charged. Surrending
control over the selection of journalists was the worst
sin. That, Salant said, was tantamount to allowing the
candidates to choose their own questioners. In agreeing
on veto-rights over the journalists, the League had
unwittingly granted the candidates control over the
words that would reach the public. Then, in denying
reaction shots of the audience, the League had given the
candidates de facto control over the images that would
reach the American public, too. How could television do
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its job under such restrictive conditions? League
representatives stuck to their guns, and Salant walked
out of a Friday meeting, raising the spectre over the
weekend preceeding the first Ford-Carter debate that CBS
9
might boycott it entirely.
But the networks did not boycott the first
presidential debate in sixteen years. On Thursday
evening, September 23rd, President Gerald Ford and
Democratic presidential candidate Jimmy Carter met on
the stage of the Chestnut Street Theatre in Philadelphia
to debate before a tightly-packed theatre audience and a
10
national television audience of 80 million people.
The consensus among pundits was that both candidates
relied too heavily on economic statistics, neither
proved able to articulate a convincing vision of where
he wanted to lead the country, and both firmed-up
support among their constituencies with 2 polls giving
11
President Ford a slight edge for his performance.
Then, well over an hour into the droning rhetoric,
silence disturbing and unexpected, befell the two men
seeking the presidency of the United States. As Jimmy
Carter belabored "a breakdown in trust among our
people," debate moderator Edwin Neuman interrupeted him,
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and said, "Excuse me, Governor. I regret to have to tell
12
you that we have no sound going out on the air." And,
both men stopped talking. Each stood at his podium.
Neither said a word to each other nor continued to
debate, because the sound was out for the theatre
audience, too. After twenty-seven minutes, sound was
restored, and the debate concluded.
A twenty-five cent electrolytic capacitor had
broken in one of the twenty-four amplifiers ABC-TV News
was using to transmit sound to seventeen sources fed by
the pool cameras. The capicator, in itself, was not
important. It's job was to cut the hum and buzz in a
power supply for the pool cameras. Once sound was
restored the buzz and hum were not audibly worse due to
the one broken capacitor. And, because network news
people are highly competent, it took ABC personnel only
27 minutes to arrange for the sound to be transmitted
through a CBS-TV News sound line to the CBS broadcast
center in New York, which then sent the sound through
AT&T phone lines to the seventeen sources fed by the
pool camera so the debate could resume and finally
conclude. The technical people from the networks had
13
solved the technical problem quickly and efficiently.
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But where the sound problem did matter and
eventually did surface was in the FCC's Aspen Decision,
defining candidates' debates as "bona fide news events."
Minority candidates Eugene McCarthy, running as an
independent, Lester Maddox, running on the American
Independent Party, and Peter Camejo, the Socialist
Workers candidate, complained that the debate was not a
"bona fide news event." For had the debate been a truly
"bona fide news event," the candidates would not have
stopped talking due to a technical problem with sound.
They demanded Equal Time on the grounds the debate was
political programming, not news. John Armour, McCarthy's
lawyer, contended that neither the Superbowl nor the
Olympics nor a President delivering a State of the Union
Address had ever stopped due to tv sound problems.
Camejo's attorney pointed out that the debate was
totally staged for television, so it could not be "bona
fide." And, the American Independent Party filed papers
asserting that the sound problem showed that the
networks and the League were colluding, thus commingling
14
roles of sponsor and broadcaster.
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The FCC responded to these complaints by citing the
Aspen Decision. The FCC told the challengers that the
debate was a "bona fide news event," exempt from Equal
Time requirements, so they could not receive equal time
for their minor party candidacies.
McCarthy and Maddox persisted. McCarthy next
employed Fairness Doctrine arguments to win places in
the second and third presidential debates. The FCC and
the courts rejected his arguments. In declining to
overturn a D.C. Appeals Court decision, Chief Justice
Warren E. Burger ruled that both McCarthy and Maddox
had "reasonable opportunities to have their views
15
presented in contexts outside debates."
On candidates press conferences, the sole case in
the 1976 presidential election concerned television
networks' decision not to broadcast an October 22nd
press conference by President Ford. Television news
covered the news conference as an important story in
newscasts, but not so intrinsically important as to
warrant uninterrupted air time of its own. Network
executives cited Equal Time as well as news judgement as
the basis for their decisions. William Small, then at
CBS, pointed out that President Ford had held a news
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conference only the week before on October 14th. Small
also pointed out that since Ford's October 22nd press
conference seemed staged for its political effect,
networks would be put under pressure from other
candidates for Equal Time.
As to the remaining debates in the 1976 election,
the second debate figured prominently in Carter's
success. Early on in the second debate, Carter
articulated a winning theme. Carter immediately started
off with a broadside against "inadequate presidential
16
leadership." Four years later this theme would come
back to haunt him with a vengeance, but it sold in '76.
Ford bumbled. In response to a foreign policy question,
Ford replied stupidly, "there is no Soviet domination of
Eastern Europe" Carter pounced on that. Ford did
himself further harm by failing to correct himself
immediately, which provided Carter further ammunition
for his bumbling president theme.
Carter had enterred the second debate with concerns
about no theme, loss of support among independents and
moderates as he tried to pitch his campaign to
traditional Democrats, and with persistent questions
about his judgment for agreeing to an interview in
Playboy and then making incautious remarks about his own
sex drive, former president Lyndon Johnson and other
topics. Ford enterred the second debate partially bouyed
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by his somewhat better then expected appearance in the
first debate, but beclouded by embarrased by racist
remarks of his recently fired Secretary of Agriculture
Earl Butts. In the end, Carter stemmed the tide of
defections that had been eroding his considerable lead
in the polls up to the second debate. The third debate
was uneventful.
Both Ford and Carter spent approximately $8 million
17
dollars each on television commercials. Television
news spent millions of its own on election night voter
projections, projections made all the more difficult by
the volatility of the electorate.
The expert opinion of the '76 election was that
the public was gravely disappointed. Walter Dean Burnham
observed that voters were better informed and thus more
skeptical. He noted that in television's saturation
presentation of the campaign tv news created
expectations among voters no politician could meet.
Marshall McLuhan pointed out that images had taken
command. In a "simultaneous information environment,"
attractive images and promises win more votes than a
clearly articulated statement of goals, McLuhan
observed. Candidates' debates mattered only as elements
in this news dimension of politics. Margaret Mead
complained that tv presented so much information that
the audience saw it all as advertising. The public was
bored, she said, by the "continuous, relentless
repetition of what should be fresh experiences for
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different groups of voters." Roger Mudd called the
campaign issueless. He blamed Carter for making trust
and integrity into campaign issues and chided Ford for
going along with Carter's agenda-setting.
In the 1980 presidential elections, the Aspen
decision worked to the advantage of the incumbent, Jimmy
Carter, during the primaries, and in the general
election to the advantage of third party candidate, John
Anderson, running on a National Unity ticket.
Equal Time cases during the 1980 presidential
election focused on debates and press conferences, the
very kinds of political programming exempted from Equal
Time obligations by the Aspen decision.
The FCC and the Courts ruled against Senator Edward
M. Kennedy's complaint about one of President Carter's
news conferences. Kennedy was running an uphill
campaign against Carter for the Democratic presidential
nomination. Kennedy charged that Carter had used
portions of a White House news conference on Febrary
13th, 1980 not to respond to reporters' questions but as
a campaign forum to press his own candidacy for re-
nomination safely away from a Kennedy response. Kennedy
first went to the tv networks, which refused him on the
grounds that news conferences were bona fide news
events, and as newsmen, they had no obligation to
provide him reply time. Kennedy next went to the FCC,
which supported the networks, ruling that Kennedy had
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"failed to offer evidence that the broadcasters were not
exercising their bona fide news judgement in choosing to
18
broadcast the press conference."
Although Kennedy was playing for much higher stakes
than a regulatory ruling on Equal Time for debates in
June, 1980, the persistence with which Kennedy advocated
a debate with President Carter at that time may have
some connection to this FCC ruling. In June, 1980,
Carter had enough votes to command the nomination, but
Kennedy had enough to make Carter's renomination limited
and partisan. In early June, Kennedy offered to release
his delegates if Carter would debate him. Both he and
Carter cited Carter's refusal to debate campaign issues
as the biggest issue separating them, and at that time,
there was considerable disagreement among the two on
such issues as wage and price controls and health care.
The television networks turned down a request for
Equal Time from the Reagan campaign following a
September 18th Carter press conference, again broadcast
from the White House. The Reagan campaign never made a
complaint to the FCC. In the news conference, Carter
opened with four to five minutes of remarks on
Administration accomplishments in domestic and foreign
policy before taking reporters' questions. William
Casey, currently director of the CIA and at that time a
high level advisor to Governor Reagan, demanded the
networks provide the Republican presidential nominee
atleast four to five minutes of Equal Time to respond to
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what he called Carter's "political commercial." Casey
chastised President Carter for "an obvious partisan
announcement, not responsive to questions from the
pressseparate from the press conference.... [Carter's
opening remarks] "could not have been a more political
19
commercial if he had paid for the time." The
television networks cited Aspen in rejecting the Reagan
camp's request. "I don't think there's any legal basis
under the equal time provision," remarked William Small
20
at that time with NBC.
Equal Time figured importantly on candidates'
debates in the 1980 presidential election. Here, the
effect of the Aspen decision was to provide discretion
to a women's civic association, the League of Women
Voters, on the selection of candidates to be invited to
nationally televised political debates. The League did
not act in a vacuum, of course. It had to contend with
the incumbent president, Carter, and a highly organized
if sometimes contentious campaign team surrounding
Ronald Reagan. And it had to contend, too, with public
opinion in offering invitations, for if the League
showed too much partiality toward any of the candidates
its own stature would be diminished.
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The League had its hands full in 1980. John
Anderson's independent candidacy threw a monkey wrench
into the two-party process. Both Carter and Reagan
wanted to manipulate the League invitations to Anderson
in such ways that would benefit their own campaigns. For
Reagan this meant a one-on-one confrontation between
himself and Anderson and, eventually, between himself
and Carter, but no three-way debate among all of them.
For Carter, it meant a one-on-one with Reagan, no one-
on-one with Anderson, and a begrudging acceptance of a
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three-way debate, which Reagan then ruled out.
The League tried to use its discretion under the
Aspen decision cautiously, but it was caught up in very
powerful forces. First was the problem of handling the
Democratic and Republican nominees. Then, there was
Anderson. Faced with the Anderson candidacy, a candidacy
enjoying measurably more public support than former
Minnesota Senator Eugene McCarthy's independent bid four
years before, the League turned to public opinion polls
as the criterion for determining a candidate's
eligibility for invitations. In early Ausgust, 1980 the
League announced that candidates enjoying a national
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popularity of 15% would be invited to League sponsored
22
debates. This figure was low enough to enable
Anderson to qualify but too high for other independent
candidates, such as Citizen's Party candidate Barry
Commoner, to make the list of invited debaters.
The League's decision to set eligibility
requirements by public opinions polls drew criticism.
Andrew Kohut, head of Gallup, complained that the League
was bringing public opinion poll results "into" the
political process in using poll results as the basis for
23
debate invitations. Other public opinion experts
worried about technical problems like the margin of
error in sample findings and the likelihood that
nonvoters would have been screened out of the polls on
which the League was relying, thus skewing the sample to
the politically active and informed and not providing an
accurate reading of candidates' standings. Ruth
Hinnerfeld, the person at the League most responsible
for arranging the presidential debates, defended the
League's decision. She said of the of the 15% cut-off
figure, "we were looking for something that had the
ability to be applied in a fairly objective way, was
24
simple to understand, and was non partisan." Among
others, the League relied on the Harris/ABC poll, the
Roper and Gallup polls, the NBC-AP poll, and the Los
Angeles Times poll.
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In the end, the decision on invitations to
participate in televised presidential debates wrested
with the League of Women Voters. The League determined
that Anderson met the 15% criteria in September, in time
for a one-on-one debate with Ronald Reagan, but did not
meet the criterion in late October for a debate
including President Carter. Everybody got mad at the
League and accused it of bowing to Carter's insistence
25
that he would not do a three-way debate with Anderson.
But the League only acted as it said it would. Indeed,
earlier on in September, 1980, the League extended its
deadline for meeting the 15% requirement from the end of
August to September 10 precisely in an effort to help
Anderson, whose popularity had waned a bit in the summer
heat, to make the list of invitees.
Anderson had no one to blame but himself for
failing to make more of his candidacy in the September
21st debate against Ronald Reagan. Carter was absent,
but Anderson did not sufficiently clarify his message to
keep any momentum running toward him. His wry line from
a debate with Reagan for the Iowa caucuses that Reagan
could only balance the budget and spend trillions on
defense by using mirrors was now tired. Anderson did
nothing to reinvigorate a campaign that had reached a
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high point in Massachusetts a half year before. Indeed,
Reagan was the more successful, winning points by
deflecting concern among moderates and women, in
26
particular, that he was too bellicose.
By mid-October, some in the Reagan camp began to
worry if the Governor might lose the election, and their
concern caused Reagan to reverse his position on
participating in a one-on-one debate with President
Carter. At that time, Reagan's lead was stable, but not
growing. Reagan's advisors wanted to keep momentum
running in the Governor 's direction, and decided a
debate with Carter would be less harmful than no debate.
They feared Carter might engineer a release of the
hostages shortly before election day, and thought a
presidential debate would minimize the effect of such a
release. Finally, Reagan's advisors wanted him to put to
rest as best he could repeated public concern that he
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would get the U.S. into a war. Given his advisors'
concerns Reagan stepped back from his round-robin
position of sequential one-on-one debates, skirted
reporters' questions about his own criticism of the
League as recently as September 19 for proposing a one-
on-one debate between himself and Carter that excluded
28 29
Anderson, and agreed to debate Carter.
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President Carter won the formalities of the debate
battle. He and Governor Reagan debated each other one-
on-one over the major networks.
But Carter lost the debate. Until the debate,
televised on October 28th, Reagan had a lead but not a
commanding one. Carter enterred the debate as a
incumbent underdog, and left a corpse. "Hemmorhaging"
was the term Carter pollster Patrick Caddell would use
as he reviewed poll results the weekend preceeding the
election. When Reagan won all but five states and the
District of Columbia a week after the presidential
debate, the results were painfully in. Some Carter
supporters, at least partially as a result of his debate
performance, abandoned him for Reagan or Anderson.
As to the formalities of the debate, the League
bowed to the wishes of the the major party candidates.
Carter and Reagan both wanted a more debate-like format
than the six question format of the Anderson-Reagan
debate. Carter's aides, in particular, pushed for
rebuttals between the two candidates. Reagan's side
acceded, agreeing to a number of rebuttals in exchange
for moving the debate as close to election day as
possible. The League facilitated the contending camp's
30
negotiations.
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In this phase of the general election, Anderson was
the big loser. He was consigned to the Cable News
Network, and to responding to debate comments between
Carter and Reagan, whom he watched on a tv monitor.
Anderson purchased a half-hour of tv time immediately
following the Carter-Reagan debate to rebut the major
party nominees. His standing in the polls was 8 to 9
percent, well below the 15 percent minimum requirement.
Without a dramatic debate confrontation to highlight his
differences from Carter and Reagan and with no other
significant campaign gesture outside the debate,
Anderson's attractiveness and credibility as a candidate
waned.
Nevertheless, one should not over-hastily conclude
that League discretion on participation in candidates'
debates, due the Aspen Decision, meant that Anderson was
treated shabbily, or that voters were disserved by his
exclusion from the Carter-Reagan debate. Anderson
carried his candidacy quite far in 1980, and he received
ample coverage by broadcast journalists. The public had
an opportunity to measure an independent against the
major party candidates by following his campaign. And,
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importantly, the public also had an opportunity to
measure the major party candidates against each other
precisely because the League had discretion over
invitations as a result of the Aspen Decision.
In the 1980 presidential election, the Aspen
Decision helped the major party candidates, and
accommodated significant third party candidates with a
following among the middle class. The Aspen decision
worked the way its advocates and its detractors both
said it would. It enabled the public to see televised
political debates among the major party candidates and
it cut fringe candidates out of televised candidates
debates unless the candidates were substantial. Benjamin
Hooks's concern that Aspen interpreted Equal Time "into
oblivion" seems quite right if one wishes to sustain an
egalitarian position on political discourse. But, such a
position meant no debates.
In the hurly-burly of politics, the Aspen Decision
put a lot of power in the hands of the League of Women
Voters. The League then had to wrestle with incumbent
presidents, major party presidential nominees, and
public opinion.
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Political advertisements or tv spots figured
importantly in Equal Time rulings for the 1980
presidential election. The U. S. Court of Appeals in
Washington rejected arguments from the Carter campaign
that political commercials, sponsored by independent
political groups supporting Reagan but separate from his
campaign, violated Equal Time, the Fairness Doctrine,
and the FCC's personal attacks law. The commercials
featured pictures of Carter and used his voice. The FCC
had ruled Carter was not eligible for Equal Time due to
the commercials. The FCC cited a 1976 Supreme Court
decision (Buckley v. Valeo), which held that as part of
campaign contributions, independent groups buy all the
commerical time they wanted to advance a candidate
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without triggering Equal Time. The Appeals Court
upheld the FCC ruling.
In July, 1980, Carter had tried unsuccessfully to
surpress the commercials. The Carter campaign sent a
letter to 700 television stations warning them about
possible violations of the Equal Time law and Fairness
Doctrine if they broadcast the ads. As in their briefs
all the way up to the Appeals Court, the Carter Campaign
wrote station managers that the independent group was
really not independent of Reagan, so Carter should get
Equal Time.
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The D. C. Appeals' Court decision that political
commercials fell outside Equal Time was the most
significant of all the Equal Time decisions in the 1980
election. Reagan's supporters spent an estimated $60
million dollars in his behalf,and a considerable amount
of it went to advertising. The Reagan camp was
meticulous to keep independent groups independent of the
actual campaign so as to comply with a 1976 Supreme
Court decision enabling unlimited political
contributions by individuals and organizations as long
as there was no coordiation between the individuals
and/or organization and the campaign receiving the
32
money. Had Equal Time attached to political
commericals, the effect would have been to repressive:
there would not have been as many.
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2The next major change in Equal Time occurred in
1983. At that time, the FCC responded to a petition to
alter Equal Time, which had been submitted by Mr. Henry
Geller, Esq., an expert on the FCC's public interest
responsibilities, and by the National Association of
Broadcasters and the Radio Televison News Directors
Association. Geller petitioned the FCC to enable
broadcasters to host candidates debates themselves
without triggering Equal Time. Geller was associated
with Duke University's Center for Public Policy in
Washington, and had just completed a study, which showed
that in many state elections broadcasters were the best
parties to host candidates'debates. The NAB and RTNDA,
long time advocates of increased broadcaster discretion
in political programming, supported Geller's petition.
The FCC issued a Notice of Inquiry in response to
the Geller's petition, which requested FCC approval for
broadcaster-sponsored candidates' debates. The FCC
received comments from interest groups on both sides of
the Equal Time issue, including, among others, the three
networks, the League of Women Voters, John Anderson and
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the United Church of Christ.
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The formal fight in this FCC decision to allow
broadcaster-sponsored candidates' debates rested on
differing conceptions of FCC authority. Did Congress or
the FCC have the authority to change the Equal Time law
on so important a political programming issue as
candidates debates? Geller, the NAB RTNDA, and the
television industry argued that Congress had charged
the FCC as a regulatory body with discretionary
authority to make specific alterations in Equal Time,
such as the petitioners' request for broadcaster-
sponsored candidates' debates. Opponents of the 1983
decision, including John Anderson and the United Church
of Christ, contended otherwise, asserting that Congress
had to pass a new Equal Time law to enable broadcasters
to sponsor candidates' debates. They said the Equal Time
law specifically excluded broadcaster-sponsored debates
due to concern about political favoritism. They
maintained the FCC had no authority to exempt
broadcaster-sponsored debates from Equal Time.
This legerdemain by the part of Geller and the
proponets of broadcaster-sponsored debates is worthy of
successful politics. While it is certainly true that
Congress had always intended that the FCC and the FRC
before it to have considerable latitude in enforcing
communications law, it is equally as true that Congress
did not intend to exempt candidates' debates from Equal
Time. On the precise issue of candidates' debates, the
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League, Anderson and the United Church of Christ were
right, technically. But, metaphorically and politicaly,
Geller et. al. won the day with expansive arguments on
FCC authority and congressional risk-taking in 1959.
There can be no doubt the petitioners' argruments
were expansive. In response to the FCC's Notice of
Inquiry, proponents of broadcaster-sponsored debates
repeatedly cited the Aspen Decision as grounds for FCC
authority to rule in favor of broadcaster-sponsored
debates. Aspen, it is true, was closer to the original
1929 version of Equal Time than the '59 exemptions. The
Aspen Decision had made a hash of "use" in order to
enable third-party debates like those sponsored by the
League. The Aspen Decision had come under criticism by
1983 due to the artificiality of the League hosting
candidates' debates, particularly presidential
candidates where major party candidates in fact called
the shots. Yet, the Aspen Decision carried the day.
By citing Aspen so expansively, the broadcast
industry promoted the regulatory authority of the FCC in
order to insulate itself from congressional scrutiny on
the candidates' debate issue. As long as decision-making
on candidates' debates took place inside the FCC and not
in Congressional hearing rooms, the industry had a
better chance of gaining control over the sponsorship of
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candidates' debates without having to deal with
congressional concerns about the impacts of television
34
news and political programming on elections.
The FCC agreed with Geller et. al. The FCC
enlarged and extended broadcasters' discretion on
candidates debates. The FCC ruled that broadcasters
could sponsor debates themselves, because broadcaster-
sponsored debates were "on the spot coverage of bona
fide news events," and as such, exempt from Equal Time.
No longer would broadcasters have to work with third
party organizations, such as the League, to broadcast
candidates debates. The FCC also lifted Equal Time
requirements on rebroadcasts of candidates debates,
reversing itself on two earlier rulings.
The FCC employed a number of arguments to support
its legitimate authority to rule in favor of
broadcaster-sponsored candidates' debates. First, the
FCC asserted Congress had given the FCC power all along
to make decisions like this one. Second, the FCC
asserted that in 1959 Congress had decided to take a
risk on broadcasters' news judgement by creating
exemptions to Equal Time. Congress authorized the 1959
exemptions, the FCC wrote, on the conviction that
broadcasters would use their newly gained discretion to
produce more news and political programming even if the
exemptions opened the door for broadcasters to favor
certain candidates. Third, the FCC maintained Congress
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had exempted candidates' debates from Equal Time in 1959
if the FCC chose to classify candidates' debates as
either a "bona fide news interview" or as "on the spot
coverage of bona fide news events." The FCC cited the
legislative history of Equal Time to support these three
positions. Fourth, the FCC cited court precedents,
including rulings that rejected Shirley Chisholm's
challenge to the Aspen Decision, which supported
broadcasters' discretion in political programming and
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FCC latitude in rule-making on Equal Time.
By 1983, broadcasters finally won some of the
freedom presenting political information, which
regulation had denied them. Ironically, broadcasters won
a greater measure of their free speech liberties by
promoting the regulatory authority of the agency charged
with policing them.
Public interest advocates emerged as equally
partisan though somewhat less manipulatively adept as
Mr. Geller and the broadcasters. Anderson believed he
had more of a chance of reaching voters with decision-
making resting with the League. The League had a greater
chance of extending its influence and promoting its own
fundraising with candidates' debates in its metier
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rather outside its domain. Mrs. Dorothy Ridings, head
of the League in 1983, let everybody know her feelings
about the decision. "The FCC has left the American voter
even more vulnerable to the influence of the television
networks on campaigns and elections. Putting the debates
in the hands of the broadcasters allows profit-making
corporations, which operate in extremely competitive
37
enviornment,to make as well as cover news." The D.C.
Appeals Court upheld the FCC's ruling against challenges
38
from the League in 1984.
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3In conclusion, several themes emerge. First, the
FCC boosted its own discretionary authority to alter
Equal Time rules without consulting Congress. In both
decisions, the FCC expanded on law, and the courts
supported the FCC's interpretations. In the odd workings
of regulation, broadcasters won a free speech victory
through supporting FCC's discretionary authority.
Second, the FCC moved toward a libertarian policy
on broadcast political programming and away from a
majoritarian policy. These rulings signal the ebbing
tide of majoritarian broadcast policy within the FCC. At
the same time the FCC promoted greater freedom for
broadcasters, it also began to claim more discretion, or
"independence" for itself. While this independent course
did not excessively irritate Congress in the seventies,
this would not be the case in the eighties even with
market-oriented Republicans seizing the White House and
controlling the Senate.
Third, the FCC showed reticence as late as the mid-
seventies to enable television journalists to do their
jobs. By requirying a third party, such as the League,
to host candidates' debates, the FCC exhibited the
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abiding concern, which shaped regulatory policy since
the twenties, that mass communications media like radio
and tv would disproportionately influence election
results and shape public opinion. It was only as
recently as 1983 that the FCC granted broadcasters the
same priveleges of hosting candidates' debates that
newspapers enjoyed historically.
Fourth is the perverse effect of majoritarian
regulation. The public benefitted from these
deregulatory actions. By excluding candidates' debates
and news conferences from Equal Time obligations, the
FCC enabled more people to hear and to see more poltical
programming.
Fifth is the difficult question of whether
limitiations inherent in Equal Time make the law
anachronisitic and unworkable in the modern media
marketplace or whether major party politicians and the
networks have chipped away at Equal Time so thoroughly
that it has become eviscerated. Broadcast technology and
the media marketplace have changed fantastically since
Senator Dill first proposed equal opportunities for
candidates in 1927. The spectrum scarcity rationale for
Equal Time was much weaker by 1975 and 1983 than in
1927, 1933 and 1959. On these grounds, it would seem
that limitations inherent in Equal Time suggest that the
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law be retired.
But, it is also true that the 1959 congressional
amendments and the '75 and '83 FCC rulings on Equal Time
had their own perverse effect. While they increased the
flow of political programming to the majority of
Americans by granting broadcasters their first amendment
rights, they also limited the free speech rights of
minor party candidates. The minor party candidates lost
standing for their free speech rights while major party
politicians assured themselves tv exposure and
broadcasters won public esteem for their political and
public affairs programming.
In sum, in the seventies, majoritarian tide began
to ebb on Equal Time. In the eighties, this ebbing tide
would attempt to carry away the Fairness Doctrine as
well.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
THE EBBING TIDE OF FAIRNESS
0
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A deregulatory tide pulled at the Fairness Doctrine
by the mid-eighties. A libertarian position on broadcast
news and public affairs programming won more credence as
proponets of deregulation and competition in the mass
media marketplace became the majority on the the Federal
Communications Commission. By 1985, the FCC was launched
on a wholesale inquiry into the Fairness Doctrine, a
review initiated by Mark Fowler, Chairman of the
Commission.
In February, 1985, Fowler looked out on a group
assembled in the FCC's Hearing Room to testify on the
Fairness Doctrine. For Fowler, the panels were something
of an accomplishment. Through his efforts the burden of
debate on broadcast news programming was shifting away
from proponents of content regulation. Discussion of the
Fairness Doctrine focussed more on why government should
impose the Fairness Doctrine on broadcasters and less
toward a government role in fostering access to the
airwaves. To be sure, certain Fairness Doctrine
proponents had circularized a memo criticizing Fowler
for inviting a disproportionate number of their
adversaries to the panels. They noted the majority of
written comments supported the Fairness Doctrine, and
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opposed the FCC's ongoing Inquiry into its fate. Phyllis
Schlafly, a long time Reagan supporter and Fairness
Doctrine proponent, would shortly tell Fowler two days
of hearings were "a stacked deck designed for
1
predetermined results." But the momentum on the
Fairness Doctrine was shifting, and it was moving in
Fowler's direction. Things had begun a year before.
In 1984, riding a deregulatory wave, the FCC issued
a Notice of Inquiry into the future of the Fairness
Doctrine. The FCC's posture in the Notice was as
cautious as it was provocative and predictable. First,
on a note of caution, the FCC noted that it was merely
inquirying into the possibility of altering the Fairness
Doctrine. The FCC explicitly stated it would not repeal
the Fairness Doctrine on the basis of responses to the
Notice. Second, taking a provocative tack, the Notice
itself clearly leaned toward repeal of the Fairness
Doctrine by posing queries that indicated FCC
willingness to consider favorably disposing with the
controversial regulation. Third, in terms of
predictability, the Notice participated fully in the
FCC's current deregulatory policies dating back to the
2
seventies. It fit the general drift
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The Notice is worthy in several particulars. It
reflects the major issues facing regulators. The FCC
requested comments on the role of the Fairness Doctrine
in promoting or inhibiting the public's access to
controversy and news. This is straight-forward enough.
Here, the FCC was doing no more than querying whether
the Fairness Doctrine serves its avowed and formal
purpose or whether it does not work, as its critics
recurrently allege, and actually represses the flow of
news and information to the public.
The FCC inquired if technological innovations in tv
news programming, specifically the impact of new
channels on the diversity of news and information
reaching the public, made the Fairness Doctrine
obsolete. Did these new channels undermine the spectrum
scarcity rationale for the Fairness Doctrine? It also
queried whether the coming convergence of print and
electronic media with videotext and teletext portended
the possibility of Fairness Doctrine rulings on new
forms of electronic print.
The FCC queried whether current first amendment
jurisprudence supported the Fairness Doctrine. It
wanted to hear whether first amendment law had changed
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so significantly since the mid to late forties, when the
Fairness Doctrine was originally promulgated, to make
current enforcment a violation of first amendment rights
3
of broadcasters.
Lastly, the FCC inquired about its own authority to
alter the Fairness Doctrine, or whether only Congress
had the authority to do so. In many ways, the final
query was most telling. It signaled conflict over
whether the Fairness Doctrine was a law or a regulation.
If the Fairness Doctrine were a regulation, then the
FCC, as the responsible executive agency, could do with
it as it pleased. Such agency discretion would mean
almost certain repeal. But, if the Fairness Doctrine
were instead a law, then only Congress could authorize
any change in the controversial statute. In that case,
almost certain retention was assured. The House
Democrats were solidly behind the Fairness Doctrine, and
as recently as 1984, the Republican Senate had rejected
any substantive alteration in the Fairness Doctrine.
So, the issue was engaged. In a reprise of the
Aspen Decision enabling broadcaster-sponsored
candidates' debates, proponents of the Fairness Doctrine
would argue that only congress could define the Fairness
Doctrine, and that the FCC could only properly implement
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congress' will. Proponents were as diverse and
pluralistic as the culture as a whole. Proponents
included public interest groups, labor and religious
organizations, big business like Mobil and General
Motors, some right wing advocates, the NAACP, and the
American Civil Liberties Union. Opponents would say that
the FCC had the authority. Opponents would include the
major television networks, professional news
organizations, and newspaper publishers. First Amendment
lawyers and scholars argued both sides.
A closer look at the comments and written
responses, generated by the Notice, shows the complexity
of issues surrounding the Fairness Doctrine today.
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Does the Fairness Doctrine accomplish its intended
purpose?
The first query, whether or not the Fairness
Doctrine actually provides the public with controversial
news and reasonable opportunities to respond to news
programming, prompted vehement disagreement. Contention
turned on the "chilling effect" of the Fairness
Doctrine; that is, whether the doctrine discouraged tv
and radio newsmen from covering stories and developing
editorial views as fully as print journalists.
Radio and tv journalists and news managers said the
Fairness Doctrine limited controversial news coverage.
They claimed the Fairness Doctrine has a pervasive
chilling effect. In the case of large news
organizations, news managers and reporters complained
that too much management time was taken responding to
Fairness complaints. Smaller radio broadcasters claimed
that the Fairness Doctrine was economically burdensome.
They contended that most radio operators were small
businesses, and could not afford to cost of responding
to Fairness Doctrine complaints. Due to the time or
money involved handling complaints, news managers and
reporters said the Fairness Doctrine discouraged
coverage of controversial issues. Once burnt, twice shy
was the message.
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Former CBS news commentator Eric Sevareid called
the Fairness Doctrine "a weapon on the backpocket of
government." Referring to FCC regulators, the silver
haired former network commentator warned that "people in
officious disposition" were a greater danger to the
public interest than the press. "The press doesn't draft
you or imprison you or execute you," Sevareid said in a
commanding, well modulated voice. Someday, Sevareid
prophesized, the
and a new generat
little cancerous
heads" concerning
Fairness Doc
Doctrine chilled
advanced several
Charles Ferris,
FCC would drop the Fairness Doctrine
ion of reporters would be free of "the
bit of awareness in the back of their
government oversight.
trine advocates denied the Fairness
radio and television news. They
arguments. The first was economic.
the former FCC Commissioner and the
attorney representing the Democratic National Committee
at the panel discussions, asserted media economics were
far more important in limiting the coverage of
controversial issues. As an industry dependent on
advertising revenues, Ferris said broadcasting presented
material that is designed to be unoffensive to the
largest possible audience. Broadcasters shunned
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controversy to protect their revenues not due to the
Fairness Doctrine, Ferris said. A first amendment legal
scholar supplemented this argument. He said economic
concentration in the media threatened the diversity of
the news and information the public received.
Reed Irvine, a conservative critic of the media and
head of Accuracy in Media, which had challenged an
award-winning NBC documentary on Fairness Doctrine
grounds, supported these views. Broadcasting media is
such an "oligopoly," according to Irvine, that the
public received only "liberal" news. Television stations
would degenerate into "political tools" without the
doctrine, Irvine said, echoing a position that Mobil had
advanced in its written comments.
A second argument supporting the Fairness Doctrine
was that the Fairness Doctrine was remedial, co-
operative, only minimally intrusive. An attorney, who
had represented advocates for beverage bottle desposits
in a referendum campaign, asserted the Fairness
Doctrine enabled bottle bill advocates to get media
coverage they could not have acquired otherwise due to
saturation advertising against the referendum by the
beverage industry. Phyllis Schlafly a promiment opponent
of the Equal Rights Amendment and the Supreme Court's
decision on abortion, said the Fairness Doctrine enabled
her to negotiate news coverage on these issues, which,
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she asserted, the broadcasters routinely covered from a
"liberal" point of view. "Of all the coverage on the
ERA, over 95% of it on tv was pro-ERA and only 5% of it
was against the ERA. If it weren't for the Fairness
Doctrine, we couldn't have gotten even that measly five
percent,"Shafley said. A B'Nai B'rith attorney called
the Fairness Doctrine important in diminishing racism
and anti-Semitism. He said the Fairness Doctrine was
especially important in small towns with few radio and
often no television stations. The Fairness Doctine also
enabled B'Nai B'rith to speak with the major networks
about news coverage of the Israeli-Lebanon war, he said.
Charles Ferris and others pointed out remedial,
unintrusive aspects of the Fairness Doctrine. The
former FCC Commissioners remarked that the Doctrine only
required broadcasters to do stories over or to provide
time to interest groups in their communities. Of the
11,000 broadcasters in the country, only 25 had received
Fairness Doctrine complaints in the early eighties,
according to the public interest advocates' figures. How
could broadcasters possibly call the doctrine "chilling"
with so few cases? And, on a final note, David Rubin, an
ACLU attorney pointed out that journalists' own ethical
standards demanded more of them than the Fairness
Doctrine.
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Fairness Doctrine opponents rebutted these
arguments. They squarely denied that the Fairness
Doctrine was minimally intrusive or co-operative. Floyd
Abrams, NBC's attorney, blasted the public interest
attorney, representing bottle bill advocates. Abrams
complained that bottle bill advocates had used the
Fairness Doctrine to respond to advertisements, not news
coverage or broadcast editorials. He said it was wrong
for the FCC to force broadcasters to provide time to
bottle bill proponents when broadcasters were already
covering the ballot issue in their news casts. Abrams
reminded the commissioners that the doctrine was highly
intrusive. He cited examples of efforts in the Kennedy
and Nixon Administrations to manipulate the. FCC to
silence a right-wing radio broadcaster in the early-
sixties and to intimidate the Washington Post during
e~ Watergate scandal. He noted a failed effort by the
'CA~ -An 984 and 1985 to use the Fairness Doctrine to
a-e ABC news coverage of an alledged CIA plot to
aS9nate,- a former agent. According to Abrams, the
Falrness Doctrine gave a license to interest groups to
harass broadcast journalists. Doug Ginsburg, a Harvard
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Law School professor on leave at the Office of
Management and Budget, ripped into the B'Nai B'rith
attorney for testifying that the Fairness Doctrine
enabled B'Nai B'rith to make "private deals" with
broadcasters on news coverage of the 1982 Isreali
invasion of Lebanon. This, he asserted, showed how
intrusive the doctrine was in practice.
Perhaps overplaying his hand, FCC Commissioner
James H. Quello challenged Ferris on whether broadcast
economics are the cause of non-controverial news and
public affairs programming. Quello remarked that years
before becoming a FCC Commissioner, he had worked as a
radio news manager. Quello said he had granted an anti-
fluoridation advocate an opportunity to rebut his
station's editorials advocating floridation. Criticism
and confusion were the short term results. First, Quello
said he received a sheath of criticism from medical and
dental experts for confusing the public. Then, Quello
admitted he thought the station was misleading the
public by carrying editorials on both sides of the
issue. Finally, he said, the station dropped
editorializing entirely to avoid controversey in the
future. In a word, Quello said the Fairness Doctrine and
not the broadcasting economics limited editorials.
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Has technological innovation made the Fairness
Doctrine obsolete?
Spectrum scarcity is the driving force and
sustaining rationale for FCC licensing authority
generally and for its Fairness Doctrine policy. At the
1985 Fairness Doctrine hearings and in written comments
submitted in response to the Notice of Inquiry,
partisans engaged the issue of the impact of
technological innovation on spectrum scarcity along
predictable lines. As a rule, broadcasters and Fairness
Doctrine opponents asserted America is an "information
rich society" due, in part, to the number of radio and
television stations as well as to newer communications
technologies. Among others, these news communications
technologies include cable, satellite and microwave
technologies. Due to the increased number of radio and
television and all the new communications technologies,
they asserted original spectrum scarcity rationale for
4
the Fairness Doctrine was now anachronistic.
On the other side of the issue, a wide variety of
other interests, ranging from single issue interest
groups to enthusiasts for distasteful right wing
ideologies to such major corporations as Mobil Oil and
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established liberal organizations as the American Civil
Liberties Union disagreed. They asserted that
technological innovations did not weaken the spectrum
scarcity rationale for the Fairness Doctrine.
Broadcasters have too much power, they said. The
Fairness Doctrine is still needed to provide a flow of a
diversity of points of view to the American public.
What is interesting about these positions, of
course, is not so much the predictable assertions of
these partisans, advocates, ideologues, and attorneys.
That is all quite well rehearsed. What is more to the
point is the way contending camps approach the spectrum
scarcity issue of whether technology has made the
Fairness Doctrine obsolete. Fairness Doctrine opponents
look at the flow of news and information to the public
from the point of view of the media marketplace.
Fairness Doctrine proponents tend to look at the issue
with a view to the monopoly individual broadcasters have
over scarce licenses.
Fairness Doctrine opponents argued an abundance of
broadcast radio and television channels made the
Fairness Doctrine anachronistic. Quite aside from the
newer alphabet soup of communications technologies
(LPTV, MDS, SMATV, DBS, VCR, etc.), there are far more
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radio and television stations than there were in 1949
when the Fairness Doctrine became FCC policy. In a
competitive media marketplace, with these stations vying
for listeners, Fairness Doctrine opponents claimed the
public has innumerable opportunities to hear news,
information and a diveristy of points of view.
Numbers alone show that the spectrum scarcity
rationale for the Fairness Doctrine is outdated. There
are nearly twelve times as many television stations and
four times as many radio stations in 1983 than there
were in 1950, the year after the Fairness Doctrine was
adopted. By 1983, the average American could receive
atleast five or more channels on his television set, and
5
two-thirds of the country could receive nine or more.
The following tables show the increase in the
number of broadcast channels.
Table 1--Number or Radio Stations
1950 1970 1983
Total 2,867 6,889 9,283
Standard (AM) 2,086 4,292 4,723
AM Commercial * 4,276 4,679
AM Educational * 25 44
FM 781 2,597 4,559
FM Commercial 733 2,184 3,458
FM Educational 48 413 1,101
Source: Notice of Inquiry, p. 20323
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Table 2--Number of Television Station
1950 1970 1983
Total 98 862 1,140
Commercial VHF 98 501 536
Commerical UHF 176 321
Educational VHF 80 112
Educational UHF 105 171
Source: Notice of Inquiry, p. 20324
The new communications technologies undermine the
spectrum scarcity rationale for the Fairness Doctrine.
In addition to the 10,000 odd radio and television
stations, in 1983 there were in the United States, 6,400
cable systems, serving 29 million homes. Subscription
television (STV)was in place in seventeen markets. One
hundred and five cities had microwave (MDS) service,
serving a half million subscribers. Due to a 1983 FCC
ruling permitting MDS operators to operate multi-channel
systems (multichannel MDS), anywhere from eight to
twenty-eight more channels are available to MDS users.
Direct broadcast satellites (DBS) provide five
channels,and could provide as many as 128. Satellite
Master Antenna Systems (SMATV), primarily serving large
apartment buildings and hotels, enjoyed nearly 300,000
subscribers in 1984. There were 12 million videocassette
recorders in American homes by the mid-eighties.
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If one adds print sources to broadcasting, cable
and the new communications technologies, the amount of
information is staggering. There are 1,701 daily and
6,784 weekly newspapers and 10,809 periodicals in the
6
United States In other words and quite aside from the
new media, there are roughly six times as many radio and
television stations as there are daily newspapers. Many
of those newspapers depend on one dominant wire service,
the Associated Press, and one financially-shaky wire
service, United Press International. Neither of these
wire services is under any Fairness Doctrine obligation.
Comparison of radio and television with newspapers
in selected cities is instructive in approaching the
spectrum scarcity issue. It is invariably the case, for
example, that communities have more television and radio
stations than newspapers. For example, Los Angeles, the
second largest broadcast market in the country, supports
95 radio and television stations and 3 daily newspapers.
Pittsburgh, the twelfth largest television market,
sustains 82 radio and television stations and only two
daily newspapers. Sixty-seven radio and television
stations provide Hartford, the twenty-second tv market,
with news as does one daily paper. Austin, Texas gets
its news and information from 51 radio and television
stations and from one daily newspaper. Austin is the
eight-second television market in the United States.
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News programming also increased with the explosion
in the number of channels. Regularly scheduled network
television news accounted for sixty and one-half hours
of network tv programming per week in 1983. This is two
and a half times as much news as the twenty-four hours
of network news programmed in 1981 and nearly four times
the sixteen hours programmed in the late sixties. For
example, CBS, the dominant network, telecast nearly two
thousand hours of regularly scheduled news in 1983, up
from approximately 550 hours in 1980 and 400 hours in
1969. Local television stations boosted their news
programming,but not as dramatically as the networks. By
1982, there were, on average, ten hours of locally
produced news programming per week compared with eight
in 1971. Independent television stations also came on
line in the seventies and early eighties, providing more
local news. By the early eighties, independents devoted
8 hours a week to local news, up from three hours in
7
1974.
Ownership of broadcasting is another factor that
requires attention in discussing spectrum scarcity. Even
if more channels, more video recording paraphernalia, and
the extensiveness of news programming have increased, it
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does not necessarily follow that the sources of news and
opinion have expanded correspondingly. However, there is
sufficient diversity of ownership to enable the average
citizen to to see or hear different viewpoints. For
example, independently owned television stations have
8
expanded considerably. Of the eleven hundred VHF and
UHF television stations, half are managed by individual
licensees. It is true, of course, that the three major
networks (ABC, CBS, NBC) still reach a dominant share of
the television audience. ABC, CBS, and NBC each own five
stations, all in major cities. Each has more than two
hundred affiliates. Cable television is less
9
concentrated than broadcasting.
Proponents of the Fairness Doctrine argue that
spectrum scarcity is still a problem, because there are
more applicants for broadcast frequencies than there are
available. Due to this limitation, which is sui generis
to broadcasting, the Fairness Doctrine is still
necessary, they say. Again, the unit of measurment is
the individual licensee, not the media marketplace and
the broadcast news available to the public.
241
When speaking of the media marketplace, Fairness
Doctrine proponents say that the continuing domination
of broadcasting, of the three major networks in
particular, require sustaining Fairness Doctrine
regulations. Andrew Schwartzman, representing the Media
Access Project, remarked most cogently on this issue.
Schwartzman pointed out that the continuing success of
broadcasting in attracting investment capital indicated
that broadcasting will continue to be the dominant
source of television and radio programming to the
American public for some time to come. Henry Geller, an
expert on television news programming, supported this
view in his written remarks. Geller pointed out that the
high prices commanded for television stations indicated
scarcity.
Cable television and the new technologies came
under attack. The National Rifle Association tried to
puncture the argument about a cable cornucopia. Like
other conservative critics of the media, the NRA
advocated retention of the Fairness Doctrine to assure
its representatives and members could request reply time
if broadcasters covered the NRA's issue, the right to
bear arms, in their news programming and/or editorials.
The NRA pointed out that broadcasters reach 98% of
American homes while cable reaches at best just more
than a third. To make matters worse, the NRA, noted that
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broadcasting penetration was highest in the areas with
the greatest population, because it is only recently
that major cities are being wired for cable television.
And, in the cases were cable does program news,
specifically C-SPAN and Ted Turner's Cable News Network,
the NRA complained that the programming focussed too
much on national issues rather than local ones. Mobil
pointed out that most of the newer cable channels
programmed entertainment, not news and public affairs.
Mobil wanted to show that the increased number of
systems and channels hardly meant an increase in news
and public affairs programming. As to the newer
technologies, Fairness proponents argued their use and
applications are untested, in the future, at best
10
speculative.
The wrinkle in the spectrum scarcity argument is
that it is both technological and economic. On the
economic grounds,the issues of oligopoly and barriers to
entry and so forth, money determines the scarcity of
broadcast stations. These concerns about oligopoly are
what animate ideologues like Reed Irvine and Phyllis
Schlafly to condemn the "liberal" media,or in Schlafly's
phrase, "The Big Three TV Networks,"which "exercise
monopoly control over news and information so vast they
are a Fourth Branch of Government." And on a more
thoughtful and articulate level, this is the concern
that informs Schwartzman's and Geller's remarks that the
high prices commanded by television stations in major
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television markets indicate the scarcity of broadcast
outlets. If more frequencies were available on the
spectrum, presumably these television stations would not
11
command such steep prices.
This mix of economic and technological issues
clearly illustrate the problems confronting the FCC in
administrating the Fairness Doctrine. Due to the
economics of broadcast television, the FCC is placed in
an odd policy position. During the hearings, Daniel
Brenner, Administrative Assistant to Chairman Fowler,
articulated this problem. He pointed out that if the FCC
enforces the Fairness Doctrine in smaller television
markets, those are exaclty the markets where broadcast
frequencies are available, but no one comes forth to
apply for them because stations in those communities are
not profitable. So, in technological terms of spectrum
scarcity, those are the communities where an abundance
of frequencies actually exist physically. On the other
hand, in the larger television markets, there is a
scarcity of channels due to the demand for lucrative
licenses. However, the intense competition among the
television stations in these larger communities
guarantees plenty of opportunities for the public to see
and hear controversial news. In cases of this sort, the
FCC is reluctant to make a Fairness ruling because due
to the highly competitive local television market.
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Finally, on the convergence issue, broadcasters
worried that the newer technologies of videotext and
teletext might be construed as broadcasting and hence
come under Fairness Doctrine obligations. If a daily
newspaper editorial were to come into one's home over a
televison screen, for example, would the newspaper or
the carrier or both be required to provide response
space? Fairness proponents said these worries were
exaggerated.
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3.) First Amendment Jurisprudence
In the thirty-seven odd years since the original
Fairness Doctrine hearings, first amendment
jurisprudence has taken more of a libertarian position.
Several court decisions provide greater freedom for the
speaker now than was the case when the FCC originally
articulated the Fairness Doctrine in the late forties.
Increased freedom for the speaker goes to the heart
of the Fairness Doctrine. Due to spectrum scarcity, the
Fairness Doctrine is premised on the opposite principle
of listener sovereignty. The Fairness Doctrine, after
all, quotes approvingly and extensively from
Frankfurter's passages in the Associated Press and the
Network cases that the flow of news and information to
the public takes priority over the rights of the speaker
to articulate his thoughts due to the scarcity of
broadcast frequencies. Frankfurter had referred to this
technological problem as radio's "unique characteristic"
and basis for licensing. At the Fairness hearings in
response to the 1985 Notice of Inquiry, few quoted
Justice Frankfurter, but his thinking on listener
sovereignty dominated panel discussions and written
comments.
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First amendment attorneys, broadcasters, partisans
reached back to a more recent precedent, the Supreme
Court's Red Lion, decision in 1969. To no one's
surprise, Fairness Doctrine proponents cited Red Lion
approvingly and persistently to argue that first
amendment jurisprudence required the FCC to continue
implementation of the Fairness Doctrine and to drop the
current inquiry.
In Red Lion, Justice White articulated the listener
sovereignty rationale for a unanimaous court. White had
written and his fellow justices had agreed that "it is
the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of
the broadcasters, which is paramount." The Court also
ruled that the First Amendment was not unabridgeable.
The Court maintained that due the scarcity that
government could impose content regulation in order to
assure a diverse flow of news and information to the
public. "There is nothing in the first amendment which
prevents the government from requiring a licensee to
share his frequency with other and to conduct himself as
a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those
views and voices which are representative of his
community and which would otherwise, by necessity, be
12
barred from the airwaves." Certainly, other, more
recent cases were cited by Fairness Doctrine proponents,
but Red Lion comprised the backbone of these other
13
rationales.
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Fairness Doctrine opponents looked to fresher court
rulings, to the Court's ruling on libel in the Sullivan
Case (1964), and to the Miami Herald case in 1974. In
Sullivan, they found a standard that print journalist
had to willfully, intentionally misrepresent information
about a public figure--what the Court called actual
malice--in order for an individual to bring libel
charges. How different, Fairness Doctrine opponents
argued, was this standard compared with responsibilities
imposed on broadcasters to provide time to reply to
their editorial views or to be impelled to do a story
over.
In the Miami Herald case, Fairness opponents had an
unequivocal assertion that government cannot tamper in
the editorial decisions of the press. This was the
proper standard for broadcasting, they contended. Other,
recent court rulings from the mid-seventies held that
speakers' identity, wealth, persuasiveness, or
distastefulness had nothing to do with his right to
14
speak. The right to speak was unabridgeable.
Best of all, however, was a historic Supreme Court
decision in 1984 in which for the first time the Court
threw out content requirments in broadcasting. Supreme
Court Justice Brennan invited a test case of the
Fairness Doctrine in FCC v. League of Women Voters.
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Brennan noted that the Red Lion Court had left the door
open to future reconsideration of the Fairness Doctrine
when spectrum scarcity was less pressing. And, noting
the changes in the number of channels, Brennan wrote
that reconsideration of the Fairness Doctrine may now be
15
appropriate.
A historical view highlights the differences in
first amendment jurisprudence between the late-forties
and the mid-eighties. The Court initially sustained the
FCC's regulatory authority over broadcast content in
1943 in the NBC case. It also reaffirmed in the AP case
that a private monopoly cannot control the flow of news
and information to the public. As commerical enterprises
involved in the dissemination of news, information and
entertatinment, the print and broadcast media were
equally as subject to social and economic regulation as
any other business, Frankfurter ruled, even if their
businesses were those of ideas, opinions, information,
and the popular arts. So sweeping was Frankfurter's
language that both cases became precedents for the FCC's
direct regulation of news and public affairs in the
Fairness Doctrine. All of this was far beyond the public
interest responsibilities imposed on the FCC in Section
315 of the Communications Act.
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Justice Frankfurter's views followed existing
precedent. From the beginning of federal regulation of
broadcasting in the twenties, first amendment
jurisprudence placed pubic order above the rights of
speakers. In 1927, in Whitney v. California, the Court
upheld a California statute forbidding communists from
recruiting members. In 1925, in Gitlow v. New York, the
Court ruled that the first amendment did not protect
seditious speech. In 1919, in the Schenk decision, the
Court articulated the "clear and present danger"
standard on freedom of speech, and in Abrams v. US, it
ruled that the first amendment did not enable
publications during the course of World War I that were
critical of U.S. participation in the war. In 1918, the
Court ruled the first amendment did not protect
newspapers from contempt convictions for publishing
articles critical of the legal arguments during pending
court cases. In 1907, the Court ruled that even if
allegations of a public official's malfeseance were
true, the speaker could still be penalized if the court
deemed the assertions were detrimental to public
welfare. And, as far back as 1877, the Court ruled that
Congress could exclude publications, thought to be
16
immoral, from the mails.
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Add to this the development early-on of radio as an
entertainment medium and not as a news media
and Frankfurter's opinion favoring reationale for
content regulation is quite plausible. Judge Bazelon,
an expert on communications law, remarked on the
pervasiveness of first amendment standards, upholding
public order over speaker's rights, during the early
days of broadcasting. In his dissenting opinion in
Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, Bazelon noted
"that radio came into the world as a magic box
analogized to the telegraph... Broadcasters themselves
were viewed as entertainers rather than responsible
journalists: certainly they were not 'newsmen.' The
Commission felt justified in imposing upon these
neophytes a series of obligations to insure they would
17
act 'responsibly' in the public interest."
How different these decisions are from Sullivan or
the Miami Herald. Cases involving political
broadcasting, specifically CBS v. DNC, and FEC v. NCPAC/
FCM also supported increased discretion for broadcasters
and greater freedom of speakers, eroding further the
grounds for the Fairness Doctrine. Coupled with Justice
Brennan's invitation to reconsider the Fairness
Doctrine, first amendment grounds shifted dramatically
to the advantage of the broadcaster since the mid
forties.
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4. Does the FCC have authority to repeal the Fairness
Doctrine?
FCC authority to repeal the Fairness Doctrine is a
judgement call. In this turf battle with a hostile
Congress, FCC Chairman Mark Fowler, himself a proponent
of deregulation, will only say, "I think there are very
good arguments that it [the Fairness Doctrine] is
codified, but there are other arguments that suggest it
is not. I haven't had a chance to parse through all
18
that to make a final determination in my own mind."
As in the Aspen Decision, the argument turns on
whether Congress or the FCC has authority to repeal or
substantively alter the Fairness Doctrine. And, as in
1975, interest groups much divided along the same lines.
The public interest groups, the big corporations like
Mobil and General Motors, and the right wingers like
Irvine and Schlafly assert that the Fairness Doctrine is
codified, so only Congress can alter it. CBS, NBC and
broadcasting trade groups assert that as the responsible
regulatory authority the FCC does have authority to do
as it pleases with the Fairness Doctrine. ABC offered a
qualified opinion, asserting that the FCC should do as
it pleases with the Fairness Doctrine, and seek
congressional approval for its actions. First amendment
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scholars took either side. Clearly the broadcast
industry wants the FCC to claim authority to deal with
the Fairness Doctrine, because broadcasters would get
more freedom under the deregulation-minded FCC than from
Congress.
The day before FCC panel discussions on the Notice
of Inquiry, Representative John Dingell, Chairman of the
House Commerce Committee, called a press conference
along with other Fairness Doctrine proponents to
challenge FCC regulatory authority. Dingell blasted the
FCC as "radical" and "ideological." He dismissed the
inquiry as a fool's errand. "This Commission should have
recognized long ago that it is an independent regulatory
agency accountable to the Congress, and, as such, it may
find that what it thinks is a legal loophole can fast
19
become its own noose." Prospects for a repeal of the
Fairness Doctrine hardly looked promising on the Hill.
And, just as clearly, big business, public interest
groups, special interest groups, religious groups, the
Democratic Party each wanted Congress to keep authority
to make, break or alter the Fairness Doctrine. Many of
these groups believed they could exert greater influence
on the Hill and receive more protection from Congress
than from the FCC. As recently as 1983, efforts to win
"first amendment parity" for broadcasters had failed in
Congress.
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So, once again, the issue of FCC discretion was
engaged only this time for news and public affair
programming rather than for political programming.
Partisans, advocates, ideologues and attorneys engaged
the issue. Both sides argued fiercely that the
legislative history and the law allowed only their view
to prevail.
The precise issue of this regulatory fight was the
1959 amendments to Section 315 of the Communications Act
and Justice White's language in Red Lion. The 1959
amendments exempted "bona fide" newscasts, news
interviews, news documentaries (with incidential
coverage of a candidate) and on-the-spot coverage of
news events from Equal Time. But Congress further
amended Section 315 with a watered-down version of an
amendment origially offered by Wisconsin Senator William
Proxmire -that these exemptions did not relieve
broadcasters from obligations to operate in the public
interest. Congress inserted language from the Fairness
Doctrine, "'to afford reasonable opportunity' for the
discussion of conflicting views on issues of public
20
importance" in the new Section 315. Based on the
legislative history of this sentence, Justice White had
ruled in Red Lion that Congress had codified the
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Fairness Doctrine as part of the amendments to Section
315a in 1959. In other words, Congress had codified the
Fairness Doctrine in 1959, so only Congress could change
it now.
A close look at the legislative history of the
1959 amendments to Equal Time devolves quickly into
competing arguments about the intent, content, and fate
of the Proxmire Amendment. In 1959, Senator Proxmire had
offered an amendment to Equal Time, which would have
codified the Fairness Doctrine as part of Equal Time.
But, the amendment never passed. The Senate passed a
version of it. The House did not. Senator Pastore, the
Chairman of the Interstate and Foreign Commerice
Committee, called the amendments "surplusage" at one
occasion and hailed it as sustaining listener
21
sovereignty at others. And, Congress finally passed
the above quoted sentence calling on broadcasters to
obey long standing public interest responsibilities and
to provide controversial news programming.
Both camps fell into line. Predictably, Fairness
Doctrine proponents argued the sentence and the
legislative history behind it proved that Congress had
codified the Fairness Doctrine, so the FCC's Notice of
Inquiry and panels were as gratuitous as they were
overreaching. Fairness Doctrine opponents made counter
arguments that Congress was far more concerned with
candidates than with news programming and access issues
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as it amended Section 315. The Lar Daly decision had
thrown Congress into a tizzy just before the 1960
elections. Congressmen and senators wanted to make sure
legally qualified candidates like themselves could get
on the television news without triggering Equal Time.
They pointed out correctly that the legislative history
makes no specific reference to the Fairness Doctrine,
and they concluded that the language of the sentence was
generally about public interest responsibilities, not
about the Fairness Doctrine.
And on the FCC's discretionary authority, that is,
on the FCC's right to substantively alter or repeal the
Fairness Doctrine vs. a more narrow regulatory scope of
implementing Congress' laws, the sides again broke down
predictably. The proponents argued, like Dingell, that
the FCC is an instrument of Congress. The opponents
noting the FCC's long history as a regulatory agency,
charged with making policy for rapidly changing
technologies, contend the FCC's leadership role on
communications regulation enabled it to do as it pleased
with the Fairness Doctrine. However, assertions by
previous FCC commissions that Congress had codified the
Fairness Doctrine, did little to strenghten their
22
arguments.
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5. Tentative Solutions
Given contention about FCC authority to
substantively alter the Fairness Doctrine, several
courses of action were suggested.
Henry Geller, the prominent communications
attorney, recommended that the FCC make the Fairness
Doctrine applicable on overall programming (i.e. not
case by case) at license renewals on under some sort of
Sullivan rubric. Such a policy might well be within the
FCC's powers without angering Congress too much. The
proposal clearly gives prejudice to broadcasters,
because under the Sullivan guidelines, broadcasters
would have to have behaved egregiously for a claimant to
wrest their license. Still, broadcasters do not support
the Geller proposal, because the threat of a license
challenge is more serious than the current case-by-case
Fairness Doctrine sanctions of modifying their news and
public affairs programming.
A second solution, advanced by Harry "Chip"
Shooshan, a Washington communications attorney who had
been cheif counsel of the House Telecommunications
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subcommittee in the late seventies, and Doug Ginsburg, a
Harvard Law profesor on leave with the Office of
Management of Budget, suggests suspension of the
Fairness Doctrine in big tv markets. This would seem to
be consistent with Justice Brennan's invitation.
However, if the FCC were to take this course of action,
it would put a double standard of fairness in place, one
for big tv markets and one for small. This course would
pose serious implementation problems for the FCC and, no
doubt, new rounds of litigation when a broadcaster or a
complainant wished to challenge the rule. The virtue of
the proposal is its litigenousness, because it would
force judicial reconsideration of the Fairness Doctrine.
A third solution, advanced by ABC, calls for repeal
of some Fairness Doctrine appendages. These include the
personal attack rule, which enables direct access to a
television station by an individual to rebut editorials
that are critical of him or her. The Cullman decision,
which enables interest groups to receive free time to
articulate their position seemed dangerous to ABC
because it placed broadcasters in the position of
subsidizing interest groups. The Zapple ruling,
requirying broadcasters to sell time to spokesmen for
candidates on the same basis as they would for
candidates also was more of a nuisance than a value from
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ABC's point of view.
In conclusion, one might observe that the world of
communications has changed considerably over the fifty-
eight years since Congress passed the Radio Act of 1927.
Technology has exploded, providing many more channels.
The remarks of the journalists that the Fairness
Doctrine can and is used to silence them have to be
taken seriously.For whatever influence the major
broadcast networks may have over that of other national
news organizations, such as the New York Times or the
Washington Post or the Gannett papers and television
stations, there is little evidence to say the networks
behaved irresponsibly. Arguments that television news,
political and public affairs programming is chilled by
its location in an advertiser-dependent, mass market
entertainment industry are similarly wanting in
discussing the Fairness Doctrine. Perhaps the Times and
the Post may be "chilled" by their dependencies on
advertising revenues, but neither has also to endure
supplemental federal regulation, such as the Fairness
Doctrine.
At this point, the wiser course lays in recognizing
the limits of both Equal Time and the Fairness Doctrine
to accomplish their avowed results. Rather than
stimulating a flow of news, political and public affairs
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programming to the public, both laws enervate it.
The historical focus of this study attempts to
show that conditions change. It was entirely one matter
to enact Equal Time when there were approximately six
hundred radio stations in the country, and is quite another
to apply it today. Television is very different in 1985
than it was in 1949, when the FCC articulated the
Fairness Doctrine. A sea change is underway in
communications. Broadcast journalists deserve the same
first amendment rights as print journalists so that
citizens can reach decisions on American political
instituions through - robust public discourse.
Beneficently intended laws, framed for an earlier time,
disserve the public now.
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noteworthy for the articulation of the Fairness
Doctrine because the FCC indentified the flow of
news and information to the public through
controversial public affairs programming with
broadcasters' public interest responsibilities as
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obligations to provide controversial public affairs
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Radio station WHKC in Colubmus, Ohio had refused to
sell time to Local 927 of the AFL-CIO to discuss
labor, racial and political issues and to solicit
memberships. WHKC also censored scripts, a routine
practice in radio broadcasting in the forties.
When Local 927 filed a complaint to revoke WHKC's
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274
local. WHKC management agreed to review program
requests individually and without discrimination.
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network. The FCC ruled that since United
Broadcasting management had agreed to balance its
news and public affairs programming and had ceased
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the public interest. The FCC ruled, therefore,
that the United Broadcasting Company could retain
its license for WHKC.
In the Sam Morris case (March, 1946), the FCC
reasserted that overall programming, including
controverial public affairs programming, was a
criteria for license renewal. Mr. Sam Morris, a
local temperance activist in Dallas, Texas asked
the FCC to revoke Dallas radio station KRLD's
275
license. Morris claimed that radio advertising for
alcoholic beverages was offensive, and he objected
to KRLD management's refusal to sell time during
peak listening hours to individuals and
organizations promoting temperance. The FCC ruled
against Mr. Morris, saying that it would not grant
standing to his petition. A single issue, such as
temperance, did not constitute sufficient grounds
to warrant a special FCC action, the FCC ruled.
Rather, the FCC would review KRLD's license on the
basis of its overall programming as it routinely
would.
The Sam Morris decision also expanded the
scope of the FCC authority over public affairs
programming due to the FCC's ruling that
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could "raise substantial issues of public
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the expression of a view protected by
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controversial public affairs programming within its
review criteria for license renewal.
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atheism, and by doing so had breached its public
interest responsibilities as trustees of the
airwaves. In a word, the FCC denied Robert Harold
Scott's individual petition for programming
advocating atheism, and upheld standards that
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33. For full list of respondents, see BC Docket Number
82-564, Report and Order, adopted Nov. 8, 1983 and
released Nov. 16, 1983.
34. Broadcasting, Feb. 1, 1985.
35. The FCC also declined the petitioners' request to
exempt documentaries from Equal Time; it preferred
instead to decide political complaints about
documentaries on a case-by-case basis. See FCC News,
Report Number 17750 concerning Docket Number 82-564,
Nov. 9, 1983.
36. In part, the D.C. Appeals Court had ruled "in
creating a broad exemption to the equal time
requirements in order to facilitate broadcast coverage
of political news, Congress knowingly faced risks of
political favoritism by broadcasters, and opted in favor
of broadcaster coverage and increased broadcaster
discretion. Rather than enumerate specific exempt and
non-exempt uses,' Congress opted in favor of
legislative generality, preferring to assign the task
to the Commission. See Chisolm v. FCC, 538 F.2d
366, (D. C. Circuit 1976).
37. Wall Street Journal, Nov. 9, 1983.
38. Broadcasting, Feb. 27, 1984.
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ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER SEVEN
1. Statement of Phyllis Schlafly, In the Matter of
Inquiry Into Section 72.1910 Of The Commission's Rules
And Regulations Concerning The General Fairness Doctrine
Obligations Of Broadcast Licensees, Docket No. 84-282,
before the Federal Communications Commission,
Washington, D.C., Feb. 7, 1984. (Here and after this
will be referred to as "Schafly Comments.")
2. Federal Register, vol. 49, no. 94, "General Docket
No. 84-282; FCC 84-140," May 14, 1984, 20317-20344.
(Here and after cited as "Notice of Inquiry".)
3. Among other cases, the FCC cited Court decisions
which held that the first amendment granted robust
freedom of speech, irrespective of the identity of the
speaker, or the persuasiveness of social undesirability
of his speech (First National Bank v. Belotti, 435 US
735(1978), Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of
Willingboro, 431 US 85(1977)). The FCC also noted that
a recent Court ruling held that the first amendment was
fundamental, absolute, unabridgeable, and that,
importantly for the Fairness Doctrine, forbade limiting
any individuals' freedom of expression in order to
enhance another's (Buckley v. Valeo, 424 US 1(1976)).
In a word, the Court currently ruled that the first
amendment is absolute, not distributive. It also noted
apparent first amendment incompatibility of two Supreme
295
Court decisions, one (Miami Herald Publishing Co.,
Division of Knight Newspapers, Inc., v. Tornillo, 418
Us 241(1973)) denying ordinary citizens access rights
to newspapers on the first amendment grounds of freedom
of the press and another (Red Lion Broadcasting Co., et
al. v. FCC et al., 395 US 367(1968)), citing freedom of
speech, that imposed citizens' access rights on
broadcasters (Notice of Inquiry).
For purposes of simplicity, the following comments
of Eric Sevaried, Charles Ferris, Esq., Reed Irvine,
David Rubin, Floyd Abrams, Doug Ginsby, and James H.
Quello are here cited as comments In the Matter of
Inquiry Into Section 73.910 Of The Commission's Rules
And Regulations Concerning The General Fairness Doctrine
Obligations Of Broadcast Licensees, Docket No. 84-282,
before the Federal Communications Commission,
Washington, D.C., Feb. 7-8, 1984. (Here and after
these comments will be referred to as "Sevaried
Comments," "Ferris Comments," "Irvine Comments,"
etc., respectively.)
4. These newer communications technologies include
cable distribution, low power television (LPTV),
multipoint distribution service (MDS), Satellite Master
Antenna System (SMATV), direct broadcast satellites
(DBS), videocassette recorders (VCR), and videotext and
teletext.
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5. Comments of Columbia Broadcasting Service, Inc., and
reply comments of Columbia Broadcasting Service, Inc.,
In the Matter of Inquiry Into Section 73.910 Of The
Commission's Rules And Regulations Concerning The
Fairness Doctrine Obligations Of Broadcast Licensees,
Docket No. 84-282, submitted to the Federal Communications
Commission, Washington, D.C., Sept. 6, 1984 and Nov. 8,
1984, respectively. (Here and after these will be
referred to as "CBS Comments" and "CBS Reply
Comments," respectively.)
6. Comments of the National Association of
Broadcasters, In the Matter of Inquiry Into Section
73.910 Of The Commission's Rules And Regulations
Concerning The General Fairness Doctrine Obligations Of
Broadcast Licensees, Docket No. 84-282, submitted to
the Federal Communications Committee, Washington,
D.C., Sept. 6, 1984, 11 (Here and after this will be
referred to as "NAB comments"); CBS Comments, 48-50;
Notice of Inquiry, 20324.
7. CBS Reply Comments, 27.
8. Two hundred twenty-seven independently owned
television stations existed in 1983, up from 77 in
1970, and 30 in 1960.
9. Broadcasting/Cablecasting Yearbook, F-31-49, 1984,
cited in CBS Comments.
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10. Comments of the National Rifle Association, In the
Matter of Inquiry Into Section 73.1910 Of The
Commission's Rules And Regulations Concerning The
General Fairness Doctrine Obligations Of The Broadcast
Licensees, Docket No. 84-282, submitted to the Federal
Communications Commission, Washington, D.C., Sept. 6,
1984. (Here and after this will be referred to as "NRA
comments."), (The INQUIRY here and after will be
referred to as The Fairness Doctrine Notice of
Inquiry). Comments of Henry Geller and Donna
Lampert, The Fairness Doctrine Notice of
Inquiry (here and after these will be referenced as
"Geller Comments"), Comments of the Media Access
Project, The Fairness Doctrine Notice of
Inquiry (here and after referred to as "MAP Comments"),
Schlafly Comments.
11. Schlafly Comments, Geller Comments, Irvine Comments,
Media Access Project Comments.
12. Cited in Statement of Erwin Griswold, press
conference, February 2, 1985. For Red Lion, see Red
Lion Broadcasting Company, Inc. v. Federal
Communications Commission, 395 US 367.
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13. Justice Douglas did not participate in this
decision, because he had not heard the arguments. In
subsequent decisions on political programming, Douglas
argued passionately against government content
regulation, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic
National Committee, 412 US 94 (1973). Justice Fortas
did not participate in the decision.
14. First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 US 735
(1978), Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of
Willingboro, 431 US 85 (1977), Buckley v. Valeo, 424 US
1 (1976), CBS Comments, NRA Comments.
15. Federal Communications Commission v. League of Women
Voters of California, Supreme Court of the United
States, No 82-912, July 2, 1984.
16. Gitlow v. New York, 268 US 652 (1925), Toledo
Newspaper Company v. United States, 247 US 402 (1918),
Paterson v. Colorado, 205 US 454 (1907), Ex Parte
Jackson, 96 US 727 (1877), Schenk v. United States, 249
US 47 (1919), Whitney v. California, 274 US 357 (1927),
Abrams v. United States, 250 US 616 (1919).
17. Brandywine Main Line v. Federal Communications
Commission, 473 F. 2nd 17, 71-72, (D. C. Circuit, 1972).
18. Broadcasting, February 18, 1985, p. 41.
19. Statement of the Honorable John D. Dingell, press
conference, February 6, 1985.
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20. Section 315 of the Communications Act of 1934, as
amended September 14, 1959, Public Law 86-274.
21. Cited in Geller Comments, MAP Comments, CBS
Comments, NAB Comments.
22. Letter To The Honorable Oren Harris In Reference To
The "Fairness Doctrine" Implementation, FCC 63-849, 40
FCC 576 (1973).
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In the Matter of Inquiry into Section 72.1910 Of the
Commission's Rules and Regulations Concerning the
General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast
Licensees, Docket No. 84-282, before the Federal
Communications Commission, Washington, DC. Comments
were submitted to the FCC by the following
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Comments of Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
Reply Comments of Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc.
Comments of National Broadcasting Company, Inc.
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Information Administration
Commemts of Henry Geller and Donna Lampert
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Comments of General Motors Corporation,
International Paper Company and Campbell-Ewald
Company
Reply Comments of the US Public Interest Group
309
Comments before the FCC were made by the following
people on February 7 and 8, 1985:
Floyd Abrams, Jerome Barron, Jeff Baumann, Lee
Bollinger, Michael Botein, Bev E. Brown, Andrew
Buchsbaum, Terry Dolan, Wallace Dunlap, Timothy
Dyk, Bruce Fein, Charles Ferris, Charles
Firestone, Doug Ginsburg, Ralph Goldberg, Reed
Irvine, Bob Johnson, Sis Kaplan, Tom
Krattenmaker, John Martin, Bill Monroe, Scott
Powe, Peter Prichard, David Raim, David Rubin,
Phyllis Schlafly, Mike Schooler, Andrew
Schwartzman, Chip Shooshan, Eric Sevareid, Steve
Simmons, Sam Simon, Craig Smith, J. Clay Smith,
Jr., John Spain, Joe Waz.
310
JOURNALS AND MAGAZINE ARTICLES
Bazelon, David L. "The first Amendment and the 'New
Media'--New Directions in Regulating
Telecommunications," 33 Federal Communications Law
Journal 2.
Bliven, Bruce. "How Radio is Remaking Our World." The
Century Magazine 108 (June 1924): 149.
Bollinger, Lee C., Jr. "Freedom of the Press and Public
Access: Toward A Theory of Partial Regulation of the
Mass Media," 75 Michigan Law Review 1 (1976).
Broadcasting, Mar. 21, 1934; Sept. 5, 1947; Mar 8, 1948;
Apr. 6, 1948; Jan. 6, 1949; Feb. 27, 1984; Feb. 1,
1985; Feb. 18, 1985.
Broadcasting/Cablecasting Yearbook, F-31-49, 1984.
Fowler, Mark S. and Daniel L. Brenner. "A Marketplace
Approach to Broadcast Regulation," 60 Texas Law
Review 1 (1960).
Garvey, Daniel E. "Secretary Hoover and the Quest for
Broadcast Regulation." Journalism History 3, (1976-
77): 128-131.
Godfrey, Donald. "The 1927 Radio Act: People and
Politics." Journalism History 4, (1977): 75-78.
Herring, E. Pendelton. "Politics and Radio Regulation."
Harvard Business Review XII (January 1935): 167-178.
311
Hoover, Herbert. "Policing the Ether." Scientific
American (Aug. 1922).
Kalvern, Harry. "Broadcasting, Public Policy and the
First Amendment." Journal of Law and Economics 10
(1967): 15-89.
MacMillan, John E. "New Voices in a Democracy."
Television Quarterly 3 (Summer, 1964).
McKerns, Joseph. "Industry Skeptics and the Radio Act of
1927." Journalism History 3, (1976-77): 128-131.
Morse, Arthur B. "Four Days at Bellagio." European
Broadcast Union Review (September 1969).
Mullahy, Donald P. "The Fairness Doctrine: Benefits and
Costs." Public Opinion Quarterly vol. 33, no. 4
(Winter 1969-1970).
Sarno, Edward F., Jr. "The National Radio Conferences,"
Journal of Broadcasting XIII, (Spring 1969).
United States News and World Report, May 21, 1943.
312
NEWSPAPERS
New York Times, May 7, 1926; Oct. 11, 17, 18, 23, 29,
1959; Nov. 3, 5, 1959; May 17, 18, 1960; Aug. 1, 10,
1960; Sept. 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 1976;
Oct. 3, 5, 8, 16, 18, 23, 1976; Feb. 16, 1980; Sept.
19, 20, 1980; Oct. 18, 1980; Nov. 9, 1984.
Wall Street Journal Nov. 9, 1983.
SPEECHES AND ADDRESSES
Statement of the Honorable John D. Dingelll, Press
Conference, Feb. 6, 1985.
Durham, Congdon B. "Broadcast News and the Fairness
Doctrine." Address to the Practicing Law Institute,
February 27, 1971.
Goodman, Julian. "The Fairness Doctrine vs. Press
Freedom." Address to 22nd Annual Convention of
American Women in Radio and TV, May 18, 1973.
Statement of Erwin Griswold, Press Conference, Feb. 6,
1985.
Minow, Newton N. "The Vast Wasteland," Address to the
National Association of Broadcasters, Washington,
DC, May 9, 1961, cited in Kahn, Documents of
American Broadcasting, 28-291.
313
Murrow, Edward R. "Wires and Lights in the Box," Address
to the Radio Television News Directors Associatin,
Chicago, IL, Oct. 15, 1958, cited in Kahn, Documents
of American Broadcasting.
Ridings, Dorothy. Remarks at a Conference held at the
Institute of Politics, John F. Kennedy School of
Goverment, Cambridge, MA, Jan. 29-31, 1982, cited in
Television and the Presidential Election: Self
Interest and the Public Interest edited by Martin
Linksy, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1983.
Sarnoff, Robert W. "An NBC View" in The Great Debates,
ed. Kraus, 59.
THESES
Curtis, Charles Grant, Jr., "Franklin D. Roosevelt and
the Commonwealth of Broadcasting," B.A. Thesis,
Harvard College, 1978.
Murray, Michael Dennis "See It Now vs. McCarthyism:
Dimensions of Documentary Persuasion," Ph.D. Diss.,
University of Missouri, 1974.
314
